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Safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) requires shutdown systems to mitigate design-basis 
accidents. Shutdown is based on measurements from in-core flux detectors. Thus, this thesis 
proposes a methodology for managing neutron-detector aging. Detector performance improvement 
for prompt fraction along with genetic algorithm optimization, risk estimation, and the fault 
semantic network (FSN) are studied.  
Detector models have been developed using circuit models to represent detector behavior 
in aged conditions. For cases with preprocessed measured data, initial conditions are set to the 
initial sample value, and an inverse of the transform is applied to reconstruct the signal at the 
detector. The model’s response is compared to the plant data to validate output. Proposed gains 
have been implemented in the model with the old gain values to compare with FUELPIN code 
predictions. A genetic algorithm has been selected to solve optimization and search problems 
where the Dynamic Signal Compensator (DSC) function is the objective function and the detector 
function is the fitness function. Two  new sets of gain constants have been used to solve the power 
ramp-up case, allowing reduction of maximum margin-to-trip (MTT) loss to 0.8%.  
 The risk model has been established in the FSN using historical data, and the risk factor 
for all channels has been identified. The initial channel table and risk prioritization map are updated 
as information becomes available. This is demonstrated in three case studies where assumed 
component failure rates were used in a qualitative/quantitative manner for risk estimation.  
 The results suggest the simulated ramp rate with the optimized DSC gain constants is 
conservative compared to actual fueling and signal oscillation rates. Further gains in detector 
prompt fraction were obtained by optimization of the amplifier gain settings through genetic 
algorithm with no adverse impact on operating margins. 
 
Keywords: neutron detector aging; degradation of detector prompt fraction; fault semantic 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
   This chapter introduces the thesis subject and motivation for research. The overall 
research goal is given along with several specific thesis objectives in support of the primary 




 Protection against ionizing radiation is an essential safety requirement for any type of 
research, development, or commercial application of nuclear energy. To ensure public safety, the 
primary objective of any utility is to demonstrate that it has a safety case that meets site licensing 
requirements regarding public dose limits under design-basis accident conditions. In Canada, NPP 
shutdown systems rely on neutron detection systems to implement this mandate. The Canadian 
fleet of power reactors, constructed in stages from 1966 to 1991, is nearing the end of its design 
life. Station measurements of detector responses to flux indicate that the detector performance is 
decreasing with time and at a significantly faster rate than earlier predicted. The investigation 
identified that degradation of the dynamic response (i.e., a prompt fraction [PF]) of in-core flux 
detectors is due to changes in the isotopic composition of the detector material from exposure to 
the core neutron and gamma flux, i.e., a function of aging.  
The current methodology for PF measurements ignores the local conditions of individual 
in-core detectors, which could cause an error in the results and lead to overestimation of the 
degradation. Thus, there is an opportunity to challenge and revalidate assumptions and approaches 
for scheduling detector replacements.  
 
In light of the above discussion, the motivation for this thesis is as follows: 
 Degradation of in-core neutron detector prompt fractions due to the effects of aging can 
adversely affect safety analysis assumptions. There is a need for a method that improves 
the effective prompt fractions (EPF) for aged detectors. A method which provides the 
option to delay detector replacement or penalties to the trip setpoints would be desirable. 
Aging detectors exhibit increased noise response and poor signal discrimination properties, 
and they are also prone to specific types of signal variations called oscillations. These 
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contributing factors must be analyzed when developing a new methodology for 
optimization of detector EPF in aged conditions. 
 
 Any new improvement method must be integrated with a risk estimation mechanism. Such 
an approach could be used as a companion tool for probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The 
main advantage, compared to PRA, is that it can address the instantaneous risk increment 
to determine whether the continuous operation of the system in a particular configuration 
is too risky or requires immediate compensatory actions. The approach would need to be 
suitable for NPP staff to make risk-informed decisions in near-real time.  
  
1.2. Research Objectives 
 The main issue pertaining to this thesis is to propose a new methodology that: 
 will improve the effective prompt fractions for aged detectors, 
 may delay the need for detector replacement or the application of penalties, 
 will not adversely affect the operational margin to trip. 
 
Accordingly, this overall goal can be translated into the following specific research objectives: 
1) Develop simulation models for aged in-core neutron detectors. The model should consider 
plant transient scenarios, detector noise and signal oscillations, encompassing: 
a) the proposal of two noise reduction techniques, namely low-pass filters (LPF) and wavelet 
transform analysis (WTA),  
b) performing data dimensionality reduction using principle component analysis (PCA), 
weighted PCA (wPCA), and nonlinear PCA (NLPCA) with artificial neural network 
(ANN) methods to reduce the model processing time. 
 
2) Improve prompt fraction for aged detectors with minimum design changes and demonstrate 
that increasing DSC amplifier gains can mitigate the effects of aging for Pt-clad detectors 
without significant intrusive modifications to the existing instrumentation.  
 
3) Optimize DSC gain settings using a proposed enhanced genetic algorithm to improve detector 
prompt fraction in aged conditions; compare the obtained results to the existing model to show 
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improvement in performance. Residual dynamic signal compensation (DSC) error has been 
selected as the primary criterion for this assessment.  
 
4) Develop a qualitatative/quantitatative risk estimation method to integrate with the proposed 
approach for estimating instantaneous risk due to detector degradation to enable risk-informed 
decisions for detector replacements. FSN methodology is used to qualitatively assess risk from 




 As discussed earlier, a reduction in prompt fraction can have an adverse impact on safety 
analysis assumptions and increase the risk to production and safety. The existing detector models 
do not account for potential complications from fueling near detectors and flux detector signal 
oscillations. This thesis helps to resolve these gaps through the following original contributions: 
 The existing detector models are enhanced to account for typical plant transients, e.g., 
fueling near a noisy, aged detector. The proposed approach is validated using real plant 
data.  
 DSC gain constants are increased to their maximum value based on current hardware 
limitations, and detector response is evaluated using actual plant data for transient cases 
while satisfying the maximum criteria for residual DSC error. The proposed approach is 
validated against a limiting criterion of impact on MTT of ≤1 percent.  
 Efficiency improvements are realized by implementing stochastic optimization, which 
involves the use of random probabilities in the iterative search for a solution. Further 
efficiencies are gained by applying approximations to the fitness test that is otherwise 
difficult to construct, too complex, and computationally prohibitive. This enhanced genetic 
algorithm is used to obtain an optimal set of the DSC gain constants while satisfying the 
same error and validation criteria.  
 A new risk management approach based on an FSN is developed and customized for use 
in the neutron detection systems to their unique aging characteristics. The approach allows 
for qualitative and quantitative instantaneous and aggregate risk estimation. The proposed 
method is validated using real plant data for two different transient scenarios, namely a 
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noisy detector and a prolonged detector signal oscillation. Additional studies on denoising 
are performed using an LPF and WTA. The two methods are compared in terms of the 
highest signal-to-noise improvement. The best-performing method is identified, and an 
option for additional future optimization is proposed.  
 Additional studies into data dimensionality reduction are performed using PCA, wPCA, 
and NLPCA with an ANN approach. The results are validated against the plant data. An 
option for future optimization of the NLPCA-ANN approach is proposed to improve 
network run time for real-time application. 
 
1.4. Publications  
Sections of this thesis, as well as other supporting work, have been published in the open 
literature in peer-reviewed journals and conference papers listed below: 
1. Emmanuel Boafo, Elnara Nasimi, Luping Zhang, Hossam A. Gabbar, “FSN-Based Co-
Simulation for Real Time Safety Verification of Nuclear Power Plants,” Mechanical 
Engineering Journal (JSME) 4, no. 2 (2017). 
2. Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “Application of Safety Instrumented System in Older 
Nuclear Power Plants,” Nuclear Engineering and Design Journal 301 (May 2016): 1–14. 
3. Emmanuel Boafo, Luping Zhang, Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “Co-Simulation for 
Real Time Safety Verification of Nuclear Power Plants,” ICONE 23 (May 2015): 17–21 
(Chiba, Japan). 
4. Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “Signal Denoising Methods for Fault Diagnosis and 
Troubleshooting at CANDU® Stations,” Nuclear Engineering and Design, Elsevier, 280 
(2014): 481–492. 
5. Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “FSN-Based Fault Modeling in Candu® Stations,” 
Journal of Annals of Nuclear Energy 65 (March 2014) 325–337. 
6. Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “Application of Principal Component Analysis for 
Diagnosis of Neutron Overpower System Oscillations in CANDU Reactors,” Journal of 
Nuclear Engineering Design 270 (April 15, 2014): 238–248. 
7. Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “Optimal Steady State Identification of Liquid Zone 




8. Elnara Nasimi, Hossam A. Gabbar, “Application of Principal Component Analysis for the 
Diagnosis of Neutron Overpower System Oscillations in CANDU Reactors,” Annual 
Conference of Canadian Nuclear Society Conference, Toronto, Canada (June 9–12, 2013). 
Please note that due to an official name change, two different surnames are used to refer to Dr. 
Hossam Gaber, e.g., Hossam Gaber and Hossam A. Gabbar.  
 
1.5. Thesis Organization 
Organization of the remainder of this thesis is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: Background information on PF and results of the conducted literature review are 
presented. In this chapter, previously published research work was considered for its 
applicability to this study.  
 
Chapter 3: The proposed methodology for mitigation of declining PFs, emphasizing the need 
to denoise plant data and reduce dimensionality before the analysis, is discussed. LPF and 
WTA methods are used to determine the most suitable alternative in terms of the resultant 
signal-to-noise ratio. Dimensionality of data is reduced with PCA and two of its derivatives, 
namely weighted PCA and nonlinear PCA. An algorithm for optimization of the gain setting 
constants is developed using a GA approach. The proposed method considers increasing trends 
in detector noise and spurious unexplained variation in detector signals. Finally, methods for 
quantifying operational risk using the FSN approach are discussed.  
 
Chapter 4: Representative case studies where detectors show poor signal discrimination 
properties, increased noise response, unexpected trips, decreasing prompt fraction, and other 
spurious behavior are provided in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 5: Selected methods are applied to the case study data, and comparisons between the 
theoretical cases and the obtained results are made. Finally, a summary of the main results of 




Chapter 6: Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of this work in relation to the research 
objectives and the obtained results. Areas for future work are identified, providing the 








Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
 This chapter summarizes previously published research work applicable to this study. In 
some cases, the listed citations present only overall knowledge developed in the academic 
community up to date. They are listed nonetheless as they aid in the identification of already 
available methods and overall trends, even if not directly used in this work. Where direct relevance 
to the current research exists or where this work directly builds upon prior research, appropriate 
citations are made. 
 
2.1. Terminology and Definitions 
Prompt Fraction: 
The intrinsic response of a detector to a neutron flux change consists of a prompt and delayed 
component and is based on the detector material. The prompt response of Inconel detectors is 
mainly due to neutron capture by 59Ni (n, γ, e) and is nominally over-prompt (i.e., overestimates 
the thermal power). The introduction of platinum cladding causes an additional gamma reaction, 
195Pt (γ, e), which reduces neutron sensitivity, and platinum-clad detectors are nominally under-
prompt (i.e., underestimate the thermal power). The fraction of the total response that occurs 
immediately is called the prompt fraction (PF).  
 
Effective Prompt Fraction: 
To provide a more accurate representation of thermal power, a dynamic signal compensator (DSC) 
was included in the design. The output signal from each detector passes through a DSC circuit, 
which applies predetermined gain factors and time constants. The output from the DSC is called 
the effective prompt fraction (EPF). The EPF values are used in the safety analysis. 
 
2.2. Calculation of Prompt Fraction  
 Prompt fractions of in-core neutron detectors at Canadian NPPs were calculated following 
the initial five-year development program at the Chalk River Laboratories [1]. It was expected that 
platinum-clad detectors’ PF would decrease from ~90 to ~85% over twenty years [2]. Subsequent 
measurements of detector responses caused confidence in predictions of detector dynamic 
response for a twenty-year service life. An additional study performed in 1985 by the industrial 
collaboration project suggests that PFs will decrease from 89 to 82 [3]. Another industry-driven 
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study done in the 1990s predicted that PFs would remain above 85% after twenty years in service 
and should not decrease below 77.4 % [4].  
 The method used in these studies consists of determining a conservative rate of degradation 
using two (2) consecutive tests performed at a two- or three-year interval during planned 
maintenance shutdowns. An average degradation rate is established to bound the slowest detector, 
with a probability of at least 95% (i.e., adding 2σ). This can be shown as the future value of the 
prompt fraction, starting from the most recent test performed at t1, and considering the previous 
test performed at to: 
 
PFi(t1 +Δt) = PFi(t1)+(μ-2σ)*Δt   [Equation 2. 1] 
 
μ(1-β)=m-tβ, n-1xs/sqrt(n)    [Equation 2. 2] 
 
where: 
 PFi(t1) – is  measured EFP of detector i at time ti; 
 t1 – is time typically associated with the most recent outage/measurement; 
 PFi(t1 +Δt) – predicted PF value for detector i at time (t1 +Δt); 
 tβ, n-1 – is the statistical student t distribution for probability β and n-1 degree of freedoms; 
 μ(1-β) – is the momentum of the statistical distribution resulting from pfi= PFi(t1)-PF(to), at 
confidence 1-β; 
 m – is the mean of the sample; 
 s – is the standard deviation of the sample set on n detector deltas; 
 σ – is the standard deviation; 
 β –the value of 90% is assumed to be adequate which can be interpreted as single sided 
probability. 
 
The resultant PFi(t1 +Δt) is then used to determine penalty factors or schedule detectors 
replacement. A penalty for an in-core detector is used to compensate for detectors that have low 
prompt fractions to maintain the same trip coverage, i.e., trip time. This can be expressed in terms 
of the margin-to-trip (MMT) as follows: 




The relationship between the (MTT) and the trip set points (TSP) can be defined as: 
 
MTT = TSP/(RP*CPPF)      [Equation 2. 4] 
 
where: 
 RP – is the reactor power. 
 
Therefore, equation 1.2 can be expressed in terms of PF’ as a function of the CPPF when the 
penalty is applied: 
PF’= (MTT’)/(MTT-1)*PF where MTT'=MTT/CPPFpenalty  [Equation 2. 5] 
 
Therefore, for RP of 90%, a nominal case with MTT=1.2 and PF=1.0485 is equivalent, i.e., same 
trip time, to a PF' of 0.812 with MTT' reduced to 1.165. Using equation 1.4, the PF' is calculated 
as 0.865. Using this approach, equation 1.3 can be used to implement a tradeoff between non-PF 
penalties applied to detector calibration and PF degradation rate. To determine the PF degradation 
at operating reactors, detector response to changing field conditions is measured during planned 
reactor shutdowns. 
 
2.3. Prompt Fraction Degradation due to Aging 
 The Canadian fleet of power reactors, constructed in stages from 1966 to 1991, is nearing 
the end of their design life. Station measurements of detector responses to flux indicate that the 
detector performance is decreasing with time and at a significantly faster rate than predicted earlier. 
The investigation identified that degradation of the dynamic response (i.e., PF) of in-core flux 
detectors is due to changes in the isotopic composition of the detector material from exposure to 
the core neutron and gamma flux—a function of aging. These changes are also often referred to as 
detector burnout. It is important to point out that the method for measuring prompt fraction 
described above results in data with a wide variance, both in the past and during more recent tests 




Figure 2. 1: Variation of PFs in Pt. Lepreau ICFDs for various shutdowns, (curtesy of Pt. 
Lepreau NPP). 
 
Figure 1.1 shows that the PF values vary between 0.81 (81%) and 0.96 (96%). However, the overall 
trend in PF degradation is increasing over time. Following tests in 2000 to 2007, eight (8) detectors 
failed with PF values below 85% and were replaced. An additional twenty-five detectors were 
determined to have low PFs and were scheduled for replacement. Detector replacements can only 
be performed during planned maintenance outages and require significant lead-in time to enable 
design work, regulatory approvals, and parts and tools to be prepared. Compensatory measures 
such as reactor power de-rates are implemented as an interim solution during preparation for 
replacements.    
 Similar issues with PF degradation due to detector aging affect other utilities in Canada. 
For example, the graph in Figure 2.2 shows an example of PF values for three (3) detectors at a 




Figure 2. 2: Example of PF degradation of three (3) detectors (designated as 2G, 1H, and 3J). 
The safety analysis limit (SAL) is shown as a purple horizontal line. The scheduled replacement 
is shown as a blue vertical line. 
 
The trend shown in Figure 1.2 indicates that the detectors 2G, 1H, and 3J are all expected to 
degrade below the safety analysis limit of 77.4% and the design limit of 65% set up by this 
operating utility. Due to the uncertainty in the assumptions used in the current PF measurement 
approach, each utility sets these criteria based on best practices for detector replacements and 
operating experience with pressurized heavy water reactors in Canada. Although not supported by 
academic research in the open literature, it is accepted as a suitable practice by the Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission and is documented in the utilities’ safety analysis. The principle used 
here is that the safety analysis is performed at limiting conditions. However, the safety limit is 
evaluated considering actual conditions implemented in specific NPP reactor unit operation. One 
can observe in Figure 1.2 that by the year 2020, the three (3) detectors shown above will no longer 
be considered fit for duty. Similarly to the case discussed earlier, this will require the detectors to 
be removed from service until the scheduled refurbishment in 2025. The resultant loss of 
redundancy in the neutron overpower protection will cause a need for compensatory actions, such 
as reactor power de-rates and other penalties.  
 Interviews with the site staff and correspondence with experts on this subject matter 
confirm a significant concern about degradation of the dynamic response of in-core neutron 
detectors due to long-term neutron irradiation as well as other failures attributed to aging. Most 
12 
 
recent assessments indicated that thirty-five in-core detectors were deemed to have values below 
the safety analysis limit of 65%. Ongoing changes in detector performance affect critical trip 
parameters for safety systems and raise new safety and licensing issues for the NPPs, which often 
results in financial losses. The current PF safety analysis limit at the NPP in question is determined 
to be 65%, and no operational margins can be utilized this time. A portion of the required 
compensatory actions to enable operation of the detectors with PFs (shown in Figure 2.1) is listed 
in Table 2.1:  
 
Table 2. 1: CPPF penalties for in-core neutron flux detectors with low EPF values. 
 
System Detector Penalty Expiry 
Shutdown System  Pt-clad 1.003 01-Feb-18 
Shutdown System Pt-clad 1.004 01-Nov-18 
Shutdown System Pt-clad 1.005 01-Jul-19 
Shutdown System Pt-clad 1.006 01-Apr-20 
 
 
The penalties shown in Table 2.1 will have to be continuously recalculated and applied until 2025, 
at which point the detector replacements can be performed, which is the only approach used by 
the industry to address PF degradation due to aging. Extensive documentation, testing, and 
regulatory approvals are required to support detector removal and replacement tasks. This type of 
maintenance is costly and involves significant radiation exposure: 
• High gamma fields in the range of REM/hr exist around the neutron detector assemblies.  
• It is expected that replacement of detectors will contribute a dose of 1 REM per person 
during a typical maintenance outage.  
Also, as discussed earlier, the current methodology for PF measurements ignores the local 
conditions of individual in-core detectors, which could introduce an error in the results and lead to 
overestimation of the degradation. 
 
2.4. Assumptions 
The following assumptions are used in this thesis: 
1. The magnitude of the detector response to fueling is based on historical observations at a 
particular NPP, namely 10% of full power (FP) plus a signal oscillation of 6%. These 
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values are NPP-specific and will differ at other utilities. The simulation models may need 
to be adjusted if used for analysis at other NPPs based on the relevant historical data. 
2. Since the exact degradation mechanism of the detector prompt fraction is not confirmed 
(as discussed in Section 1.1), it is not known which delayed component is affected as the 
detectors age. However, it is expected that the detector prompt fraction with aging can be 
simulated by adjusting the fastest delayed fraction, which will maximize the potential 
reduction in in MTT. The results of the proposed approach will be compared to the 
theoretical predictions by FUELPIN code to validate the accuracy of this assumption. 
3. The prompt fraction for aged detectors in this study will be assumed to be 0.75, or 75%, 
based on the safety analysis pertaining to this case study. The same value is applied in the 
FUELPIN code simulations used for validation of the results of this approach. The 
simulation models and FUELPIN inputs may need to be adjusted if used for analysis at 
other NPPs based on the relevant safety analysis case. 
 
The neutron detector signal is filtered by a dynamic signal compensator (DSC) to better 
approximate the power of the fuel during transient conditions as shown in Figure 2.3 below.  
 
Figure 2. 3: True power reference (magenta), in-core neutron flux detector (ICFD) output (red), 




This case shows the impact of a fuelling transient coincidental with the detector signal oscillation. 
The graph in Figure 1.3 shows that the simulated ramp rate is conservative compared to actual 
changes in reactor power due to fuelling and oscillation rates. It can also be observed that the result 
is under-prompt, as expected. However, it can be noted that there is a discrepancy between the 
actual reactor power (shown in magenta) and the detector output with the current DSC gain settings 
(shown in green). Ideally, the signal after the DSC should be compensated such that the signal 
matches the fuel power. The residual error between fuel power and compensated signal, in this 
case, is in the order of -1.64% FP.   
  
2.5.  Detector Models, Degradation and Prompt Fraction Measurements in NPPs 
 At the time when neutron detection systems were designed and installed for earlier 
generations of domestic NPPs, a complete and accurate analytical model of detectors was not 
available. The decision to proceed with Inconel and Inconel-clad detectors was made based on an 
understanding of the then-current producing mechanisms, mostly based on experimental data, such 
as those obtained during a two-year study at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories [1]. Some 
additional testing and design work were done at the Gentilly HWPR-BLW reactor, as well as 
experiments at the Argonne Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR II) described in [2].  
 The early design of neutron detectors in use in domestic nuclear power plants consisted of 
coiled coaxial cables with MgO as an insulator [1] and Inconel®600 [3] as the main core wire and 
outer sheath material. This solution is based on the work of a pioneer of detector design, as 
described in [3]. The original intent of this work was to satisfy the need for a new generation of 
sensors capable of long-term continuous operation in a reactor core. Initial detectors had slow 
responses and were used primarily for flux mapping. Subsequently, the primary objective in 
detector technology was for a faster response that can be used in larger reactors for fast control 
and safety systems [4, 5, and 6]. Detector response to both neutron and gamma, particularly to the 
delayed components, became an important consideration.  
 Additionally, the long-term impact of harsh service conditions and continuous exposure to 
radiation on detector sensitivity had to be examined. A few emitter materials were considered, e.g. 
cobalt detectors were studied in [7]. Researchers also looked at the option of zirconium detectors 
in [5], but these designs did not possess all the desired characteristics regarding sensitivity, noise 
susceptibility, and response to prompt and delayed components. Examination of detector emitter 
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materials in the hot cells at Chalk River Laboratories [8] showed that even with Inconel®600 
material, irradiation-induced embrittlement in PHWRs resulted in detector failures after only 
several years of service [8]. Even when the detector assemblies were normally maintained in an 
inert helium atmosphere, some failures occurred due to an incorrect operating environment, i.e. 
loss of the cover gas [8]. Another possible cause of low insulation resistance is deterioration of 
MgO insulation due to radiation effects [8].  
 In addition to material properties and service conditions, several other factors affecting in-
core flux detector performance have been identified. A known issue affecting early stages of 
system development was the design of Vanadium in-core flux detectors. These types of detectors 
were initially proposed for use in flux mapping routines but were determined to be unacceptably 
slow due to their inherent design features [3].  
 As detectors age, they become more sensitive to neutron activation and electronic noise, 
known as the burn-up effect [9]. The impact is manifested in the main control room as an increased 
frequency of low MTT alarms. Another aging effect is inherent to the detectors themselves. 
Detector effective PF degradation and potential mitigation methods have been studied for the past 
two decades [10, 11, and 12] to mitigate the known issue of loss of sensitivity due to detector aging 
and burn-up. The current methodology used to calculate the prompt fractions of in-core flux 
detectors is based on ion chamber rundown signals during a trip test [13, 14, and 15]. This 
methodology ignores the local conditions of individual in-core detectors, which could introduce 
an error in the results [16, 17]. The results obtained have a wide variation, which is difficult to 
explain based on current understanding of the physical process of detector long-term neutron 
irradiation [16, 17].  
 To improve uncertainties in PF values, a combined Owners Group project (COG-95-449) 
was formed, and the findings are far more credible [18]. Measured and predicted PF values for Pt-
clad ICFDs were examined and evaluated. Another approach that uses an absorber to apply a local 
flux perturbation repeatedly, on power, could be employed for a PF measurement. In 2004, an at-
power method for determining PF was presented in [18]. It is based on noise analysis and does not 
require a reactor power perturbation. Instead, it makes use of the fluctuations in neutron flux 
caused by the reactor control system (e.g., PHWR liquid zone levels, 0.25 Hz). The in-core neutron 
detectors can measure the induced neutron noise, but only the prompt component of the detectors 
can follow the fluctuations. A comparison of the measured signal to the noise source allows the 
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PF to be determined. This method is particularly attractive in practice because it has minimal 
impact on plant operation.   
  
2.6. Tools and Methods for Modeling Detector Response  
 There are two aspects to the discussion of the detector model. First, it is a physical model, 
e.g., the physical dimensions of the detector, emitter, and collector materials, source-detector 
distance, or the type of the insulation used for cable shielding. The other aspect is the detector 
behavior, or the model of the response to the neutron interaction. As discussed in section 2.1, in 
the early days of NPPs in Canada, a complete comprehensive detector model was not available. 
With the ongoing research and development, a set of safety analysis codes, which potentially could 
be used in accident analyses and parametric assessments, was established. Some of the commonly 
used codes currently include WIMS-IST and DRAGON to perform 2D and 3D lattice cell 
calculations in support of the reactor physics core equilibrium calculations, RFSP to perform 
reactor physics core equilibrium calculations for use in large break loss of coolant (LBLOCA) 
analysis, and FUELPIN and SIMBRASS codes for use in loss of reactivity control (LORC) and 
neutron overpower analysis [19]. In Canada, point kinetics models in FUELPIN code have been 
widely used to calculate the impacts of the design change on predicted reactor physics 
characteristics of the fuel and the core as a whole and to assess the loss of reactivity control. 
FUELPIN simulates point reactor kinetics given a constant rate of reactivity insertion or constant 
rate of reactor power increase [20]. It also simulates the thermal response of a fuel element and the 
response of the neutronic trips [20]. A trip parameter is considered effective in preventing fuel 
melting if it is initiated at least 1.5 seconds prior to fuel center-line melting time predicted by the 
code [19].  
WIMS-AECL, DRAGON, and RFSP codes are currently utilized in most industrial applications 
as the primary 3D transport software. The end goal of the simulations is to produce two sets of 
cross sections for the system with the control device removed and fully inserted. The cross sections 
are homogenized for the full height and depth over the inner area of the model from the center of 
the left fuel channel to the center of the right fuel channel, including the control device [19]. The 
differences in the two sets of homogenized cross sections are then computed, producing the 
incremental cross sections for the specific control devices that are required for the diffusion 
calculation. These incremental cross section values are included as an additional input in the 
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diffusion calculation to adjust the reference lattice cell cross sections appropriately account for the 
control device configuration at any one time [20]. This 3D transport solution is quite complex and 
is computationally intensive; as such, the geometry of the fuel channel and some of the control 
devices are simplified for the calculation.  
 Other work performed recently in collaboration between Lancaster University and 
Innovative Physics Ltd. in the United Kingdom focused on the comparison of CdZnTe neutron 
detector models using MCNP6 and Geant4 codes [21]. Initially, both the MCNP and Geant codes 
were developed to specialize in neutral particle models and accelerator models, respectively [21]. 
Following additional studies, there is now a greater overlap of the capabilities of the two codes so 
that MCNP can be used as a validation tool for comparative studies. 
 The MCNP suite of codes deserves a special mention in the literature review. Monte Carlo-
based tools have been extensively used in the predictions of detector response in conjunction with 
the point reactor model for the development of neutron detectors. Since the point reactor model 
fails to accurately predict detector response in common applications, the general Monte Carlo code 
was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and modified specifically to simulate the pulse 
streams that would be generated by a neutron detector and normally analyzed by a shift register 
[22]. A variant of the MCPN code, namely MCNP-Random Exponentially Distributed Neutron 
Source (MCNP-REN), along with the Time Analysis Program, predicts neutron detector response 
without using the point reactor model, making it unnecessary for the user to decide whether or not 
the assumptions of the point model are met for the application. The work described in [22] 
demonstrate that MCNP-REN is capable of simulating standard neutron coincidence counting as 
well as neutron multiplicity counting [22]; its applications can also be used for other detector 
design tasks. Findings of this work show that the method used in MCNP-REN is fundamentally 
sound and can eliminate the need to use the point model for detector performance predictions. 
 Results of neutron detector efficiency modeling for several detector designs have been 
collected and studied, as shown in [23]. The focus of this analysis was on the incident neutron 
spectra, detector efficiency, and count rate at the detector location [23]. Functional dependence on 
the source-detector distance, experimentally observed in 2014, was compared to MCNP/MCNPX 
simulation data [23]. 
 The efforts to develop a simulation model of the detector dynamic response have continued 
to the present day. A unified framework for modeling slow-response, self-powered neutron 
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detectors with discrete-time state-space representation for Vanadium and Rhodium emitters is 
described in [24]. As discussed in section 2.1, these slow-response detectors are typically used for 
flux mapping. To be useful for trip protection in safety systems, the signals must be augmented 
with time compensation to counteract the delay due to beta decay. A majority of these 
compensation techniques are based on Laplace and z-transformations, which inevitably requires 
some kind of approximation to map from s-domain to z-domain. The authors argue that the 
prevailing approaches are neither straightforward nor accurate due to complex manipulations of 
representations in different domains. Moreover, the reported methods are generally developed in 
a case-by-case fashion, without addressing the issue with a generalized approach that applies to all 
kinds of slow-response in-core detectors. The approach proposed in [24] is a derived discrete-time 
state-space model, which readily facilitates application of state-of-the-art signal processing 
algorithms such as Kalman filtering.  
 Development of 3D neutronic kinetic models and control for the control system of PHWR 
is carried out in [25], using a modal synthesis method. The reactor space-time-dependent neutron 
flux is synthesized by a time-weighted series of precalculated neutron flux modes, which are 
Eigen-functions of the governing neutron diffusion equation at reference steady-state operating 
conditions. The performance of the developed 3D model is compared with that of a traditional 
coupled point kinetic model in a closed-loop environment of a reactor regulating system (RRS). 
The 3D reactor model is implemented by a MATLAB/Simulink software environment, and the 
accuracy is validated against actual plant measurements under transient conditions.  
 A semi-empirical dynamic model, devoted to simulation of the Inconel lead cables in 
Ontario Power Generation’s Darlington Nuclear Generation Station and able to simulate the lead 
cables’ response to arbitrary neutron-flux transients, was developed in 2013 and is described in 
[26]. This model was developed using a MATLAB/Simulink toolbox, where the model’s 
parameters were obtained by fitting simulation results to measured lead-cable signals acquired 
during reactor shutdown. The functionality of the Simulink model was demonstrated for arbitrary 
neutron flux transients, and simulation results were found to agree within 1.2% with measurements 
for reactor trip transients [26]. Although some discrepancies were identified, further investigation 
of the observed differences was not performed at the time.  
 Further review of published research, not shown here, shows that the MATLAB/Simulink 
package provides a flexible environment for solution of the time-differential or integral problems. 
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A variety of numerical time-integration algorithms in Simulink allows for obtaining results for the 
transient analysis without developing routines for each case. Instead, the space-time coupled 
problem can be converted into space-dependent only, where the MATLAB/Simulink tools are used 
to solve the time-only-dependent problem.  
 Furthermore, the MATLAB/Simulink environment has been widely used for simulation of 
dynamic systems both in and outside the nuclear industry. This simulation tool was chosen for the 
current study. To predict the transient reactor fuel power, a FUELPIN code will be used. This code 
incorporates a neutron point kinetics model and can, therefore, be used to simulate the effects of 
reactivity changes due to burnup. Although MCNP is a well-developed, state-of-the art transport 
code, used globally for radiation-transport or reactor physics calculations, it is unable to perform 
burnup calculations, so to assess burnup-dependent power distributions, additional codes are 
required. The output of the FUELPIN code is used in this thesis to validate the MATLAB/Simulink 
results to demonstrate that the proposed design change has minimal impact on the reactor physics 
aspects of the various reactor power transients and therefore has minimal impact on the timing of 
neutronic trips credited during the transient analysis. 
 
2.7. Noise Reduction and Data Preprocessing Methods  
 Noise in process signals is not just unwanted disturbance affecting system performance. It 
also negatively affects the ability to analyze plant transients by masking true process deviations or 
corrupting useful data signals. Despite recent advances in hardware and instrumentation 
technology, various forms of noise still affect signal readings and make fault detection challenging.  
 Application of various denoising techniques based on statistical methods has been 
proposed for source separation in industrial data at Électricité de France power plants with the 
objective to separate vibration modes [27] and reduce the flattening noise using a two-order 
statistical algorithm.  
 Various types of filters are commonly used for recovery of objects from noisy and 
incomplete signals as well as for data denoising. Typical filters assign coefficients corresponding 
to specific details of process data so that dimensionality of data sets can be reduced by omitting 
some data points without negatively affecting the overall trends in the process [28]. A similar 
method is proposed where all coefficients are evaluated against a particular threshold and are set 
to zero if they are not significant enough [29]. Standard and median nonlinear filters are a common 
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technology used for resolution of Gaussian noise. While they smooth the data well and remove 
noise, they do so at the expense of losing high-frequency details and are best suited to work with 
data that is heavily contaminated with spikes [30] rather than low-energy noise dispersed 
throughout the data.  
 Application of traditional digital filters, matched filters, discreet wavelet transforms, and 
the second-generation wavelet transforms was proposed for denoising the measurement of 
insulation conditions in power plants [31]. Similarly, application of the Kalman filter as a 
denoising technique was proposed for noise-contaminated data in air preheater systems and 
performed well, but only white noise was involved in the computation [32].  
 Time domain averaging methods, such as time synchronize averaging (TSA), and fast 
Fourier transform (FFT) techniques, have been proposed to mediate the effects of background 
noise [33, 34, and 35] in rotating equipment affected by vibration. By using an FFT, the vibration 
signal amplitude, which is a function of time, can be represented by the amount of signal 
information at different frequencies. A similar method was proposed for reducing random noise in 
hydroelectric generator control systems [36]. The generator response [36], particularly its dynamic 
response, was simulated using a time-averaging algorithm [36], which was applied under 
disturbance conditions. In this study, it was necessary to minimize noise disturbances during the 
process of data collection. The proposed methodology was extended so that outlying data points 
could be ignored while calculating the average responses. Use of the FFT method was also 
considered for identification of the dynamic response time of a nuclear plant pressure transmitter 
[37] to detect sensing line blockages. The limitation of all these methods is the loss of important 
information present in the signal, requiring a tradeoff between noise-filtering capabilities and 
quality of results. 
 Time domain filtering is a method that has been proposed for tuning filters to avoid the 
averaging process [38, 39]. Although the results appear to be much improved, this method has the 
drawback of increased computation time and therefore does not appear suitable for real-time fault 
diagnostic applications at present.  
 The fuzzy sensor validation and fusion (FUSVAF) [40] algorithm uses nonlinear dynamic 
validation curves and a weighted average aggregation. This algorithm was proposed for removal 
of noise and sensor failure data from measurements in a gas turbine at power plants. In this study, 
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a nonlinear system was subject to both noise and outliers. Different types of noise were considered, 
including non-Gaussian noise.  
 A similar approach was used for analysis of temperature signals from the Experimental 
Breeder Reactor II [41]. The upper plenum of the reactor is investigated during a startup from 0% 
to 100% full power [41]. This method compares features from redundant and related signals. 
Research shows that it is possible to determine whether the noise is the consequence of an 
equipment anomaly or a process abnormality [41]. This work suggests that a similar technique can 
have wide applicability across other plant systems and applications, e.g. monitoring of instrument 
calibration.  
 A feed-forward multilayer artificial neural network (ANN)-based approach has been 
proposed to model nonlinear systems and was tested for two target applications in reactor power 
level monitoring using system output data at various operating points [42]. In one case the 
instantaneous position of the control rod, reactor power, and rod drop distance were input to the 
neural network [42], while the resulting instantaneous power was the output. A similar approach 
was used for modeling the behavior of the control system AC servo motor position to predict the 
instantaneous rod position. The results suggest that the multilayer feed-forward, ANN approach 
can be successfully used to represent a system’s original nonlinear behavior [42]. 
 Data denoising using wavelet analysis is a novel technique for improving data quality and 
reliability. Wavelets are functions that can be described by certain mathematical parameters and 
can be used for representing data or other functions. Wavelet analysis methods have not been 
widely applied in process industries where discretely sampled time-series data needs to be 
analyzed [43, 44, 45, and 46]. Application of wavelet transform technique has been proposed for 
denoising generator output data [47]. A multilevel 1-D wavelet in level-5 decomposition was used 
in this experiment and proved useful for minimizing fluctuation of the data. A fault detection 
method based on wavelet denoising and Scholkopf’s kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) 
method [48] was proposed for application in chemical industry for denoising data and removing 
disturbances. When applied to the Tennessee Eastman (TE) process, it proved superior in fault 
detection. Wavelet domain Hidden Markov Tree (HMT) was recently proposed for use at smaller 
power plants in China [49] to denoise the flame image of boilers so that boiler characteristics, such 
as combustion rate and flame temperature, can be optimized. This method proved very successful 
for white Gaussian noise and performed better than other denoising techniques.  
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 Signal decomposition using wavelet methods for the purpose of eliminating drafting noise 
was studied for the in-service eddy current inspection of steam generators [50], where recognition 
of a defect in the obtained image heavily depends on the separation of mixed signals and removal 
of wobbling noise. This study produced satisfactory extraction and classification results for all 
measured signals.  
 Application of wavelet analysis in power system disturbance modeling was described in 
[51], where wavelets were used to model a variety of power system transients, which can be used 
for developing a fault classification method. Another application of wavelet transform analysis is 
troubleshooting voltage variations in power systems [52], where it was demonstrated to be useful 
for classifying power system failures. Minimizing the effect of randomness in the reactor power 
transient data by using different classes of smoothing was investigated in feed-water control of a 
large pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) [53, 54].  
 The use of various denoising methods for troubleshooting in-core neutron detection 
systems at nuclear power plants was discussed by the current author in [55]. This work examined 
the development of an intelligent digital filter methodology based on low pass filters and a wavelet 
transform approach.  
 
2.8. Dimensionality Reduction with Multivariate Techniques/Principle Component 
Analysis 
 Principle component analysis (PCA) is one of the oldest and most versatile methods of 
multivariate analysis (MVA). Many applications of multivariate techniques have been made in the 
behavioral and biological sciences [56, 57, 58, 59, and 60], but they have also been used in other 
applications, e.g., in the pharmaceutical industry for tablet development and manufacturing [61]. 
It is commonly used in various industries for dimensionality reduction for detecting and diagnosing 
faults [62, 63, and 64]. MVA methods have been proposed for application in industrial, chemical, 
and water treatment processes [65, 66, 67, and 68] and will be considered for this study.  
 The use of PCA methods for analysis of transients in neutron detection systems was 
discussed by the current author in 2014 [69]. This work studied the development of an intelligent 
troubleshooting methodology for NPPs that required dimensionality reduction of process data 
using intelligent PCA and weighted PCA algorithms. A similar approach was proposed by another 
research group in 2015, where the methodology of PCA is utilized to construct the mathematical 
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models among various in-core flux detectors [70]. The proposed fault detection approach is 
validated with four types of simulated detector faults and the results are positive; however, only 
simulation data was used in this study.  
 
2.9. Optimization Methods and Algorithms 
In general, optimization involves finding an alternative with the most cost-effective or best 
achievable performance, which is typically accomplished by maximizing desired factors and 
minimizing undesired ones under the given constraints. In the nuclear industry, the ongoing desire 
to improve power plant performance and safety records is one of the drivers for optimizing plant 
efficiency through development and application of innovative tools. Methods for mathematical 
modeling and optimization of NPPs were proposed as early as 1975 [71, 72].  
In 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established a technical working 
group on life management of NPPs [73]. This group is tasked with the managerial and engineering 
aspects of NPP maintenance, particularly with its optimization process for condition monitoring 
and maintenance strategies [73]. In its 2003 report, the IAEA defined the objective of the 
optimization of NPPs as a systematic improvement in the overall performance and competitiveness 
of NPPs while preserving and enhancing safety through the application of technological and 
engineering best practices [73]. This report established the foundation for the optimization 
methodologies that have since been proposed for the nuclear industry. 
In the 2010 study, a combined simulation-optimization tool was developed and used to 
optimize the secondary loop of an HWPR NPP (in Gentilly-2 nuclear station) [74]. The simulation 
package was used to estimate the behavior of the power plant and to allow the best tradeoff for the 
operating conditions [74]. The results showed that there is an opportunity to improve the overall 
performance of the power station. 
A novel method for optimization of the maintenance activities in the NPP while 
considering the plant safety is developed in [75]. The objective function of the optimization is the 
mean value of the selected risk measure, which is assessed from the minimal cut sets identified in 
the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) [75]. The proposed method is applied to the PSA model 
of a safety system to show that optimization of maintenance decreases the risk and improves the 
plant safety [75]. 
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Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a population-based stochastic optimization technique 
first proposed in 1995 [76] for improvement of nonlinear functions. Instead of using genetic 
operators, the individuals in each population pool are “evolved” by cooperation and competition 
among the individuals themselves through generations [76]. A new parameter, called inertia 
weight, is introduced into the original particle swarm. Based on this approach, an algorithm has 
been developed to optimize the fuel core loading pattern in a typical light water-cooled reactor 
[76]. The proposed algorithm presents a simple social model, while a modified version of the 
algorithm for discrete variables has been developed and implemented successfully for the multi-
objective optimization of fuel-loading pattern design with constraints [76]. The simulation results 
suggest that the proposed methodology can help in the acquisition of a new pattern without 
contravention of the limitations [77]. 
Monte Carlo neutron transport codes have been applied for reactor analysis where large-
scale neutron transport simulations require large-scale computations. An example of this approach 
was demonstrated in [78], where the researchers implemented and tested several algorithms using 
a simple Monte Carlo communication kernel intended to mimic the behavior of the full Monte 
Carlo code [78]. A quantitative evaluation method for the maintenance plan for NPPs based on 
scientific approach was then proposed. The computer simulation of maintenance planning for 
boiling water reactor (BWR) systems was carried out and showed that the proposed method can 
produce a new maintenance plan that meets the conservation targets corresponding to maximum 
support [78]. 
A new hybrid mutation in the GA was proposed in [79] for designing the loading pattern 
(LP) in pressurized water reactors. A GA and crossover techniques were used to optimize an 
objective function in this study. The flattening of power inside a reactor core was chosen as an 
objective function, and the results showed a significant improvement [79]. 
In general, the literature review suggests that optimization provides greater flexibility 
concerning specifying additional design requirements while maintaining compliance with the 
predetermined set of constraints. Thus, optimization algorithms could provide the benefit of tuning 




2.10.  Risk Estimation and Mapping to Operational Decision Making 
 Concerns about depletion of nonrenewable natural resources, carbon emissions, and 
environmental and societal impacts of dependency on fossil fuels were important factors in the 
initiation of the nuclear program in the United States in the mid-1960s and in Europe in the mid-
1970s. To progress to large-scale nuclear energy production worldwide, the introduction of NPPs 
required that safety analysis, risk assessment, and safety barriers be evaluated for all potential 
hazards associated with atomic energy. The Event Tree Analysis (ETA) method was proposed 
circa 1974 by a committee of specialists under Professor Norman Rasmussen to estimate the 
radiological consequences and the probability of occurrence of events that might arise during a 
serious accident. In this work, known as WASH-1400 report [80], a probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) approach was used for a large, light water reactor. Although, with time, the initial findings 
of the WASH-1400 were much debated [81], the PRA approach became widely adapted in the 
nuclear industry and Fault Tree (FTA) and Event Tree (ETA) Analysis techniques became standard 
tools used by risk assessment professionals in the nuclear industry.   
 The approach used in ETA and FTA is basically the same and is based on analysis of 
possible causes for any top event or combination of causes and their propagation [82]. The two 
approaches involve the use of graph techniques called event trees and fault trees. This, in turn, 
requires identification of all potential hazards and a thorough understanding of the plant design, 
operation, maintenance, and testing. Furthermore, the ability to translate that understanding into a 
model of the plant that captures the logic of the possible sequences of events is critically important 
[83]. The complexity and tight coupling of nuclear plant processes make it imperative that the 
search for accident sequences be conducted in a systematic and structured manner. This logic 
development can be conducted in either an inductive or a deductive manner, or both.  
 The inductive method starts with a given initiating event, usually a plant malfunction. Then 
all the ways in which that malfunction can progress are traced until an end state. The outcome of 
the end-state failure is determined based on consequences such as economic factors, public health, 
or equipment damage. The deductive method, on the other hand, first postulates the existence of 
the end state of concern and then, step by step, establishes the various ways in which that end state 
can occur.  
 Both ETA and FTA methods have been successfully used in the nuclear power industry for 
risk assessment applications. However, these methods are not particularly suitable for real-time 
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operational support. The processes of collection of fault data, fault typing, and model updates are 
time-consuming and resource-intensive. It is understood that plant-specific data should be selected 
over a sufficient time period to provide statistically meaningful results. Therefore, there is typically 
a year of delay between the in-use models based on historical values and the current real-time 
system failure data. Once all the fault data is collected for a year, the probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) database needs to be updated. The Bayesian methodology is used to incorporate the plant-
specific observed failures with generic failure rates. The applicable models (unavailability/risk) 
are evaluated after the failure rate update. The analyst must solve the applicable unavailability and 
risk models with the updated PRA database. The new frequency for the risk models and predicted 
future unavailability (PFU) values, i.e., the probability that at a future time a system will be found 
in a state in which component faults prevent it from operating with acceptable effectiveness, are 
determined. The PFU and frequency are compared with previous baseline, targets, and limits and 
compared with the most up-to-date unavailability targets. It is not uncommon that when a decision 
is made to revise the failure rates in the PRA model with plant-specific data, the overall probability 
numbers change (increase or decrease), sometimes in a statistically significant way, indicative of 
the current plant performance. A significant failure rate change analysis is typically performed 
annually, following the PRA updates. The present year’s mean failure rate for a certain group and 
failure mode is compared to the previous year’s failure rate fifth percentile and ninety-fifth 
percentiles. If the present year’s failure rate is greater than the previous year’s ninety-fifth 
percentile, then the failure rate change is considered a statistically significant failure rate increase, 
thus challenging the system unavailability assumptions and decision-making process.  
 Another approach for fault identification and analysis is based on statistical methods such 
as in [84, 85]. The presence of a fault is determined by comparing the current status of the system 
with the predefined state, and the solution is narrowed down to the fault detection and identification 
(FDI) with no forecast capabilities [86], particularly for the future system upsets [87], i.e., fault 
prediction. Methodologies based on rule-based methods [88], decision trees, or Bayesian networks 
[89] have been proposed. The approach involves the establishment of correlations between 
previous events and fatal events to predict potential failures in the future [90, 91, 92, 93, and 94]. 
One of the main limitations of these methods is the practical difficulty of managing a large number 
of variables, and relationships among them, especially in high-dimensionality datasets. Therefore, 
it is often required to apply sophisticated mathematical techniques to relatively simple knowledge 
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structures to reduce the dimensionality of data and efficiently establish correlations between 
defined behaviors. This equation-based approach has been criticized on theoretical as well as on 
empirical grounds [95]. 
 A significant amount of research effort is directed toward developing and implementing 
intelligent automated tools based on various pattern-recognition schemes, knowledge-based 
systems, or artificial neural network systems. Solutions based on intelligent computational 
methods, such as GAs, Fuzzy Logic (FL), and Artificial Neural Network (ANN), have been 
developed for various industries, such as automotive [96], geophysical [97], and intelligent online 
performance monitoring of electronic circuits and systems [98]. Such applications are also widely 
considered in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, mathematics, and 
physics [99, 100, and 101]. These methods gained popularity with many professionals as an 
alternative to the modeling of some physical and nonphysical systems. This approach can be based 
on a scientific or mathematical foundation. Power production industries have also looked into the 
applicability of these methods for fault detection in power plant instrumentation [102] to assess 
system status and the possible need for component maintenance. Similar solutions based on FL 
techniques have been proposed for solar thermal power plants [103, 104]. The application of 
similar techniques in nuclear steam generator level control is described in [105, 106, and 107]. It 
has been proposed for groundwater pumping at a coal-fired unit [108], a hybrid fuel cell-gas 
turbine facility [109], and a combined cycle power plant [110, 111]. 
 Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is a technique often used to analyze 
the consequences of a failure within a complex system and the severity of those consequences and 
is somewhat related to the Bayesian approach for diagnostic of the system status. Unlike the 
FMECA, Bayesian networks can be tuned to model the relationships between components of a 
complex system and estimate their probabilities of failure with time. This approach is 
fundamentally different from the PRA system unavailability models when used for calculations of 
operational reliability and making risk-informed decisions for maintenance. One of the limitations 
of the current PRA methods is due to the assumption that the probabilities of all failure modes of 
a particular component remain the same during the calendar year. The models are recalculated 
only after the failure data is collected for the entire year. Bayesian-based methods can be used to 
reason forward and backward, work with missing data, and extend to include decisions made. For 
the purpose of this thesis study, comparison of system unavailability statistics based on the 
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assumed component failure rates and actual real-time component failure rates is critical for risk-
informed and cost-effective safety-driven decisions. Therefore, a companion tool to the PRA 
methods is needed to enable risk estimation, both qualitatively and quantitatively, for the 
instantaneous status and risk assessment of the fast, dynamically changing neutron detection 
systems, particularly when affected by aging.  
 
2.11. Fault Semantic Networks (FSN) for Qualitative/Quantitative Risk Estimation 
 
2.11.1. Fault Semantic Network Overview 
 The work that laid the initial steps for the concept of an integrated FSN methodology 
started with a practical experiment conducted at Okayama University, Japan, in 2009 [112, 113, 
and 114]. In this work, it was proposed to analyze and forecast faults based on monitoring of a 
large set of process variables in a large, complex chemical control system. The experimental plant 
consisted of tanks, pumps, sensors, alarms, control valves, and manipulated valves. The measuring 
equipment consisted of sensors measuring temperature, pressure, and vibration levels at different 
locations in the plant, and alarms were set on the limits of process variables (PVs), e.g., water level 
in the tank [114]. The proposed model applied subset modeling strategy and Bayesian approaches 
(the Restricted Vector Auto-Regressive Model [RVAR] and Bayesian Vector Auto-Regression 
[BVAR]) to decrease dimensionality of the process variables and determine the suitability of fit 
over the forecasting interval. The results were compared to an unrestricted Vector Auto-Regression 
(VAR) model for each variable in each equation. For short forecasting intervals, RVAR provides 
better performance than BVAR, but this changes if applied over longer test intervals, where BVAR 
performs better.  
 The main advantages of the proposed approach for fault forecasting were its ability to work 
offline, the flexibility of setting the runtime, and the ability to estimate faults accurately. Both 
RVAR and BVAR algorithms performed well compared to the other approaches in their ability to 
forecast faults before they occur, not simply detect faults after the fact.  
 This work also highlighted the problem with over-parameterization and the need for 
parameter reduction to improve the forecasting performance. Application of sophisticated 
mathematics for this purpose may not be ideal due to restriction on the type of inputs, and a 
different approach based on modern computing methods is suggested to take advantage of the 
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simplicity of individual relationships within the data. This work also suggested that a proposed 
fault forecasting system (FFS) should be linked with an intelligent fault knowledge base where 
mitigating barriers and actions can be stored so that the users of this system can get immediate 
support during early stages of fault development. 
 
2.11.2. Development of FSN Knowledge Base 
   Development of a knowledge base and acquisition system for failure and accident analysis 
was explored for applications at gas processing facilities [115], particularly at liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) plants. In this work, accident models are structured using FSN and are linked with lessons 
and controls to assist during design and operation phases due to the presence of known hazards 
such as fire, explosions, and health and environmental impacts. In addition to exploring knowledge 
base design, this work examined the associated accident risk estimates. Deviations are modeled 
using a qualitative approach, i.e., parameter behavior is described by terms such as “high” or 
“low.” For example, a high temperature is modeled as an association of process variable = 
“temperature,” and deviation is “high.”  
  Next, faults are defined in the generic form and associated with all possible causes and 
consequences. A fault model is related to plant equipment, which is associated with a unique 
equipment tag or ID. The user can further tune and enhance the fault models for the equipment 
class. Next, a causation model is formulated from the cause or causes of the final accident, as 
suggested by the authors. This work proposes to collect accident data for each equipment class. 
Next, causes, consequences, and the fault locations are assigned using this system.  
 Development of the knowledge base and acquisition system for failure and accident 
analysis is described in [116] for gas processing facilities. The authors suggest that risks can be 
calculated for each fault propagation model and aggregated for each piece of equipment, process, 
and scenario. The systematic analysis of a knowledge base and acquisition system to support the 
analysis of faults and accidents for gas plants was the main contribution of this study. The 
researchers did not provide any comparative studies on how this approach compares to alternative 
existing or experimental methods. 
 A similar approach was investigated by the author in [117], where a methodology for a 
new intelligent and highly automated hierarchical control chart (HCC) approach was proposed. 
The main objective of this study was to develop an operations mapping solution that provides 
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control system designers, developers, and operators with a single view of all elements and systems 
[117]. The HCC approach is designed with integrated interactive data access and information 
retrieval capabilities to enable faster fault diagnostics [117].  
 
2.11.3. Qualitative Hazard Analysis Technique Based on FSN Methodology 
 Another application of FSN for LNGs was explored in [118] with the main focus on 
developing a qualitative hazard analysis technique. In this work, the authors proposed to use 
historical accidents at LNG facilities to establish accident propagation steps and to link those with 
related process variables.  
 The main objective was to propose an algorithm for early identification of process failures 
that can be used to support plant operation in real time. In this resultant study [119, 120], an FSN 
is designed with causes, while faults and consequences are modeled as network nodes. The 
accidents are treated as a sequence of events. The proposed approach suggests that prediction of 
accidents can be achieved by integrating related state variables (SVs), i.e., process data, and 
possible deviations and failure modes with process models. All PVs are assumed to be in several 
predefined states described using qualitative values, e.g., “N” for normal, “L” for low, or “H” for 
high, as given in [120]. Next, the PV state is compared with each accident fault model to decide 
whether the accident is likely to occur and to map it to the closest accident scenario. This approach 
was demonstrated in the case study of an unknown accident in the flush drum process. This work, 
however, did not give statistics on how this approach compares to other popular fault and accident 
prediction techniques. 
  
2.11.4. Use of FSN with Genetic Programming for Batch Process Analysis 
 The application of the FSN for the Tennessee Eastman (TE) process, introduced by Downs 
and Vogel in early 1990 [121], was proposed in conjunction with genetic programming for 
chemical and other industrial processes that use hazardous and flammable materials in [122, 123]. 
FSN describes relationships between variables using directed graphs, where causes, faults, and 
consequences are shown as nodes in the network connected by directed links according to the 
predefined rules. However, there are many cases where uncovering relationships and patterns 
between process variables may be challenging. This condition may have a detrimental effect on 
the ability of FSN to find the cause or causes of the disturbance and their accurate mapping to 
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consequences. The focus of this work was on suggesting the optimal method of uncovering 
relationships between process variables that would be involved in the FSN analysis. 
 In the subsequent work presented in [124, 125, 126], it was proposed that many different 
approaches can be used to qualitatively and quantitatively describe these relationships, e.g., a 
probabilistic approach, FL, or mathematical formulations. The authors explored the applicability 
of genetic programming algorithms for this purpose using the TE process as a case study. Tuning 
of FSN performance for the TE process is expected to improve the overall approach to 
implementing automated hazard identification algorithms. 
 
2.11.5. Industrial Applications of FSN  
 Application of the FSN as an integrated approach was proposed as a novel technique for 
modeling fault, failures, hazards, and accident models at LNG plants [119]. Similar to chemical 
and batch production plants, LNG facilities are prone to faults and failures and have hazards that 
could potentially develop into accident scenarios if left unmitigated [119]. Fault development and 
fault scenario analysis was the main topic of the work where FSN design was discussed.  
 Development of FSN starts with an analysis of plant structure, behavior, operation, control, 
and functions, where all plant equipment is described in a hierarchical manner, i.e., all equipment 
is arranged into a set of parent-child classes. Selection of classes is based on the equipment 
function, components, and related process variables. For example, the “pump” class is treated as a 
parent class that may include various child classes, e.g. “centrifugal pump.” Faults are treated as a 
combination of a normal process variable (PV) behavior and unwanted deviation. All PVs are 
identified and linked to the associated potential fault or failure propagation scenario.  
 Next, causational models are built for the associations between process equipment PVs and 
information about hazards, faults, and failures from previous accidents and maintenance data. 
Thus, the static layer of FSN is based on known historical data. Next, dynamic FSN is constructed 
using real-time process data and can be updated as new fault data become available. The authors 
argue that this method can be further used to estimate safety measures for each operational step 
since a process model validated with process conditions allows accurate risk estimation for 
different accident scenarios [124, 125, and 126]. The main advantage of this approach is that it 
allows integration among various scenarios in multiple fault propagation models and includes 
degradation and process condition information. Integration among these scenarios in a qualitative 
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and quantitative manner provides an additional advantage where risk-informed decisions need to 
be made both during design and operational phases. This work, however, did not give statistics on 
how this approach compares to other popular fault and accident prediction techniques performed 
on a specific case study.  
 
2.11.6. FSN Methods for Transient Analysis in Neutron Detection Systems 
 The use of FSN methods for troubleshooting neutron detection systems was discussed by 
the author in [127]. This work analyzed the development of intelligent troubleshooting 
methodology for NPPs based on an FSN with risk estimation. The underlying Bayesian network 
is used to continually recalculate the real-time system risk status. It enables the user to define very 
complex workflows where hundreds of potential parameters can be analyzed and compared. The 
incoming information is inserted as evidence into the Bayesian network and results in dynamic 
updates to the knowledge base.  
In this thesis, a similar approach is applied. The FSN network is constructed as a dynamic, self-
adapting decision tree that keeps learning over time. This is unlike the traditional decision trees, 
which are static structures that don’t adapt to the situation and learn over time. Similar to the earlier 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter describes methodology proposed in this thesis. First, the approach looks at 
validation of the maximum amplifier gain increase based on the existing hardware limitations. 
Subsequently, optimization of gain settings using an enhanced GA is proposed. Finally, a risk-
estimation tool based on the FSN is developed to assess the risk and mitigate detector aging effects 
without adversely affecting the operational MTT. All proposed methods are demonstrated using 
plant data collected using a plant information (PI) system at an NPP. The scope and overview of 
this approach are both shown below in Figure 3.1 and are described below for each step.  
 
Figure 3.1: Research methodology in this thesis. 
 
Step 1: This thesis starts with the analysis of an existing detector model, followed by a new model 
extension for validation purposes. Detectors and their components are presented both as 
mathematical models and control circuits. First, the existing detector model is studied and 
analyzed. This step is required to develop understanding of the detector behavior and to determine 
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whether the existing detector model is suitable for accurately showing degradation due to aging, 
specifically fueling near high-response detectors, signal oscillations, and ramp-up after a 
prolonged outage.  
 Additionally, this step allows the development of familiarity with the hardware 
implementation of the dynamic signal compensation (DSC) module. This step is important to 
determine the limitations of the current hardware components and to evaluate the magnitude and 
the impact of possible changes to the DSC design. For example, assuming that the overall DSC 
drift impacts each individual parameter (i.e. K1, K2, and K3) as a percentage based on the gain 
value, it is necessary to evaluate the impact on instrument uncertainty calculation, e.g., drift, setting 
tolerance, temperature effect, etc. The analysis of the existing detector model was also important 
to confirm in that the time constants are not adjustable, and therefore cannot be calibrated with the 
current design. Finally, a proposed methodology for new model development with optimization of 
the transient conditions is discussed, and an example of the new detector model is shown.  
 
Step 2: A detector model that accounts for aging is set up in Simulink and customized for three 
transient scenarios that are common at the NPP, namely, noisy detector signals, signal oscillations 
during normal operation, and a full power ramp-up. Plant data is acquired at this step to be used in 
the analysis. The detector signals appeared to be contaminated with random noise spikes, both 
positive and negative, lasting for very brief time intervals. Low-pass filters (LPF) and wavelet 
analysis transform (WTA) methods were explored for the purpose of denoising and smoothing the 
data. Based on the performance comparison, the best method was selected and used.  
 Next, methods for dimensionality reduction of plant data were explored. Dimensionality 
reduction is considered an important step for systems where multiple, fast-changing process 
variables must be analyzed simultaneously to establish the main contributing factors to system 
faults. It is necessary to identify the initiating cause of process variation to establish a mapping 
between the affected equipment and PVs. PCA is used in this thesis for identification of variables 
of particular interest. Weighted PCA (wPCA) is used without modifications to improve the 
robustness of the algorithm. Feature extraction for fault identification and reconstruction is 
investigated at this stage. The PCA and wPCA algorithms used for dimensionality reduction are 
modified to work with nonlinear data, particularly due to liquid zone (LZ) control valve challenges, 
to support real plant processes where the linearity of data is not known in advance. Feature 
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reconstruction was performed using nonlinear PCA with the auto-associative neural network 
(ANN). The algorithms available from open research are customized for research objectives in this 
thesis. All the above were considered helpful in addressing the general concern with data 
visualization and presentation. 
 
Step 3: Existing detector gain setting methodology is discussed first. The main limitation of this 
methodology is that it does not account for potential complications from fueling near detectors, 
high-response detectors, signal variability, or reactor power maneuvers following a prolonged 
outage. This thesis proposes to extend a detector gain setting methodology to include operational 
transients. The methodology for denoising and dimensionality reduction of plant data is discussed 
at this step. Next, new detector models for particular cases of interest are developed in 
MATLAB/Simulink. The models are tested using plant data to confirm detector response versus 
the safety analysis limits for MTT, which allows extension of the gain setting methodology for 
actual operating transients. 
 
Step 4: Optimization of the detector gains setting values using an enhanced GA is proposed in this 
step. The optimization is performed to determine whether additional gains could be obtained with 
minimal modification to the amplifier circuit boards. This new knowledge is a significant original 
contribution of this thesis and constitutes advancement in knowledge that can be useful to others. 
 
Step 5: Methods for assessing risks due to detector aging are analyzed at this step. First, the FSN 
approach is described. Next, it is proposed to develop a qualitative/quantitative risk estimation 
mechanism to quantify the risk associated with aged detector system performance. This approach 
will allow accurate risk estimation for different transient scenarios and is equipped with the 
corresponding risk mitigation barriers to aid in operational risk-based decision making. All the 
above steps are further described in subsections below.  
  
3.1. Existing Detector Model 
  A review of the related literature found that neutron detector dynamic response has been 
studied for several decades, as discussed in Chapter 2. First, the detector signal is converted into 
current and voltage format by the current amplifier. The current reading is compared against a trip 
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set point (TSP) as well as a low MTT marker. Trip logic identifies a suitable behavior, e.g., on the 
indication of high neutron power, a signal to activate a safety system is issued. If the process signal 
did not reach the TSP but is approaching an upper control limit, then an alarm will be issued to 
notify the operator that a low MTT condition has occurred, as shown in Figure 3.2.   
   
Figure 3.2: Instrumentation loop block diagram. 
 
  There are two (2) first-order filters in the instrumentation circuit, as shown in Figure 3.2, 
each with a compensation time constant. A summing amplifier adds the two (2) filter outputs and 
a direct, unfiltered signal. It is assumed that the time constant and fixed delay measurement account 
for all the instrumentation from the flux detector to the trip logic circuit.  
 As new knowledge became available, to provide a more accurate representation of thermal 
power, a DSC was included in the amplifier assembly. The DSC is designed to help match the in-
core detector signal to thermal fuel power. This circuit compensates for a portion of the difference 
between the detector signal and the transient power response. The output signal from each detector 
passes through a DSC circuit, which applies predetermined gain factors and time constants. There 
is no combination of the DSC time constant components because the three DSC elements act in 
parallel, and the one (1) with the largest gain is a direct component (no delay, dominating for the 
limiting accident) that makes the time constant of the two (2) filters irrelevant. New detectors have 
an initial response to neutron power changes of about 104% (over-prompt). For natural uranium 
fuel, which has a 94% response (under-prompt), it follows that the detectors overestimate fuel 
power by about 10% immediately after a step increase in neutron flux. The introduction of 
platinum cladding causes an additional gamma reaction, 195Pt (γ, e), which reduces neutron 
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sensitivity, and platinum-clad detectors are nominally under-prompt. The circuit can be modeled 
as follows: 
 













1 11   [Equation 3.1] 
 where:   
 Kl, K2, and K3 are the adjustable gain coefficient for the input and output voltages;  
 K1 is the static gain, and K2, K3 are dynamic gains.  
 
During normal DSC operation there, the two (2) integrating amplifiers (30-second and 2,500-
second time constants τ2 and τ3 and gain K2 and K3, respectively) subtract their gain from the gain 
of K1 over time to attain the steady state gain of 1.0 (i.e., K1-K2-K3=1.0).  
The compensation has an effect only under a dynamic situation, i.e., when the reactor 
power is changing. At a steady state, the compensator has a negligible effect on the detector signal. 
The output from the DSC is termed the effective PF and is used in the safety analysis, as discussed 
in chapter 1. The background contribution of the lead cable, which depends on the concentrations 
of impurities, is usually less than 3% of the total signal, while the detectors themselves depress the 
local thermal neutron flux by about 2%.  
  
3.2. Development of the New Detector Models in Simulink 
 The Pt-clad detector is sensitive to the local radiation intensity. For fixed reactor geometry 
in a steady-state core, the neutron and gamma fluxes are proportional to one another. Both are 
related to the fission rate of reactor power. The detector response to the radiation is almost totally 
prompt. However, since the gamma signal in a reactor is partially delayed (approximately 30% 
from β-active fission products), the response of the detector to changes in power is delayed. Results 
from CRNL [1, 3] indicate that neutron capture is the source of 70% of the current generated in 
the Pt-clad detector. Approximately 30% of the response is due to reactor gamma radiation. With 
irradiation, the gamma-ray induced current will remain approximately constant. The neutron-
induced current I(n, γ, e) from platinum will burn out with a cross section of approximately 27 
barns, while the current from Inconel will increase initially as 58Ni transmutes to 59Ni. Eventually, 
the Inconel component will burn out with a cross section of approximately 4.6 barns. The predicted 
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variation, based on an extrapolation of CRNL data, is an increase of total sensitivity by about 15% 
during the first three years, followed by a decrease to about 85% (of the initial sensitivity) after 
twenty years. Thus, in this thesis, the following assumptions are used: 
 During a reactor’s normal operation, a self-powered neutron detector is always subject to 
both neutron and gamma flux, and around 30% of its signal is due to delayed gamma rays.  
 Since in a natural uranium-fueled reactor, 70% of the gamma flux is assumed to be prompt, 







    [Equation 3.2] 
 where: 
 I  – total current produced by the detector; 
 ),,( enI  – current due to ),,( en   reactions; 
 ),( eI  – current due to ),( e reactions. 
  












  [Equation 3.3] 
 
Detector response, including PF and delayed components, is well known for the nominal detectors. 
The same cannot be said about aged detectors. Measurements of detector performance in all 
literature studies focus on assessing detector PF. Reliable information related to how the various 
delayed components of the detector response change with time is not available. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the assumption is made as follows:  
 A proportional increase of all delayed components occurs due to the changes in the detector 
PF.  
 Only the fastest delayed component is impacted by aging effects.  
 
One of the approaches for analysis of the detector response in aged conditions is based on 
FUELPIN simulations. FUELPIN is a computer code that was developed to predict the transient 
reactor fuel and clad temperatures based on a lumped parameter model of a fuel pin. The code 
incorporates a neutron point kinetics model and can, therefore, be used to simulate the transient 
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changes in fuel power.  In FUELPIN, fhe functions, shown in the Laplace domain with the “s” as 
a Laplace variable, relating the DSC output signal to the input signal from the amplifier output can 














     [Equation 3.5] 
where: 
 D – is relative detector signal amplitude; 
 N – is the neutron flux; 
 

  – total delay fraction; 
 

i – ith delay fraction; 
 i – ith decay constant; 
 id –relative amplitude of delay group i.  
 

































  [Equation 3.6] 
 
where: 
 2V  – output of compensation network; 
 1V  – input to compensation network; 
 1K  – is a constant, adjustable from 0.90 to 1.15; 
 2K  – is a constant, adjustable from 0.006 to 0.057; 
 3K – is a constant, adjustable from 0.031 to 0.093; 
 2 – is a 30 second time constant; 




With this approach as the basis, the detector model in this thesis was developed in Simulink. The 
assumptions used in the model development are as follows: 
 DSC input is modeled as the output of the amplifier stage,  
 The output from the dynamic compensation circuit, which represents the compensated flux 
detector signal, is fed into the input of the voltage comparator, 
 The DSC transfer function has a proportional gain term and two first-order lag terms each 
of which has an adjustable gain, 
 All detectors are assumed to be aged in this analysis. 
 
3.3. Calculation of Nominal and Maximum DSC Gain Settings 
Thus, a typical self-powered in-core detector can be modeled as a current source shunted 
by a resistor and a capacitor to represent cable insulation as shown below in Figure 3.3.   
 
Figure 3.3: In-core flux detector modeled as a current source. 
 
The linear amplifier with filtering is assumed to have a single pole response with a time constant 
of , i.e.  = RC as demonstrated in Figure 3.4.  
 
 













Figure 3.5: Linear amplifier system representation. 
 
 The capacitance depends on the length of the lead cable. The detector current can be 










  [Equation 3.7] 
where: 
 K  – calibration constant; 
 pF – prompt fraction; 
 ia –  the fraction of the ith decay component; 
 t  – time (step change occurs at time zero); 
 i –  the decay time constant; 
   – step change in flux. 
 A portion of the schematic for the main Printed Circuit Board (PCB), which houses the 




Figure 3.6: A portion of the main PCB schematic for detector amplifier is shown. 
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Using the assumptions discussed earlier, K1 gain can be calculated with the following 
formula: 
Gain = (R39*R50)/(R68*R49)   [Equation 3.8] 
where: 
 R39 (6.81KΩ), R49 (10KΩ), R50 (10KΩ), and R68 (4.99KΩ) - are 
resistors shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
This yields the nominal values between 0.68 and 1.36, depending on the positions of P7 
and P8 resistors (shown in Figure 3.6) which are installed in series with R68. To account 
for resistor tolerances, the maximum allowance for K1 gain is, therefore, set to be 0.75 to 
1.25. 
  
Case 1: Steady State Response 
As discussed earlier, the DSC modifies the in-core amplifier signal to compensate for the 




























   [Equation 3.9] 
where: 
 V2 – is the output of the compensation network; 
 V1 – is the input to the compensation network; 
 K1 – is a constant, adjustable from 0.90 to 1.15; 
 K2 – is a constant, adjustable from 0.06 to 0.057; 
 K3 – is a constant, adjustable from 0.031 to 0.093; 
 τ2 – is a 30 second time constant; 
 τ3 – is a 2500 second time constant.  
 
 The gain coefficients K1, K2, and K3 are determined based on the assumption that a 
6.00 VDC input is used to the DSC. This measurement corresponds to 120% full power 
(FP). The 6.00 VDC is at the amplifier output and corresponds to a 0.720 amp current 
generated by a calibrator source. Table 3.1 documents the voltage values at a steady state 
corresponding to the old DSC gains. The steady-state tolerances for the individual gains 
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are ±1 mV and for the sum of the three gains is ±10 mV. To account for the instrumentation 
uncertainties during calibration, the tolerance for the sum of all three gains can be 
calculated as the root sum of squares (RSS) of the individual tolerances of K2 and K3, i.e. 
±14.4%. 
 
Table 3.1: Steady state voltages corresponding to current DSC gain configuration for a 
6.00 VDC input. 
 













Tolerance             
(VDC) 
K1 1.082 +TP10 to -TP5 (1.082*6)/2 3.246 3.245 to 3.247 
K2 -0.008 +TP3 to -TP5 (-0.008*6)/2 -0.024 -0.023 to -0.025 
K3 -0.074 +TP4 to -TP5 (-0.074*6)/2 -0.222 -0221 to -0.223 
K1+K2+K3 1.000 +TP2 to -TP5 
(1.082-0.008-
0.074)*6 6.000 5.990 to 6.010 
 
Table 3.2: Steady state voltages corresponding to current DSC gain configuration for a 
6.00 VDC input. 
 
Case 2: Transient Response 
 During normal operation, there are two (2) integrating amplifiers (30-second and 
2,500-second time constants, τ2 and τ3 , and gain K2 and K3, respectively) that subtract their 
gain from the gain of K1 over time to attain the steady-state gain of 1.0 so that K1-K2-
K3=1.0. Transient response to a step input can be verified by checking the DSC output at 




















  [Equation 3.12] 
where: 
 VTP1 = 6.0 VDC , step input at time zero; 
 t – is the time; 
 τ2 = 30 seconds, time constant; 
 τ3 = 2500 seconds, time constant; 
 TP1, TP2, TP3, and TP4 – test points for measurements; 
 K1, K2, and K3 are per gain values in Table 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
Table 3.2 documents the voltage values at a steady state corresponding to the new proposed 
DSC gains.  
 
Table 3.3: Steady state voltages corresponding to the new recommended DSC gain 














Tolerance             
(VDC) 
K1 1.150 +TP10 to -TP5 (1.15*6)/2 3.450 3.449 to 3.451 
K2 -0.057 +TP3 to -TP5 (-0.057*6)/2 -0.171 -0.170 to -0.172 
K3 -0.093 +TP4 to -TP5 (-0.093*6)/2 -0.279 -0.278 to -0.280 
K1+K2+K3 1.000 +TP2 to -TP5 
(1.15-0.057-
0.093)*6 6.000 5.990 to 6.010 
 
 
As time increases the voltage at test points TP3, TP4 and TP2 will approach the steady 






Table 3.4: Transient voltages corresponding to the old DSC gain settings for a 6.00 VDC 
input. 
Elapsed 
Time (sec) Test Points 
Expected Voltage 
(VDC) 
Tolerance             
(VDC) 
30 +TP3 to -TP5 -0.015 -0.012 to -0.018 
600 +TP4 to -TP5 -0.047 -0.042 to -0.052 
720 +TP2 to -TP5 6.332 6.298 to 6.366 
 
 
Table 3.5: Transient voltages corresponding to the new DSC gain settings for a 6.00 VDC 
input. 
Elapsed 
Time (sec) Test Points 
Expected Voltage 
(VDC) 
Tolerance             
(VDC) 
30 +TP3 to -TP5 -0.108 -0.101 to -0.114 
600 +TP4 to -TP5 -0.060 -0.054 to -0.065 
720 +TP2 to -TP5 6.418 6.436 to 6.402 
 
The new gains for each detector are set to their maximum values, given in Table 3.2, and 
are applied to every DSC module as shown below: 
 







K1 1.082 1.15 
K2 0.008 0.057 
K3 0.074 0.093 
 
Next, the impact of the proposed DSC gain changes is assessed by using the neutron 
detector DSC Simulink model.  
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3.4. Calculation of Residual Error for Transient Scenarios 
 The following transient scenarios were used in FUELPIN for aged detectors with 
the DSC gains at nominal and modified values as shown in Table 3.3: 
 Ramp increase in power from 0% to 100% at rates of 0.1%/sec and 1%/sec. 
 Ramp decrease in power from 100% to 70% and 10% at a rate of 0.8%/sec. These 
transients are used to find the amount of undershoot in the compensated detector 
signal. On power reduction, it appears to be lower than it is. 
 Power increase of up to approximately 10% over time periods ranging from 10 sec 
to 2 minutes. These stylized transients are used to set up bounds for the worst 
expected detector response following a refueling and allow for estimation of the 
impact of changes in DSC gains on operating margins during refueling.  
 
For all cases, the simulations were performed for a total of a one hour period. The 




















Table 3.7: Maximum Residual Errors for detectors, aged (PF=75%), from FUELPIN. 
Cases 
Error  
(nominal DSC gains) 
Error  
(max DSC gains) 
K1 1.066 1.150 
K2 -0.028 -0.057 
K3 -0.038 -0.093 
Ramp Down (decrease in power) 
100% to 10%, at 0.8%/sec 10.45 9.04 
100% to 70%, at 0.8%/sec 3.49 3.02 
Ramp Up (increase in power) 
0% to 100%, at 0.1%/sec -11.54 -9.81 
0% to 100%, at 1%/sec -11.62 -10.04 
Refueling (power increase) 
10% , in 10 sec -1.18 -1.00 
10% , in 30 sec -1.17 -1.00 
10% , in 60 sec -1.17 -1.00 
10% , in 90 sec -1.17 -1.00 
10% , in 120 sec -1.17 -1.00 
 
 Here, the residual error is calculated as the difference between the compensated 
signal and fuel power in percentage of power. For refueling and ramp increases of power, 
the positive residual error means that the detector is overcompensated and MTT decreases 
by the amount of error. Conversely, the negative residual error means the detector is 
undercompensated. For ramp decreases in power, the negative residual error means that 
detector is overcompensated by the amount of error. Conversely, the positive residual error 
means the detector is undercompensated.  
 For all scenarios considered, the maximum reduction in MTT for the worst fueling 
transient is found to be less than 1.0%. This criterion is used in this thesis to validate the 
proposed approach for optimization of the DSC gain settings using a GA.  
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3.5. Denoising Plant Data for Analysis 
The methodology for plant data de-noising and smoothing used in this thesis is 
explained below. These steps are not a primary focus of the thesis but were considered 
significant enough for development of an overall framework. Low-pas filter (LPF) and 
WTA algorithms are described first, along with a discussion on the extension of the best-
performing method. These methods were chosen based on the ease of implementation. No 
attempts are made in this thesis to customize or tune filters. The scope of this section is to 
estimate the overall impact of noise reduction and overall feasibility of these methods for 
managing detector degradation due to aging. Application of the most promising method on 
a case study is also presented in this section.  
 
3.5.1. Selection of Approach 
The methodology for PF optimization proposed in this thesis considers increasing 
trends in detector noise, particularly during fueling and coincidental detector signal 
oscillations. Processing large time-series data from a noisy process is a significant 
challenge. Thus, a need for additional techniques for noise reduction and signal smoothing 
prior to subsequent analysis was identified. The chosen method must be able to support a 
high volume of input data without dramatically increasing processing time or negatively 
impacting computational complexity. Another major factor is the potential data losses 
associated with the chosen method. This is particularly critical for applications in fault 
detection for neutron detector systems. This thesis proposes a mitigating strategy based on 
denoising or filtering the output signals from each detector before it passes through the 
DSC circuit and the application of predetermined noise reduction factors using LPF and 
WTA.  
 
3.5.2. Overview of Low-Pass Filter Methodology 
Smoothing, differentiation, and peak sharpening of the signal and its frequency 
spectrum were performed using low-pass filter methods. The literature review, highlights 
of which are given in chapter 2, shows that LPFs typically perform well as data smoothers. 
A low-pass conventional filter approach was chosen for this thesis because of its previous 
high success and relative ease of implementation. More importantly, low-pass filters are 
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known to provide a certain degree of data smoothness while preserving the independence 
of the components, which is a critical criterion for this study. This thesis is mainly 
concerned with the spikes in the positive direction since these can have an adverse impact 
on safety analysis assumptions. If not mitigated, random high-frequency noise can result 
in a much more severe impact on MTT calculations.  
Removal of evident disturbances, such as spikes and steps, was accomplished using 
a filter model established in MATLAB to produce theoretical results. Next, an 
experimental temporary modification was installed for one detector at a power plant to 
compare actual results to the predicted response. In this modification, the detector readings 
were captured using data-logging equipment connected to the buffered output of the flux 
detector amplifier. The obtained data was used for analysis of the filter performance, e.g., 
comparison of the unfiltered versus the filtered signal. The use of a buffered output and a 
signal isolator of the data logger allows the implementation of this and subsequent 
modifications without any safety impact on the plant operation.  
 
3.5.3. Application of the LPF Approach in This Thesis 
Commonly used smoothing algorithms are rectangular, triangular, pseudo-
Gaussian, and the Savitzky-Golay algorithm [128], sometimes also referred to as the least-
square method. The first three methods are based on replacing each point in the signal with 
the average of m adjacent points. Typically, m is selected to be a positive integer, called 
the smooth width, and is chosen to be an odd number. This method ensures that the smooth 
coefficients are symmetrically balanced around the central point to preserve the x-axis 





  [Equation 3.13] 
 
The smooth width can be adjusted to obtain the optimum results, and smoothing can be 
applied several times resulting in a multi-pass smoothing with a combined smooth width 
of: 




 n is the number of passes; 
 w is the w-width smooth. 
 
If the raw data is not corrupted, smoothing should not distort the signal. For white noise, 
i.e., noise evenly distributed over the entire frequency spectrum of the signal without sharp 





   [Equation 3.15] 
where:  
 S is the standard deviation of the remaining noise after smoothing, 
 m is the smooth width. 
 
For cases when the smooth width is substantial or signal distortion is highly undesirable, 
the Savitzky-Golay [128] algorithm can be applied. This method is developed on the 
principle of least-square fitting of polynomials to segments of the data. In its simplest form, 
it can be described as a nonrecursive filter. This filter replaces each data value fi with a 
linear combination gi  of itself and some number of adjacent neighbors, i.e., the average of 









   [Equation 3.16] 
where: 
 nL - is the number of points to the left of the data point; 
 nR -  is the number of points to the right of the data point; 
 cn - is the filter coefficient,  where cn=1/(nL+nR+1). 
 
 The Savitsky-Golay algorithm identifies filter coefficients cn such that the moving 
window averaging preserves the area under a spectral line, the mean position in time, the 
so-called first moment, and the higher moments. This method is less effective at reducing 
noise but is better at preserving the shape of the original signal.  
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3.5.4. Peak Finding Method 
 When the data set is contaminated with noise or the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is 
extremely low, false peaks can be expected. One of the ways to process a real peak in the 
signal is first to identify where the actual peaks are, and then measure the peak amplitude, 
i.e., height, width, and position. A conventional method for peak finding is to look for a 
negative slope zero-crossing of the first derivative and then determine the position, height, 
and width of each peak by least-squares curve fitting about the maximum.  
 Certain smoothing filters can distort signals, as discussed earlier, thus affecting the 
peak heights and width. Therefore, it could be useful to establish specific threshold criteria 
for slope parameters so that only signals that exceed this threshold are taken into 
consideration [129]. This approach should provide accurate results even for heavily 
smoothed first derivatives with known noise distortion since the peak parameters extracted 
by curve fitting are not distorted.  
 
3.5.5. Proposed LPF Algorithm Optimization 
 For this study, the low-pass filter appears to be a suitable approach since it provides 
the compromise between the required degrees of smoothing versus latency. It is important 
to note that in this study, only past and current detector input signal xn is available to 
produce output signal yn. Thus, the poles of the filter reside in the unit circle |zp|<1. Since 
a single-pole filter is proposed, )1( pz  where α is a filter constant, then 11    
and the range of α where the filter is causal and stable can be shown as 20   . The 
area of interest is the high-frequency noise. Thus, the pole is along the positive side of the 
line, and α needs to be in the range between 0 and 1. The filter can be tuned so that very 
little smoothing occurs (α is close to 1). However, there is almost no latency in the detector 
amplifier output. Conversely, if a higher degree of smoothing is required, the value of α 
can be reduced to be closer to zero. This, however, will result in higher latency. At time n, 
the smoothed output yn can be given as: 









 h  - is a data sampling time interval, e.g., two (2) seconds; 
 τ - is the time constant. 
 
As discussed earlier, the high frequency noise affecting detector signal varies in the 
frequency spectrum, amplitude and time of occurrence. Thus, it is proposed to modify the 
least mean squares filter design algorithm so that it is possible to continually update a set 
of weights that change the output of the system to adaptively cancel the noise in a rapidly 
changing environment as shown in Figure 3.7:   
 
Figure 3.7: A block diagram for the proposed algorithm. 
 
In this figure, the error signal is fed back into the filter which modifies its weights according 
to the ultimate desired signal. The value of α defines the weight given to the previous data 
versus the raw data. Thus, the output signal yn can be computed by summing the product 






    [Equation 3.19] 
 







)(1    [Equation 3.20] 
where: 
 i - is an amalgamation of the magnitude of error, computed each time the weights 
are updated; 




The check for filter stability can be performed by comparing the output with the previous 
output. This approach initially estimates the correction coefficient, and then iteratively 
updates it in the appropriate direction, which optimizes accuracy. As time goes by, the 
correction coefficients should reach their optimal values. For example, if the error is a 
quadratic function that never goes negative, minimizing the mean squared error means 
moving along this quadratic function. The objective here is to get to the minimum of the 
function where the error is minimized. An integral absolute error (IAE) approach can be 
used to achieve this goal. In this case, the error is integrated over time without placing 




 [Equation 3.21] 
 
This approach tends to produce a slower response, which may not be acceptable if the filter 
latency is a critical performance characteristic. It can be improved by application of an 





 [Equation 3.22] 
 
The ISE will penalize large errors more than smaller ones since the error is squared. The 
system optimized for ISE will tend to eliminate large errors quickly but will tolerate small, 
persistent errors for an extended period. This will produce fast responses but with 
considerably low amplitude and oscillation. Since the reduction in latency is a desirable 
feature in this filter application, this can become a viable option for implementation.  
 There are many other functions that can be considered for filter optimization. They 
will not be further explored in this thesis.  
 
3.5.6. Overview of Wavelet Analysis Methods – Morlet Wavelet 
 Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, the main challenge expected with LPF 
filter methods is the poor SNR and losses in signal shape and amplitude. The in-core 
detectors in this study (e.g., located in the horizontal flux detector assemblies) have roughly 
similar noise (amplitude and pattern) as an SNR of approximately 110/1 at full power. The 
SNR values decrease significantly during low power operation, and shutdowns and any 
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additional losses due to filtering are highly undesirable. Therefore, application of the 
WTM, as an alternative approach to LPF, is also investigated in this thesis. Wavelets are 
well suited to represent signals with discontinuities [130], which is a critical factor for 
applications with real-time data. Also, WTMs are a novel intelligent filtering technique 
with a promising future potential for development. This criterion was also a deciding factor 
in the selection of this approach. Using the governing equations, a model was established 
in MATLAB to produce theoretical results. 
 A family of wavelets is comprised of a main wavelet ψ(t), or the so-called mother 
wavelet, and daughter wavelets (also called window functions), defined by the main 
wavelet and a scale function φ(t) in time domain [131]. These daughter wavelets are 
themselves functions with different regions of support and are used in the transformation 
process to extract information from the raw data. The wavelet transform is a product of the 
data signal and the wavelet family. The scaling function can be used to filter out the lowest 
level of the transform. It also ensures the entire spectrum is covered: 
b)/a-(t (t),  ba    [Equation 3.23] 
where: 
  (t) – is the mother wavelet; 
 (t)   – is a scaling function; 
 a – is a scale parameter; 
 b – is a time translation. 
 
Because wavelet analysis combines both time and frequency analysis of the incoming 
signals, the wavelet function is in effect a band-pass filter. It can also be applied for data 
smoothing by using adaptive thresholding, where wavelet coefficients can be selected to 
correspond to undesired frequency components [132].  
 A wavelet first needs to be selected, and the process data is then converted into the 
wavelet domain. Next, a threshold for the wavelet coefficients is determined based on the 
selected threshold rules. Finally, the transform is inverted so that the wavelet is 
reconstructed using the original approximation coefficients and the modified detail 
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coefficients. Denoise filters must be selected carefully to obtain the shape of the wavelet 
closely matching the faulty signal pulse.  
 The Morlet wavelet transform belongs to the class of continuous wavelet 
transforms, where a wavelet function multiplies the signal and the transform is computed 
separately for different segments of the time-domain signal. The MWT is based on the real-
valued wavelet function and scaling function, but unlike conventional wavelet transforms, 
the MWT is complex, with real and imaginary parts, where the exponential carrier is 
multiplied by a Gaussian window [131]. Using νo as a constant, the Morlet mother wavelet 
can be defined as: 
))(2exp( (t) 22 ovv      [Equation 3.24] 
 
The real part of the Morlet wavelet can be shown as a cosine signal that decays 




 (t) 22 tvt or 
 
 [Equation 3.25] 
 
 Here the exponent term helps determine the shape of the wavelet, and a shape 
parameter β is used to optimize a trade-off between time resolution and frequency 
resolution.  
 
3.5.7. Potential for MTW Optimization 
 The frequency resolution increases, whereas time resolution decreases, with the 
reduction of β and will become a cosine function with the finest frequency resolution when 
β is equal to 0. Similarly, when β the parameter reaches infinity, the Morlet wavelet obtains 
the finest time resolution. From the mother wavelet, a daughter Morlet wavelet can be 
derived as follows: 
)
)(






  [Equation 3.26] 
where: 
 a – is the scale parameter for dilation; 
 b – is a time translation. 
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Thus, when the signal is convolved with the designed Morlet Wavelet, noise and faults 
present in the signal can be identified from the filtered signal. Using this approach, a shape 
parameter β can be used to optimize a trade-off between time resolution and frequency 
resolution to make the proposed method suitable for a near-real time processing at the plant. 
 
3.6. Data Dimensionality Reduction Prior to Analysis 
The methodology for dimensionality reduction and pattern recognition in this thesis 
is presented below. The main reason for the use of PCA in this thesis is for reduction in the 
dimensionality of the dataset and pattern identification. These steps are not a primary focus 
of the thesis but were considered significant enough for development of an overall 
framework. PCA, wPCA, and nonlinear PCA algorithms are described first, followed by a 
discussion on the extension and application of these methods in the thesis.  
 
3.6.1.  Selection of Approach  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the methodology for PF optimization of aged detectors 
must account for typical plant transient scenarios. In addition to noisy detectors, potential 
complications to data collection and analysis result from fueling near noisy detectors with 
the coincidental occurrence of signal oscillations with transient zone levels, as shown in 





Figure 3.8: Typical detector signal oscillation—a trend of a detector (designated as AF13H) signal is shown in red, and the 
coincidental zone level transient is shown in blue and green. 
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This behavior is unexpected because the detector signals and liquid zone controller levels 
are not synchronized. A similar phenomenon (shown below in Figure 3.9) was noted at 
several nuclear power plants in Canada. For example, from 1999 to 2003, a neutron 
detector (designated here as detector 4F) was showing steady performance with relatively 
little noise present. At midyear of 2003, an unexplained adverse change in the detector 
signal occurred. A high rate of signal variations persisted until January 2010, when the 
detector signal returned to its previous performance with minimum disturbances.  
 
Figure 3.9: Detector performance trend example for January 1999 – January 2011. 
 
 The main concern in this case is the impact on MTT, both during normal operation 
and particularly during refueling. A trend of typical MTT at normal full power operation 
sampled every five (5) minutes across four reactor units is shown below in Figure 3.10. 
 
Clear shift at mid-year point 
2003 





Figure 3.10: A typical MTT at full power. 
 
Analysis of plant data shows that during a typical high-power operation, 66% of the time 
there was less than 7.5% margin available and no events where margin exceeded 10%. 
Thus, to maintain the required margin, reactor power de-rates were required. In an ideal 
case, e.g. with 105 in-core detectors randomly distributed with 2-out-of-3 trip logic, the 
required detector setting can be shown as: 
RDS = CPPF x Pwr = 110%  [Equation 3.27] 
where: 
 CPPF – is the minimum issued channel power peaking factor = 1.10; 
 trip setpoint = 122%; 
 all units operating at 100% full power (FP).  
  
Thus, the maximum achievable margin is 12% when a reactor is operating at 100%. 
The impact of margin reduction due to oscillation can be seen by comparing Figures 3.11 
and Figure 3.12 where the margin was reduced by 2% on average due to signal variation. 
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Figure 3.11: MTT in the absence of signal variations, February 20, 2012. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Impact on MTT when signal variations are present, February 19, 2012. 
 
 The unexplained signal behavior is always present during high power operation at 
greater than 86% FP and typically results in a 2 to 3% decrease in MTT. Previous 
engineering analysis confirmed that the detector loops and zone controllers operated 
correctly in every case where signal oscillations were present but failed to identify the root 
cause of unexpected system performance due to a large number of potential suspects, i.e., 
potential variables that could affect detector output.  
 Thus, plant data dimensionality reduction is important in this case. There appear to 
be multiple, fast-changing process variables that must be analyzed simultaneously to 
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establish the main contributing factors of system behavior. It is essential to understanding 
the variations and grouping structure of a dataset, as well as to find the most important 
features that explain the most variance in the data. 
A comparison of dimensionality reduction techniques, given in Chapter 2, indicates 
that the best method is problem dependent, e.g., the topology of the embedded data, size 
of the dataset, noise versus signal, sparseness versus curvature, and the scale of interest. 
However, a review and systematic comparison of the many dimensionality reduction 
techniques show the superiority of the variants of PCA algorithms on the most 
heterogeneous classes. In this study, an unsupervised PCA method is used to discover the 
structure in the input variables. A supervised learning approach would not be suitable in 
this case since the relationships in the input data are not known in advance. Another 
advantage of using a PCA algorithm is that it can also be used to significantly speed up 
unsupervised feature learning. This aspect is essential for the current case study since the 
dataset has no target variable or response value and is unlabelled. The other important 
consideration for selection of a PCA for this study was the opportunity for future 
optimization, which should be computationally and numerically feasible to implement in 
practice.  
The PCA and wPCA algorithms used for dimensionality reduction need to be 
modified to work with nonlinear data to support real plant processes. For example, 
nonlinearity of the zone control valves at the NPP in this study has been speculated to be a 
probable cause for detector signal oscillations. In some cases, a response to a unit step 
change resulted in a high degree of signal oscillation exceeding ±15%. This is consistent 
with the field observations of cases where the zone oscillations of up to 20% have been 
noted in the worst-case scenarios.  
A variety of nonlinear dimensionality reduction techniques have been proposed to 
address the limitations of traditional techniques such as PCA and classical scaling for 
nonlinear dimensionality reduction, such as in this case. A literature review of different 
data modeling methods (given in chapter 2), e.g., PLS, back-propagation multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) neural networks, radial basis function (RBF) neural networks, and an 
adaptive B-spline modeling algorithm (ASMOD), indicates that all these methods can 
identify and represent general nonlinear dependencies in the data without a priori 
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specifying which particular nonlinear dependencies to look for. However, the PLS 
approach needs active interaction from the data analyst to identify nonlinear dependencies.  
In this thesis, comparisons of the prediction accuracy and performance 
characteristics, such as computation time and simplicity of use, were the basis for the 
selection of non-linear PCA with an ANN approach. A feed-forward multilayer ANN is 
proposed to model nonlinear systems and has already been tested for two target 
applications in reactor technology, as discussed in the literature review.  
 
3.6.2.  Dimensionality Reduction with PCA 
  A principal component calculated by PCA is a single axis in space. The second 
and third principal components are other axes in space, perpendicular to the first. Each unit 
is assigned a set of scores to show the magnitude of its effect on the rest of the components. 
For all vectors in the dataset, each row position in a vector always corresponds to the same 
type of observation.  
 
k=1, 2, …, n   [Equation 3.28] 
  
Assuming each of the m rows contains values that are independent and identically 
distributed instances of process variables, m by n X-matrix can be set up as follows: 
 
   [Equation 3.29] 
 
The mean of the attributes in each row to get m mean values is given, and each entry in the 
data matrix is replaced by its difference with the mean; the data average vector can be 
defined as follows: 


































































 i=1, 2, …, m.     
 
Next, covariance matrix can be computed: 
 
    [Equation 3.31] 
 
Then the eigenvector/eigenvalue pairs of  can be determined as  
where r is the rank of . For each  k=1, 2, …, n a corresponding data axis of 
 can be calculated to represent the new coordinate system. Finally, the PCA 
algorithm will produce the n-vectors such that for 
the covariant matrix S(Y) has nonzero diagonal entries and all off-diagonal elements are 
zero.  
 
It is assumed that all the principal components, as a whole, form an orthogonal basis for 
the space of the data. Thus, PCA algorithm is used to decompose a data table with 
correlated detector and process system measurements into a new set of uncorrelated  
orthogonal variables, i.e., principal components. This approach will allow mapping of the 
affected equipment to process variables with the main contribution to the process upset.  
 
3.6.3.  Improving Robustness of Algorithms—Weighted PCA 
 To improve the robustness of the PCA algorithm, a recently proposed 
generalization of PCA, or so-called wPCA, can be used. The application of a wPCA 
increases robustness by assigning different weights to data objects based on their estimated 
relevance. The weights are selected by using the inverse variances of the ratings. This 
approach standardizes sample data by assigning weights to the mean and the outer products 
that form the covariance matrix. Also, this puts a weight factor on every point in the training 
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3.6.4.  NLPCA-ANN Approach  
 Feature reconstruction is a process similar to dimensionality reduction and is used 
in cases where data of interest is large and complex. The data of interest is selected and 
transformed into a much-reduced representation set of features that correspond to particular 
attributes within the original data. A collection of such observations or a feature set can be 
shown as a feature vector. This principle allows elimination of redundant measurements 
and reduces computational demands and burden on the processing hardware [133]. A 
variety of nonlinear dimensionality reduction techniques have been proposed that aim to 
address the nonlinearity effects where input and output have a nonlinear relationship or the 
linearity of the process data is not known in advance. In some such cases, a nonlinear 
system can be modeled using linear equations. The results of this approximation or so-
called linearization may not be sufficient for all cases, mainly when the accuracy of a 
system model can have a high impact on the results.  
A novel extension of PCA is known as nonlinear PCA (NLPCA) [134]. In this method, the 
principal components are generalized from straight lines to curves using ANNs. The 
introduction of hidden layer(s) makes it possible for the network to exhibit nonlinear 
behavior. NLPCA using an ANN allows mapping between x to the first principle 
component. The original data space is curved by applying an MLP [135] to perform identity 
mapping. The network has three (3) hidden layers of variables between the input and output 
layers of variables as shown in Figure 3.13:  
 
Figure 3.13: Neural network model for calculating NLPCA. 
 
Transfer function f1 maps from x, the input column vector of length l, to the first hidden 




   [Equation 3.32] 
where: 
 k =1, …,m; 
 W(x) – is an m x l weight matrix; 
 b(x) – is a column vector of length m.  
 
Bias parameters are contained in the column b(x). Transfer function f1 is nonlinear, 
typically a hyperbolic tangent. A second transfer function f2,, also called identity function, 
maps from the encoding layer to the bottleneck layer. This layer has one neuron 
representing the nonlinear principal component u, given by: 
    [Equation 3.33] 
The third transfer function f3 maps from u to the final hidden layer, h(u), also called the 
decoding layer, as shown:  
 
   [Equation 3.34] 
where: 
 k =1, …,m.  
 
Next, transfer function f4 maps from h(u) to the output column vector x’ of length l as given: 
   [Equation 3.35] 
The cost function is given as: 
    [Equation 3.36] 
where: 
 x –is the original data; 
 x’ –is the output of the Neural Network. 
 
The cost function is minimized by finding the optimal values, which necessitates that the 
mean square error between the neural network (NN) output (x’) and the original data (x) is 
























minimized as well [135]. Hyperbolic tangent function for f1 and f3 and identity function for 
f2 and f4 can be shown as follows: 
    [Equation 3.37] 
   [Equation 3.38] 
 
Imposing constraint and normalization conditions as ˂u˃=0 and ˂u2˃=1, the following is 
true: 
    [Equation 3.39] 
 
The number of free parameters becomes 2lm+4m+l, where m is the number of hidden 
neurons. m≥2 condition is required for nonlinear solutions, where a higher number of m 
improves nonlinear modeling solution. Thus, linear relation u(t)=a*x(t) with a linear 
combination of xi is generalized to u=f(x), where f is a nonlinear function. As a result, the 
output of MLP is identical to the input, while the reduction in data dimension is still 
achieved in the bottleneck of the network, which provides the desired component scores. 
A further iteration of the same process is used to input the residual x-g(u) back into the 
same network to obtain the second NLPCA node and so forth. 
In this thesis, it is assumed that behavior of parameters in time series is not 
understood in advance. Initially, only PCA and wPCA algorithms were used in the 
preliminary studies. Later, it was realized that the approach had to be adjusted to 
accommodate complex ranges, minimize computing demands, or address time complexity. 
Additionally, parameter distributions can potentially significantly deviate from 
multivariate normal or other standard parametric distributions. Thus, a generic nonlinear 
PCA algorithm available from the open research is customized to optimize the overall 
solution to account for nonlinear relationships in the detector and plant data. Sample data 
is analyzed using feature extraction tools to isolate patterns of interest. New representation 
is established regarding model learning so that mapping can be done between features and 



















3.6.5.  Proposed Modification of NLPCA Algorithms 
 During early stages of this work, it became evident that one of the challenges of 
PCA and NLPCA algorithms is the model size. A large number of plant parameters change 
coincidental in time with detector response. Even after some of the detector behavior has 
been explained using the logical data models for correlation, there is still a significant 
number of process variables to be included in the analysis. This situation became 
particularly prominent during the NLPCA portion of this study, where the required 
computational effort presented challenges during network training runs. Since the proposed 
algorithm is suggested for near real-time use, it is desired to reduce computational 
demands. Therefore, this study proposes to modify the NLPCA algorithm to reduce the 
model size. The main idea in this proposal is based on the assumption that the process 
variables in this study are obtained at predefined intervals (e.g., two (2) seconds sampling 
frequency) and typically do not change significantly between samples unless an unexpected 
failure of the process occurred. Thus, it is hypothesized that it is possible to apply 
minimization of the cost function (given in Equation 3.36) to reduce the model size. This 
will result in a small impact on the network performance in terms of accuracy but may 
significantly reduce model run times. This approach is described next.  
 The measurements x used in Equation 3.36 are obtained from the various field 
devices and systems that measure and acquire process data within the plant.  These data 
are obtained from plant system interfaces synchronized to the utility’s time servers, so all 
plant data has a common time source, which allows easy correlation of events between the 
various data sources, such as Distributed Control Computers (DCCs). The plant 
information system reads each data point at a specific frequency.  Thus, the original data x 
can be presented as a series of measurements at time instance of t and can, therefore, be 
presented as x(t). Rather than including each instantaneous reading of x, the algorithm can 
be set up to forecast future process readings and only use the exception events (i.e., when 
the measurements exceed a predefined value). The proposed approach can be shown as a 




Figure 3.14: A proposed approach to model reduction by minimizing the number of the 
original data points x. 
 
Each process variable x(t) can be shown as a vector of values that should follow a particular 
predetermined setpoint within the control band. Thus, the number of x(t)’s could be reduced 
such that only significant changes in the instantaneous process variable (PV) readings are 
used in the model calculation. The error between the predicted and the measured value of 
the PV can be calculated as: 
1)+xˆ(t-x=1)+err(t set    [Equation 3.40] 
where : 
 x(t) – obtained measurement x at time t; 
 xˆ(t) – predicted measurement x at time t; 
 xset – known parameter setpoint; 
 err – the difference between the expected and the obtained value; 
 t – time.  
 
The error threshold can be established for each PV based on the engineering equations and 
the desired system performance accuracy, e.g., different weight coefficients could be set 
up for each process parameter, e.g., weight coefficient wxi set up for process variable xi. 
The same approach can be used for the control inputs, e.g., control parameters ui affecting 
specific input measurements xi. Next, the computed error can be added from the first 
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change of the measurement to the current measurement. This, in effect, will update the 
vector of the past changes in the PV and correct the prediction, i.e., generate estimates of 
what system behavior should be when presented with data of current system behavior.   The 
accuracy of the input data will be dependent upon the error threshold that is placed on the 
point but will effectively reduce the amount of data used to solve the objective function J 
per modified Equation 3.36:  
2 "" ||'x||J x    [Equation 3.41] 
where: 
 x’’ - is the reduced plant data; 
 x’ - is the output of the Neural Network. 
 
Reduced plant data is processed in the NLPCA to solve the modified objective function J, 




Figure 3.15: Reduced plant data is processed in the NLPCA to reduce the amount of data 
used to solve the objective function J per Equation 3.41. 
 
This proposal is conceptual and is intended to provide a high-level overview of one of the 
many possible approaches. It can be further developed in the future work. 
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3.7. Optimization of the DSC Gain Settings with GA 
 The focus of the DSC gain setting methodology discussed earlier in Sections 3.4 
and 3.5 is on a few selected theoretical cases. Operational constraints, particularly 
combined with aged conditions, are not considered. Thus, the limiting scenarios may not 
in fact be bounding, effectively rendering the overall results inconclusive. In this thesis, it 
is proposed to use an enhanced GA to obtain the optimum set of the K-values. As discussed 
in Section 3.4, the assumptions used in this approach are as follows: 
 DSC input is modeled as the output of the amplifier stage,  
 The output from the dynamic compensation circuit, which represents the 
compensated flux detector signal, is fed into the input of the voltage comparator, 
 The DSC transfer function has a proportional gain term and two first-order lag 
terms, each of which has an adjustable gain, 
 A typical DSC has three (3) amplifier gains that may be tuned, 
 The maximum reduction in MTT for the worst fueling transient needs to be less 
than 1.0%. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, GAs belong to the class of evolutionary algorithms (EA) and 
are a way of solving problems by mimicking the process of natural selection. The 
methodology consists of five (5) basic parts: initialization, fitness, selection, generation, 
and termination. New generations of solutions are iteratively produced and evaluated until 
a termination condition is reached. For example, if the desired fitness level has been 
attained and the allocated number of generations reached, a convergence criterion is met, 
or a computational time limit is passed. The collection of generations is referred to as a 
genome.  
 In applied mathematics, a GA is a heuristic technique for solving optimization and 
search problems. Heuristic methods may be used to reduce the amount of computational 
effort required to find an acceptable solution to a problem. A solution may not be found, 
or a solution may not be optimal. Efficiency improvements are realized by implementing 
stochastic optimization, which involves the use of random probabilities in the iterative 
search for a solution. Further efficiencies may be gained by applying simplified 
assumptions or approximations to the fitness test. This may involve the construction of a 
fitness model and making use of prior knowledge and experience. A surrogate fitness test 
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is called a fitness approximation and is used in lieu of a fitness test that is otherwise difficult 
to construct, incomplete, complex, or computationally prohibitive. 
 The rationale for the selection of the GA method is that a heuristic approach can be 
useful to reduce the amount of computational effort required to find an acceptable solution 
to a problem. The following steps illustrate the scenario under consideration: 
 Suppose there is a step change in power from zero to 100%FP, and suppose there 
is no DSC compensation, 
 Thus, the reactor regulating system (RRS) will move the reactor power until the 
detector feedback indicates 100%FP,  
 However, since the detector is only seeing 70% of the actual power (i.e., PF = 70%), 
the actual power is too high initially, 
 As the detector delayed components are introduced, the detector power increases 
and RRS will bring it back to setpoint in small steps until equilibrium, at which 
point the actual power matches. 
 
This can be represented as a function for the detector response and another function for the 
DSC. In this case, the DSC function is the objective function, and the detector function is 
the fitness function. Note that the MATLAB terminology is different: MATLAB calls the 
objective function the fitness function and fitness function is the constraint function. The 
DSC must compensate for the detector delayed components, i.e., the DSC gains must be 
selected so that the DSC function minus the detector function is greater than zero or some 
small value (e.g., 3% so there is time to get to the detector replacement timeline). To 
produce a time-dependent DSC curve in the time domain, the inverse Laplace transform is 
applied to the DSC transfer function.  
 A similar idea should hold for the detector curve, and then the two functions are 
entered into the GA solver. However, it is important to point out that there is no guarantee 
that a solution will be found or that a solution will be optimal. The following steps describe 
the proposed algorithm: 
1) Determine the Objective Function: 
This is the transfer function that represents the physical system under consideration.  
For the case study in this work, the neutron detector signal is processed by the DSC 
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according to the following transfer function model.  A neutron detector signal 
processed by a DSC can be shown according to the following transfer function model: 




  [Equation 3.42] 
where: 
 K1 - is the static gain; 
 K2, K3  - are dynamic gains; 
 𝜏  and 𝜏  - are time constants; 
 t- time variable, greater than zero (the fitness function must be met at all 
times). 
 
The analytical solution to the above Laplace transform (1) in the time (t) domain is 
the objective function: 




   [Equation 3.43] 
 
2) Determine the parameters to be optimized from the Objective Function:   
This is typically the circuit gains but may also include the time constants. The set of 
optimized parameters represents the solution, and in this study are the three (3) DSC 
gains (K1, K2, and K3). Thus, the solutions set to the objective function consists of three 
(3) DSC gain values (K1, K2, and K3).  
.   
 
3) Determine the Constraint Function(s): 
Constraint functions are additional linear or nonlinear requirements that must be met 
by the solution. For example, it is desirable that the DSC not apply an overall bias to 




Solutions are not restricted by potential amplifier design specifications. Currently, the 
circuit board design limits the ability of the GAIN potentiometer value that can be 
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selected. Subsequently, the gain cannot be increased to more than the maximum 
allowable values discussed earlier.  
 
5) Determine the Boundary Conditions: 
Boundary conditions may be imposed to help ensure the solution is feasible. In this 
study, the following conditions were applied: 
i) 1.00 ≤ K1 ≤ 1.20; to ensure the DSC can compensate for the prompt fraction.    
ii) -0.20 ≤ K2, K3 ≤ 0; to ensure the DSC can compensate for the delayed components. 
 
Boundary conditions may be tightened during subsequent GA runs based on past 
solution results.  Boundary conditions may also be used to ensure the solution will meet 
DSC hardware limitations; this was not applied in this study. 
 
6) Select a Fitness Function: 
The Fitness Function is used to determine the relative quality of potential solutions in 
each generation.  In terms of instrumentation and control, a Fitness Function is often 
called a Performance Function.  The goal of the GA approach is to minimize the 
Performance Function.  The following are some Performance Functions that are often 
cited in relation to optimizing control system parameters: 
 
i) Integral Squared Error (ISE) 
𝐼 ∫ 𝑒 (𝑡)𝑑𝑡    [Equation 3.44] 
 
 Here, the square of the error over time is integrated by ISE. ISE will penalize large 
errors more than smaller ones (since the error is squared). Control systems optimized 
to ISE will tend to eliminate large errors quickly but will tolerate small persistent errors 
for a long period of time. Often this leads to fast responses but with considerable low-
amplitude oscillation. 
ii) Integral Absolute Error (IAE) 




IAE integrates the absolute error over time. It doesn’t weigh any of the errors in a 
system’s response. Therefore, it tends to produce slower responses than ISE optimal 
systems but usually with less sustained oscillation. 
 
iii) Integral Time Absolute Error (ITAE) 
 
𝐼 ∫ t|𝑒(𝑡)|𝑑𝑡     [Equation 3.46] 
 
ITAE integrates the absolute error over time. What this does is more heavily weigh 
errors that exist after a long time than those at the start of the response. ITAE tuning 
produces systems that settle more quickly than other methods. 
 
iv) Integral Time Squared Error (ITSE) 
𝐼 ∫ t𝑒 (𝑡)𝑑𝑡    [Equation 3.47] 
 
 
v) Mean Square Error (MSE) 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = ∑ 𝑒 (𝑡)    [Equation 3.48] 
 
vi) Weighted Root Mean Square (wRMS) 
 
wRMS = ∑ (E (w)-E )   [Equation 3. 49] 
 
vii) Zeigler-Nichols (Z-N) [137] 
The Zeigler-Nichols technique is a practical process for the tuning of PID controllers, 
based on trial and error. The technique is based on sustained oscillations.  Z-N is also 
known as online (or sometimes called continuous cycling) tuning.  The design criterion 
for this method is one-fourth decay ratio. The Z-N method may result in a process with 
marginal stability. 
 
viii) Settling Time 
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This is the time taken for a response to settle within some band around the setpoint. 
This time can be defined for the setpoint and the disturbance changes. Shorter settling 
times are best, although they can lead to long rise times and generally sluggish 
response. 
 
The performance function used in this study is ITAE. To facilitate its computation in 
MATLAB, the function was discretized using the multiple application version of 
Simpson’s 1/3 Rule. 
 
7) Determine the Reference Function: 
The reference function represents the desired system response. It may be theoretical 
(e.g., step disturbance) or derived from design specifications and safety requirements. 
In this study, the reference function was chosen as the system response with a 2% 
improvement of the PF safety limit, equivalent to operating with the DSC at its design 
limit. This function was chosen to determine if the GA solution can optimize the design 
values.    
  
8) Create a Simulink model of the system: 
This is achieved by using a transfer function representation of the DSC to visualize the 
gain parameters.   
 
9) Code the objective and constraint functions: 
The GA solver, options, and bounds form the main script, which calls the objective 
function to run the Simulink model. The performance function is then evaluated and 
the result returned to the GA solver. Depending on the complexity of the problem and 
computing resources, execution time may be considerable. Nonlinear constraints 
significantly increase runtimes. The GA solver has a parallel computing option to 




3.8. Risk Estimation with FSN 
 Detection of faults depends on the nature of what is causing them, e.g., calibration 
drifts are detected by monitoring equipment while degradation of the detector itself is 
identified during PF testing. Faults can be caused by a variety of reasons starting with 
design deficiencies, ingress of moisture and corrosion due to assembly structure failure, or 
inadequate or incorrect maintenance strategy. A sample fault-to-accident propagation 
scenario is shown in Figure 3.16 for the neutron detector system. Ingress of moisture into 
the detector assembly may occur due to a manufacturing defect, incorrect handling/storage, 
or maintenance. Resultant corrosion will, in turn, lead to faults where regional neutron 
power signals provide misleading readings. Faulty performance can result in reduction or 
loss of trip coverage, which, in turn, can lead to overpowering of fuel in that particular 
zone. Once the fuel sheath fails, the resultant release of gaseous fission products into the 
primary heat transport system (PHT) leads to hazardous conditions at the plant. If 
overheating is not mitigated, it may further propagate into fuel failure, failure of PHT and 
calandria tubes, and a complete disintegration of the reactor core. 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Example of Fault, Failure, Hazard and Accident Model for a Neutron 
Detection System Failure.  
 
As demonstrated in Figure 3.16, faults in the system (e.g. detector failure due to corrosion) 
result in failure to trip, leading to fuel sheath damage, fuel centerline melting and core 
destruction. Table 3.7 below shows classification of faults and groups/systems for the 
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selected case study at different times from the design concept stage to operation and 
maintenance. 
 
Table 3.8: A data acquisition cycle for faults, starting from design stage through to 
ongoing operation and maintenance. 
 Fault Failure Hazard Accident 
Design Y Y Y N 
Manufacturing Y Y N N 
Procurement Y Y N N 
Storage Y Y N N 
Installation Y Y Y N 
Operation Y Y Y Y 
Maintenance Y Y Y Y 
 
 
 An FSN approach is proposed in this thesis for estimation of risk due to degraded 
detector performance (e.g., noise and signal oscillations) and to aid in risk-informed 
decisions for detector maintenance and replacements. In general, a semantic network is a 
structure where nodes show states, and lines between nodes show transitions between the 
states. In that sense, an FSN is a method of representing fault knowledge based on 
relationships between objects, where nodes represent various faults, causes, and 
consequences. Their interconnections are shown by links to show relations between 
concepts. Using network diagrams to represent the connections and process flows of the 
system makes it easier to understand the relationships between various events, especially 
in a larger system where the impact of activities may not be explicit. In these cases, system 
modeling based on FSN may be useful to narrow down the problem areas for analysis or 
to break a large system into smaller components and analyze the linkages between them. 
This approach is also helpful in identification of the correct process variables for analysis. 




 The ontology structure of the system represents how various components of the 
system interact to produce a particular outcome, e.g., how various failure modes impact the 
system performance. Every piece and class of equipment may have more than one potential 
fault associated with it, each due to different hazards. Each unmitigated fault may lead to 
more than one accident scenario. The main objective of the FSN methodology is to 
construct these fault propagation scenarios qualitatively and to use them in risk estimation 
in different design and operation activities.  
 First, a selected set of equipment classes is identified along with their parent class, 
e.g., “detectors” and “sensors.” Each class has its associated identifier (ID) and description. 
Equipment class is related to function, component, and process variables. Failure and faults 
are represented at a generic and equipment level, and failure mode identification (FM-ID) 
is used to describe both faults and failures. Every modern power plant will have some built-
in protection or control barriers, whether passive or active, to provide a defense against 
known failures. To increase effectiveness, protections barriers are typically implemented 
with built-in redundancy. These barriers could be used for prevention, detection, or 
mitigation purposes and could comprise engineering, administrative, or operational 
activities. Resulting hazards and accidents are modeled in header and details entities and 
are linked with “lessons learned” and protection barriers (or controls) available at each step 


















Figure 3.17: Data Acquisition Process Framework. 
 The ontology structure of fault models needs to be constructed such that each failure 
mode (FM) is described using symptoms, enablers, process variables, causes, and 





Figure 3.18: Grouping of Failure Modes into Failure Mode Classes. 
 
This approach accounts for the fact that failure modes of the same system may, in 
conjunction with failures of other systems, lead to significantly different consequences, as 
seen in Figure 3.19.  
 
Figure 3.19: Failure consequences are assigned to a failure consequences class based on 
whether they affect the system on a local level. 
 
A basic causation model of a sample accident progression and control barriers can be 





Figure 3.20: Causation model for a sample accident progression in a detector system. 
 
In this causation model, cable failure was selected to be the initiating event or the 
primary cause. This failure resulted in the increased susceptibility of the system to radio 
frequency (RF), EMI, and other noise sources. In the absence of escalating factors such as 
welding or other maintenance in the vicinity of the instrumentation, this event can be 
mitigated by regular monitoring and inspections. Negative trends in the system response 
would be caught early, and progression of further accident steps could be prevented.  
However, should barrier 1 fail, the system will continue to be affected by high noise 
levels. This accident progression could be stopped by barrier 2—implementation of an 
RF/EMI-free zone around the detector instrumentation. If this barrier fails as well and the 
event resulted in a spurious trip of the system, barrier 3 is activated. Effective, timely 
troubleshooting could identify the cause of system malfunction and initiate the required 
repairs. On the other hand, lack of troubleshooting procedures, the inexperience of 
personnel, fatigue, confusing fast-changing information, and other adverse conditions 
(escalation factor 2) may lead to failure of this barrier. When barrier 3 fails, the accident 
will complete its progression, resulting in a reactor trip.  
The effectiveness of control barriers can be determined by applying semi-
quantitative measures to the evaluation of the frequency of potential incidents and the 
probability of failure. Based on the nature of the hazard, the barrier analysis can be used to 
lower the consequence and frequency of possible incidents to a tolerable risk level. The 
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risk can be established based on the probability of occurrence and consequences, both to 






       [Equation 3.50] 
where: 
•    Ft  - is tolerable frequency; 
•    Fnp -  is Process Demand frequency 
 
    Next, consequences can be assessed based on the projected damage to plant 
equipment, human life and health, ecological and environmental impacts, losses to 
reputation, or financial losses. These can be done both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Once the matrix of consequences and their weights is established, the acceptable risk level 






























Figure 3.21: Projected risk is calculated as a product of the probability of occurrence, i.e. 
frequency, and consequences, adapted from [138]. 
 
This approach is similar to layers of protection analysis (LOPA) method in [138], where 
the adequacy of protection layers is assessed applying semi-quantitative measures. The 
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frequency of potential incidents and the probability of failure of the protection layers are 
evaluated based on [138, 139], a detailed description of the hazard scenario. This approach 
allows one to quantify the expected risk with a known specific amount. Each barrier is 
considered independent of all others, and the effect of a failure of a particular barrier is not 
considered. Thus, each control barrier must address all hazard and accident scenarios it is 
designed for without affecting the integrity of the next one. For example, as shown in 
Figure 3.21, if the absolute risk is greater than the risk acceptance line, additional control 
barriers are required. If an existing barrier does not provide enough protection against the 
projected risk, further mitigating actions or measurements are needed. Thus, the protection 
layer analysis can be used to drive the consequence and/or frequency of potential incidents 
to a tolerable risk level.  
Rules are associated with each transition of the causation model within FSN, as shown in 
Figure 3.22. The rules can be defined either quantitatively (probabilistic) or qualitatively. 
If at least one characteristic or parameter of the system deviates from the acceptable 
condition, a fault is identified. For example, failures related to corrosion might be 
associated with rules such as: 
    IF   (Structure.Material = (X or Y))  
    and (PV= Gas.Pressure)  
    and (Dev = Very-Low)  
    THEN (FM = failure.detector)  
 
 Formal language is proposed to represent process domain knowledge and safety 
control rules, as explained in [124, 125], to facilitate synthesis and validation of fault 
models within FSN. These rules are initially defined in a generic form based on domain 
knowledge, i.e., regardless of plant-specific knowledge, and are then further explained. A 





Figure 3.22: A sample FSN is shown for a case of three (3) initiating causes. 
 
The proposed FSN consists of two layers for static (offline) and dynamic (online) modes. 
Real-time data are gathered for the selected case study and analyzed in MATLAB. The 
model shown in Figure 3.23 is developed within MS Visio to capture and structure process 
design models for process block diagrams (PBD), process flow diagrams (PFD), and piping 
and instrumentation diagram (P&ID), based on ISA-S95/88. 
 




Static FSN includes historical faults, failures, hazards, and accidents structured and linked 
in the form of causation models associated with process equipment. Implementation of 
fault modeling in static FSN starts with a collection of historical data, either from a real 
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process or simulation and observations for each process variable (PV) that is passed to the 
FSN. Using this historical data, the FSN interprets the results and calculates the probability 
of failures and the risks associated with each based on the predefined rules. This principle 
is schematically shown next in Figure 3.24: 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Fault modeling with static FSN. 
 
Dynamic FSN: 
A dynamic FSN, shown in Figure 3.25, is constructed using dynamic simulated or real-
time data that can be obtained from operation, maintenance, safety, and control. After the 
knowledge base has been sufficiently expanded and the accuracy of the forecasting based 
on the historical data reaches a certain level, the system can be used for real-time 
forecasting fault propagation scenarios based on the real-time data. 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Dynamic FSN with risk estimation process. 
 
 New information can be sent to the FSN knowledge database and is used to futher 
train the network to optimize its performance and accuracy of results. It is possible to 
predict the consequences for the posteriori or predicted data for the future faults. 
Probabilistic methods, such as the Bayesian belief network (BBN), are proposed to account 
for potentially incomplete or missing data.  
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 When considering any dynamic activity, it is reasonable to assume that the safety 
status of the whole system is always changing. Parameters of the current control barriers 
can be stored in the database to be taken into account when calculating the risk factor. For 
each fault propagation scenario, a link to control barriers/mitigating actions can be 
established, as shown below in Figure 3.26. 
 
Figure 3.26: Mapping of the Control Barriers (mitigating actions) to FSN. 
 
Estimation of risk to continuous operation of degraded detectors will be based on FSN 
methods. In the example shown below, there are three (3) possible risks associated with 
consequence-1, namely: 
 
 [a] cause-1, failure-1, consequence-1; 
 [b] cause-2, failure-1, consequence-1; 
 [c] cause-3, failure-1, consequence-1. 
 
For independent events, total risk associated with consequence-1 is shown as: 
 
R (Consequence-1) = [(CaFr1 + CaFr2 + CaFr3) * FPr1 * CoPr1] * CoIm1 
[Equation 3.51] 
where: 
 Causal factor CaFr1 is used to define the frequency of cause-1;  
 Probability of failure FPr1 is the probability that failure-1 will occur due to any 
cause; 
 Probability of consequence CoPr1 is the probability that consequence-1 will occur 
due to any cause and failure; 
 CoIm1 is the total impact of consequence-1.  
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The total risk of consequence-2 and consequence-3 can be computed in a similar way. For 
the case when events are codependent, the Bayesian theorem can be applied to determine 







  [Equation 3.52] 
  
The process of diagnosis for detector performance starts when the detector readings are 
obtained. These readings are synthesized with the prior (unconditional probability) of each 
root node, together with conditional probability distributions of each child node. The prior 
of each root node can be determined from the performance of the equipment (e.g., tendency 
to fault) or simply from historical data. The conditional probability distribution (the 
detector reading node) is built according to a noise distribution equation. The intermediate 
node (process node) is a function node, meaning that it is a function of its parent nodes 
only and completely determined by its parents. The joint distribution among the remaining 
six random variables can be established for: 
 sensor bias; 
 process input; 
 process gain; 
 noise variance; 
 noise; 
 sensor reading. 
 
 The Bayesian-based approach can be used for both the static and dynamic 
environments [136]. Also, the model of the static or dynamic system can be trained from 
examples if the model is not available in the analytical form [136]. Unlike neural network-
based controllers, Bayesian algorithms could be used to train systems even in cases when 
some information is missing [136]. Through Bayes theorem, probabilistic inferences can 
be made, e.g., when, for a given time instance, there are two readings available.  
Using this approach, detector response data can be collected daily and analyzed for 
risk factor trends using the event probability calculations shown below:  

















   [Equation 3.53] 
 















  [Equation 3.54] 
 








   [Equation 3.55] 
 















  [Equation 3.56] 
where: 
 d – dormant failure rate, failures per one thousand years; 
 r – running failure rate, failures per one thousand years; 
 fm – frequency of occurrence, occurrences per year; 
 Tm – mission time in hours; 
 Tr – mean time to repair, hours per failure; 
 Tt – test duration where the component is unavailable during test, in hours; 
 Te – average duration of the event, in hours per occurrence; 
 Ta – administration time in hours per failure; 
 Ti – test interval in days; 
 P – probability or unavailability, 0=P=1; 
 (Ta + Tr ) –  restoration time. 
 
The values of d, r, and Tr are obtained from historical records of component failure data. 
The values of Ti and Tt are obtained from station testing practices, and those of fm, Te, and 
Ta are obtained from station maintenance practices. In some cases, the values of d are not 
available; therefore, the r value is used. Since r is usually greater than d this practice 
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tends to conservatively over-predict failure probabilities. Also, in some cases, Ta is much 
larger than Tr, which may then be ignored. 
 The mission time of a system is the time over which the system is required to 
function after the initiating event. One of the main factors that affects the mission time is 
the accessibility of the component in question of repair. For example, a neutron detector 
cable may not be accessible for a substantial period if there are high radiation fields in its 
vicinity. In this study, the mission time was selected to be seventy-two hours, which is a 
conservative value since this allows enough time to take the appropriate mitigating action 
to alter the course of an accident sequence. 
A component/system failure rate and test interval can be assigned to the failure 
event to derive a failure-on-demand probability.  
 The front-end graphical user interface for the data collection can be set up using the 
existing application or tools already in use at the station, e.g., MS Excel. This operation 
mapping solution provides system designers, engineers, and operators with a single view 
of all detectors in a specific unit. All the station detectors are identified and connected to a 
plant information server for near real-time data collection. Next, the specific detectors of 
interest can be selected for analysis in any unit. While the detector data is being retrieved 
and saved, detector performance can be trended against the predefined parameters, e.g., the 
3 and 5% MTT bounds.  
 Historical and real-time information about detector performance is then collected 
and compiled in the FSN knowledge base for analysis of the risk profile and the need for 
appropriate mitigating barriers and their magnitude.  
 
3.8.1. FSN versus the PRA Approach 
 Once the system fault is detected, to determine whether it is acceptable to operate 
the plant in that particular configuration, a risk-based decision needs to be made by utility 
operators. If the potential consequences of an event are unacceptable, regardless of the 
improbability of occurrence, the risk should not be tolerated, and compensatory actions 
commensurate with the safety impact should be implemented.  
 However, assessing the nuclear safety risk of operating in a specific plant 
configuration expected to be in place for a limited period of time is typically not within the 
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scope of the existing station’s probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) procedures and tools. 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 2’s “Literature Review, critical limitation of the current 
PRA methods is due to the assumption that the probabilities of all failure modes of a 
particular component remain the same. The fault data collection is conducted throughout 
the current year and is used to update failure frequency tables on an annual basis. The 
applicable models (unavailability/risk) are evaluated after the failure rate update. The 
model is then rerun with the newly discovered knowledge, and the system unavailability 
analysis can be conducted.  
 Additionally, the accuracy of methods based on pure process history data is greatly 
affected by noisy or missing data and do not present a sound alternative on their own. 
Traditional model-based techniques use a mathematical model of the process and process 
measurement data to detect process faults or failures by comparison to a predefined 
threshold. The main limitation of this approach is the presence of false or nuisance alarms 
if the threshold is set up incorrectly in relation to the current state of the system, e.g., due 
to aging effects. On the other hand, qualitative model-based techniques are based on the 
causal relationship between the process variables and are not concerned with the actual 
values. This limitation does not provide a sound basis for risk-informed decision making, 
which is a critical feature in NPPs due to the nature of the industry and the possibility of 
catastrophic outcomes of wrong decisions.  
 PRA methods based on the FTA/ETA approach model propagation of accident 
sequences following initiating events and are commonly used for assessing probability, 
progression, and consequences of equipment failures at NPPs but are mostly static, i.e., it 
does not undergo frequent changes and updates. The proposed approach based on FSN 
methodology has a great advantage in the fact that the plant data can be continuously 
collected, expanded, and transferred as needed. It is possible that additional initiating 
events may be identified during operating experience review or as new research and 
knowledge becomes available. Parent-child relational structures of an FSN allow for ease 
of knowledge transfer and result in great savings in terms of time and resources required 
for knowledge-based maintenance. Fault probabilities calculated by an FSN can be 
dynamically updated as new knowledge becomes available and even in cases of missing or 
incomplete data. For example, a comparison of system unavailability statistics based on 
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the assumed component failure rates and actual component failure rates based on operating 
experience is critical for risk-informed and cost-effective safety-driven decisions. 
However, if due to a specific system configuration, a safety system is required to be placed 
in an unusual state for a short duration, risk evaluation can still be performed without 
waiting for the annual PRA model updates by using the instantaneous risk estimated from 
the FSN. FSN-based methodology can be used to incorporate the plant-specific observed 
failures with generic failure rates to determine the immediate instantaneous risk and 
compare it with the existing margin.  
 Using the proposed FSN approach, all collected data is initially stored in the 
database, where data is classified according to the rules described earlier, e.g., equipment 
data, class data, etc. All previous maintenance data, historical failure data, and expert 
knowledge are considered as well since they contain a valuable list of symptoms, diagnosis 
modules, remedies, and associated rules. A system performance assessment model in an 
FSN can be shown as a BBN directed graph together with a set of probability tables, as 
shown in Figure 3.27. 
 
 
Figure 3.27: Performance Assessment Model using a BBN Directed Graph. 
 
The graph consists of nodes and arcs, where the nodes represent variables, e.g., test 
frequency. In this case, it is discrete with values such as 0, 1, 2… The node “performance” 
is continuous, such as the probability of failure on demand. The directed arrows, or arcs, 
represent causal relationships between variables. For example, the number of faults in test 
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accuracy is influenced by the human performance, i.e., skill and experience of the test 
personnel, and the service conditions of the detectors. The node probability table (NPT) 
captures the conditional probabilities of a node given the state of its parent nodes. The 
incoming new information can then be sent to the FSN knowledge database and is used to 
further train the network to optimize its performance and accuracy of results, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.28. 
 
Figure 3.28: The process of learning BBN structure and probability parameters. 
 
Probability parameters of BBN are conditional distributions relating random variables and 
their parents. Inference is the process of computing the probabilities of each variable based 
on evidence that has been specified, in this case based on observations of plant data. The 
inference process extends the knowledge base automatically and updates the network 




Figure 3.29: New data is dynamically incorporated into the BBN. 
 
The failure rate trend analysis can be performed using the following meta-algorithm: 
 
1. Identify the starting point for the failure rate trend analysis, 
2. Identify the moving intervals for the trend analysis, 
3. Extract data for the first interval, 
4. Calculate the failure rate, 
5. If the failure rates exhibit successive increasing value for each of the intervals, then 
the test identifies an increasing trend for the group failure mode, e.g.: 
 
IF(L2>K2, IF(K2>J2, IF(J2>I2,"TRUE","FALSE"),"FALSE")) 
where: 
 I2 - is the failure rate in the first interval; 
 J2  - is the failure rate in the second interval;  
 K2 - is the failure rate in the third interval; 
 L2 -  is the failure rate in the fourth interval;   
 TRUE  - identifies an increasing trend; 
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 FALSE - identifies no increasing trend. 
 
6. If the failure rates exhibit successive decreasing value for each of the intervals, then 




 I2 -  is the failure rate in the first interval; 
 J2  - is the failure rate in the second interval;  
 K2 - is the failure rate in the third interval; 
 L2 - the failure rate in the fourth interval; 
 TRUE - identifies a decreasing trend; 
 FALSE - identifies no decreasing trend. 
 
7. If neither an increasing nor a decreasing trend is observed, then the failure rates 
exhibit no trend.  
8. Calculate the component failure rate, RATE_NEW, 
9. Compare the RATE_NEW against the fifth percentile and ninety-fifth percentile: 
If the RATE_NEW value is greater than the ninety-fifth percentile, then the failure 
rate is considered a statistically significant increase. If the RATE_NEW value is 
less that the fifth percentile, then the failure rate is considered a statistically 
significant decrease. If the RATE_NEW value is within the fifth and ninety-fifth 
percentile, then no statistically significant change in failure rate has been observed. 
10. When a statistically significant increase in failure rate is observed, follow up with 
a calculation of the available margin and comparison to the limiting criterion. 
 
In a risk assessment process, determination of the available margin and the need for 
immediate compensatory actions is a fundamental requirement. The available margin can 
be calculated as the difference between the applicable safety goal and the risk baseline 
frequency: 




The risk of core-damage is expressed as a baseline frequency, which is normalized by 
dividing by a zero-maintenance state. The baseline is only subtracted if the baseline model 
is used in the calculation of risk that would occur if there are interdependencies between 
the new components and the baseline model.   
 If there are no interdependencies, then the calculation can be completed in isolation 
from the baseline model. In this case, the calculation is the risk increment (RI) above the 
baseline model. The RI can be shown as the increase in the baseline risk as the result of a 
risk activity. This can be shown as a difference between the instantaneous risk (IR) and the 
baseline risk (BR). 
 
RI = IR – BR*ΔT      [Equation 3.58] 
where: 
 ΔT – duration of risk state. 
 Typically, the duration of risk state is calculated in hours; thus, the RI can be expressed 
as: 
RI = IR – BR*ΔT/8760hr     [Equation 3.59] 
 
Next, the need and the extent of the compensatory actions can be determined. For example, 
the magnitude of the acceptable RI can be limited to no more than 10% of the available 
margin, and the total risk due to all maintenance activities in the system can be limited to 
25% of the available margin.  
 
3.9. Summary  
 In this chapter, a methodology for new detector model development and set-up in 
Simulink is given. The models are created to represent behavior of aged in-core flux 
detectors while accurately modeling plant transient response during normal fueling 
operations and power ramp-up. The models are customized for three (3) typical transient 
cases where detector noise and signal oscillations are accounted for.  
 Additional methodology on denoising of plant data is discussed using LPF and 
WTA to minimize the noise impact on the plant transient scenarios. Methods for 
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dimensionality reduction and pattern recognition to work with both linear and nonlinear 
data were explored as well, particularly as they pertain to the detector signal oscillation 
phenomenon. These aspects are not the primary focus of this thesis but are considered 
important enhancements.  
A GA is proposed as a heuristic technique for solving optimization and search 
problem for the optimal set of the DSC gain constants. It is expected that this heuristic 
approach can be useful to reduce the amount of computational effort required to find an 
acceptable solution to a problem while still satisfying the main performance criteria of ≤1% 
of impact to the MTT.  
 To assess whether the risk to continuous operation due to this detector degradation 
is acceptable, this study proposes using  FSN methods as the means to justify the proposed 
life extension. The main advantage of the FSN methodology is that it provides a qualitative-
quantitative approach to fault identification and is both model-based as well as process-
history based. Thus, in addition to reliance on personnel judgment and subjective opinions, 
this method provides a qualitative model where the causal relationship between the process 
variables is established and mapped using associations between PVs and information about 




Chapter 4: Case Studies 
This chapter describes the selected case studies to demonstrate various aspects of 
detector aging where the proposed research methods will be applied. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate how the proposed methodology can be used to provide a 
range of tools that may be drawn from to facilitate detector life extension. There are three 
(3) main cases examined: noise reduction, detector signal oscillations, and detector 
dynamic response degradation, as shown in Table 4.1. Each study is presented in the format 
of an operational challenge and proposed solution.  
 




Challenge  Impact Proposed  
Methodology 
1 Noise Reduction Potential complications due to 
detector noise, particularly 
during fueling operations.  
LPF and WTA 
2 Detector Signal 
Oscillations  
Potential complications due to 
detector signal oscillations 
PCA, wPCA, and 
NLPCA  




The detector response, including 
PF and delayed components, is 
understood for nominal detectors 
but is less known for aged 
detectors. 
Develop aged detector 
models for typical plant 
transients 
(MATLAB/Simulink) 
and optimize PF values 







4.1. Case Study One: Operational Challenges and Proposed Solutions for Noise 
Reduction 
 
4.1.1. Operational Challenge—Increasing Noise Factor 
 The existing PF management methodology does not account for potential 
complications due to detector noise, particularly during fueling operations. However, basic 
noise analysis techniques, such as plotting detector response versus time, show that the 
overall noise factor for in-core neutron detectors is continuing to increase in severity. In 
this analysis, noise factor refers to the magnitude of variation in the time-series signal 
compared to the mean (or baseline) for that channel. Some detectors are affected more than 
others, e.g., in the trend in Figure 4.1, detector AF3H shows substantially worse 
performance than detector AF10E. This adverse trend is expected to continue into the 
future, consistent with detector aging and component wear and tear.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Noise factor trends for two detectors. AF3H (dark-blue trend) is substantially 




 A particularly noisy neutron detector, designated here as AF10F, was selected for 
this case study. This detector has been out of service for some years due to erratic response. 
The AF10F signal was observed to be noisy in January 2011, February 2011, and April 
2014, as shown below in Figure 4.2. The detector signal appears contaminated with random 
spikes, both positive and negative, shown in blue. A control detector, designated as AF11F, 
is shown in red and performs steadily as expected.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Data trend of AF10F (blue) and AF11F (red) performance on April 18, 2014.  
 
 Analysis of the sampled AF10F detector signal showed that perturbations of the 
digital switching (about 14 kHz) were superimposed upon the 115-60 Hz waveform and 
coupled into the wiring of the system. Even though best efforts are made to improve cable 
connections and shielding to minimize or eliminate the introduction of noise, these sources 
are still strong contributors and result in a large amount of corrupted, incomplete, or noisy 
data. Periodic, short-lived transients (spikes) due to the inverter switching circuitry are also 
still prominent in the amplifier signals. A newer model of amplifiers resolved the 14 kHz 




 To obtain data for this case study, a Yokogawa DL750 data logger was connected 
to the detector amplifier and used to capture detector signal. A portion of the AF10F signal 
with three distinct peaks was selected as shown in Figure 4.3:  
 
Figure 4.3: The signal appears to be visibly contaminated with random noise. 
 
 The true signal waveform is unclear due to the presence of noise, but several 
irregularities can be noted. First, at the beginning of the trend, there is a large negative 
signal spike of approximately ~2.5V. Second, during the test interval, there is a visible 
disturbance with three large signal spikes in both positive and negative direction ranging 
in the magnitude of 0.25V to 0.4V. These voltage spikes have a very short duration (~0.003 
to ~0.08 seconds). Lastly, there are two large spikes at the end of the test interval. 
Yokogawa data-logger DL750 data was imported into MATLAB software, and the portion 




Figure 4.4: Portion of the original noisy signal selected for analysis is shown in two pink 
discriminator lines.  
 
The original noisy signal is shown in the lower graph, while the upper graph shows a 
zoomed-in area of interest. Several peaks of different amplitudes were detected in this 
portion of the data set by observation, and the signal waveform appears near Gaussian.     
 
Figure 4.5: Curve fitting of the identified peaks. The waveform appears near-Gaussian. 
 
4.1.2. Proposed Methodology for Noise Mitigation  
Plant data, in this case, appears to be contaminated with random signal spikes, both 
positive and negative, lasting for very brief time intervals. Two methods (namely LPF and 















WT) will be used to denoise data. Theoretical predictions will be compared to the 
experimental results for the LPF method. Additionally, it is proposed to evaluate whether 
a hardware modification (a long-term permanent physical implementation of a causal and 
stable low-pass filtering feature) can be used to increase the input impedance of the 
amplifier to reduce the input noise current. 
 
4.2. Case Study Two: Operational Challenges and Proposed Solutions for 
Detector Signal Oscillations  
 In this thesis, the term “oscillation” is used to describe unexpected variations in 
detector signals during seemingly normal operation. 
 
4.2.1. Operational Challenge—Signal Oscillations Phenomenon 
The existing PF management methodology does not consider potential 
complications due to detector signal oscillations, particularly when combined with noise, 
during fueling operations. From the operational perspective, of greatest concern is the 
resultant potential for a reduced MTT. An example of signal oscillations is shown below 
in Figure 4.6. In this case, the signal variations occur simultaneously in zones 6 and 7, 
located on the northeast (NE) side of the reactor, but in the opposite direction of zones 8 
and 9, on the northwest (NW) side. This behavior is unexpected because the in-core 
detector signals and liquid zone controller levels are not synchronized with the 












Figure 4.6: Trends of in-core neutron detector AF13H (red), reactor-regulating system detector signals, and liquid zone control levels 
(green and blue). 
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 Previously performed engineering analysis confirmed that the detector loops and 
zone controllers operated correctly in every case where signal oscillations were present but 
failed to identify the root cause of unexpected system performance due to a high number 
of potential suspects, i.e., potential variables that could affect detector output. 
 A similar phenomenon (shown below in Figure 4.7) was noted at several NPPs in 
Canada. For example, from 1999 to 2003, a detector (designated here as detector 4F) was 
showing steady performance with relatively little noise present. At midyear point in 2003, 
an unexplained adverse change in the detector signal occurred. A high rate of signal 
variations persisted until January 2010, when the detector signal returned to its previous 
performance with minimum disturbances.  
 
Figure 4.7: Detector performance trend example for January 1999 – January 2011. 
 
 The main concern, in this case, is the impact on MTT, both during normal operation 
and particularly during refueling. A trend of typical margin at normal full power operation 
sampled every five (5) minutes across four reactor units is shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
Clear shift at mid-year point 
2003 





Figure 4.8: A typical margin for Shutdown System detectors at full power. 
 
 Analysis of plant data shows that during a typical high-power operation, 66% of 
the time there was less than 7.5% margin available, and there were no events where margin 
exceeded 10%. Thus, to maintain the required margin, reactor power de-rates were 
required. Cases where the available margin drops even further due to poor neutron detector 
performance add to the existing burden for operators and challenge both production and 
safety.  
 In an ideal case, e.g., with 105 detectors randomly distributed with two-out-of-three 
trip logic, the required detector setting can be shown as: 
RDS = CPPF x Pwr = 110%  [Equation 4.1] 
where: 
 CPPF – is the minimum issued channel power peaking factor = 1.10,  
 trip setpoint = 122%, 
 all units operating at 100% FP.  
 
Thus, the maximum achievable margin is 12% when a reactor is operating at 100%. 
1 Month of Full Power Operation Across 4 Units (Sampled every 5 minutes)
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The impact of margin reduction due to signal oscillation can be seen by comparing trends 
shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 below, where the margin was reduced by 2% on average 
due to signal variation. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Margin in the absence of signal variations, February 20, 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Impact on margin when signal variations are present, February 19, 2012. 
 
 The unexplained detector signal behavior is always present during high power 
operation at greater than 86% FP and typically results in a 2 to 3% decrease in margin. The 
specific concern for this study is that random onsets of variations in detector signals can 
result in an increased number of parameter trips. Subsequently, they can reduce the 
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effective operational margin to a reactor trip, challenging the assumptions used in the safety 
analysis.  
 
4.2.2. Proposed Solution—Dimensionality Reduction with PCA, wPCA, and NLPCA 
with ANN 
There appear to be multiple fast-changing process variables that must be analyzed 
simultaneously to establish the main contributing factors of system faults. Plant data 
dimensionality reduction is important in this case. It is necessary to identify the cause of 
related process variation to identify the cause of detector signal oscillations. The PCA and 
wPCA algorithms will be used for dimensionality reduction and modified to work with 
both linear and nonlinear data to support cases where linearity is not known in advance 
using NLPCA with the ANN. 
 
4.3. Case Study Three: Operational Concerns and Solutions for Decrease in 
Detector Dynamic Response (PF) 
The detector response, including PF and delayed components, is understood for nominal 
detectors but is less known for aged detectors. Measurements of detector performance at 
NPPs focus on assessing detector prompt fraction and replacement of detectors that are no 
longer considered fit for duty.  
 
4.3.1. Operational Challenge—Management of Degrading PFs with Noise and Signal 
Oscillations for Transient Scenarios 
 As discussed in the previous two sections, the existing PF management 
methodology does not account for potential complications due to degraded PFs of the 
neutron detectors, signal oscillations, and noise, during fueling operations. Certain neutron 
detectors tend to exhibit an unusually high response to fueling operations of nearby 
channels. As reactor units age, to extend the service life of pressure tubes, it is necessary 
to use depleted fuel bundles or selectively defuel some channels in the core. Therefore, 
detector responses to fueling increase over time, and certain channels are considered high-
risk actors based on the magnitude of change. In the example in Figure 4.11, the upper red 
trend delineates a 5% MTT and the upper dotted line 3% MTT. Examination of the trend 
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suggests that the response of detector H3 (dark red) is significantly greater than G12 
(purple) and often challenges both MTT limits. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: High response of detector H3 versus a steadier performance of detector G12.  
 
This trend is expected to continue with detector aging and PF degradation, and may 
present significant challenges from a nuclear safety as well as operational point of view.  
 
4.3.2. Proposed Solution—Extension of Methodology for Assessing Impact of DSC 
 Amplifier Gain Change 
The existing detector gain setting methodology does not consider potential 
complications discussed earlier, namely, aging, noisy detectors with high response to 
fueling, oscillations, or reactor power maneuvers following a prolonged outage. This thesis 
proposes to extend a detector gain setting methodology to address these gaps. In this thesis, 
it is proposed to develop an aged detector model assuming a proportional increase of all 
delayed components. Thus, only the fastest delayed components are impacted by aging 
effects and will be included in the new detector models for analysis. This approach will 
maximize the operational impact from the perspective of reductions in MTT of changes in 
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detector PF. When certain neutron detectors exhibit an unusually high response to fueling 
coincidental with a signal oscillation, the impact on MTT may be even more significant. 
This scenario seems never to have been evaluated before, and no simulations of aged 
detector response to fueling superimposed on a signal oscillation were found to exist in 
open literature or proprietary sources. Similarly, some detectors tend to exhibit an 
unusually high response to reactor power maneuvers, particularly during startups. Thus, 
the proposed detector models will have to account for these transient scenarios. The focus 
will be on developing new detector models for particular cases of interest in 
MATLAB/Simulink. The models will be used along with plant data to confirm the impact 
of gain changes on the MTT assumptions in the safety analysis. 
 
4.4. Risk Estimation 
 Currently, NPP operators cannot monitor instantaneous risk nor have a graphical 
representation of neutron detector risk status in real time. Similarly, the existing PRA tools 
do not enable plant users to perform risk assessments for what-if scenarios prior to entering 
a particular new plant configuration. For example, if a certain detector exhibits noisy 
response, there are no tools or operator aids to determine the risk to continuous operation 
if the condition persists for a certain time period, e.g., two weeks. A decision to replace a 
suspected faulty detector often results in penalties and reductions to the MTT. Since 
detector replacements involve complex tradeoffs among safety, plant economics, and 
equipment availability, it is desirable to have an additional tool for making more accurate 
risk-informed decisions for monitoring the health status of the detector systems. 
 This thesis proposes an FSN-based solution to address this gap and to complement 
the existing PRA tools. The instantaneous risk estimation in an FSN can be used to review 
the impact of scheduled maintenance activities on risk, evaluate the magnitude of the 
detector system impairments due to noise or signal oscillations, and provide operators with 
the appropriate mitigating actions to minimize the level and the duration of high-risk 




Chapter 5: Results Analysis 
In this chapter, results of testing new detector models, denoising and dimensionality 
reduction, PF optimization, and risk estimation results are given. The study is summarized 
in a table at the end of the chapter, where execution, main performance criteria, and results 
relevant to each case are given. 
 







Case Description  Execution Performance Criteria 
5.1.1 Model Validation  Detector responses to fueling 
and oscillations assumed to 
be 10% of full power and 6% 
respectively. 
Detector response to the 
power ramp of 16% in 
ten (10) seconds. 
5.1.2 DSC Difference 16% Ramp/10 sec for aged 
detectors 
MTT loss ≤1% 
5.2.1 Denoising and 
Smoothing of Data 
LPF SNR ≥110/1 
5.2.2 Denoising and 
Smoothing of Data 
with WTA 
MWT  SNR ≥110/1  
5.3.1 Dimensionality 
Reduction 









NLPCA Check for non-linear 
behavior based on 
pattern recognition in a 
3D PC space. 
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5.1 Model Validation—Old versus New DSC Gain Settings and Comparison to 
FUELPIN Predictions 
 A detector model is developed using mathematical/electrical circuit models with an 
MATLAB/Simulink software package, as discussed in Chapter 3. The assumptions on the 
detector signal are that the response of all detectors to the neutron flux are linear and 
composed of a prompt response and a linear combination of delayed fractions. The PF has 
the largest gain and is a direct component (i.e., no delay, dominating for the limiting 
accident). 
Case Description  Execution Performance Criteria 
5.4. DSC Model  for 
Transient Scenarios 
Application of the new gains  Residual DSC error 
≤1% 
5.5 Optimization of 
DSC gain 
coefficients 
GA solver in MATLAB Residual DSC error 
≤1% 




Figure 5.1: A detector model showing the prompt and the delayed groups. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows a Simulink model of an aged in-core detector response to the power ramp 
of 16% in ten (10) seconds. In this model, the nominal values for the delayed components 
are shown, e.g., at time constants of 3.9 seconds, 30 seconds, etc. The model has four (4) 
constant matrices: A, B, C, and D. Values for constants and parameters in the Simulink 
models are obtained from the original design documentation. The initial value for the 
neutron flux is assumed to be 1.0 n/cm2.s for stylized cases. For the cases where measured 
data is preprocessed, the initial conditions will be set to the initial sample value, and an 
inverse of the transform is applied to reconstruct the signal at the detector. The new gains 
are then applied to the reconstructed signal. The response of the model is compared to the 
plant data for a stylized case in FUELPIN to validate the model output. This case considers 
the impact of the gain factor change on a fueling transient coincidental with a detector 
signal oscillation. New proposed gains are implemented in this model along with the old 
gain values to compare with the FUELPIN code predictions. The assumptions for the 
magnitude of the signal oscillations are as as follows:  
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 Based on historical observations, detector responses to fueling are conservatively 
assumed to be 10% of FP, 
 The magnitude of the signal oscillation is assumed to be 6%, based on historical 
trends. 
 
The simulation results are shown below in Figure 5.2. The results suggest that the simulated 
ramp rate with the maximum DSC gain constants is conservative (i.e., faster) compared to 
actual fuelling and oscillation rates.  
 
Figure 5.2: 16% ramp/10 sec for aged in-core flux detectors. The simulated ramp rate 
with the new DSC gain constants is shown in red. 
 
It can be observed that the response is under-prompt, which is as expected. The 
compensated signal with new gains better matches the input power. The maximum MTT 
loss due to the gain change was 1.0%, as shown in shown in Figure 5.3 below. The results 




Figure 5.3: DSC difference—16% ramp/10 sec for aged detectors. 
 
Next, it is important to confirm that the proposed optimized gains will not result in the 
unacceptable reduction in MTT following transients such as those observed from fueling 
operations. Prior to adjusting the DSC gains to determine the potential operational impact, 
the plant data is denoised and reduced in dimensionality so that the model can be validated 
with a large historical dataset for the typical plant transients such as those observed from 
fueling operations near noisy detectors and oscillations of the detector signals impacting 
the MTT. 
 
5.2 Denoising and Smoothing of Data 
The peak data was acquired using flat baseline correction and threshold criteria shown 
below: 
 Slope threshold (SlopeT) = 0.00017778 
 Smooth width (SmoothW) = 25 points 
 Fit width (FitW) = 107 points 




Peak Summary Statistics are shown below in Table 5.2. The peak analysis results and 
histograms of the peak data are shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4.     
  
Table 5.2: The peak summary statistics. 
 
  Peak#       Position        Height      Width Area 
1 0.6872 0.04421 0.04421 0.03235 
2 0.13057 0.65297 0.04965 0.03452 
 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of the peak analysis results. 
 
 Interval Height Width Area 
Maximum 0.050553 0.6872 0.04965 0.03452 
Minimum 0.050553 0.65297 0.04421 0.03235 
Mean 0.050553 0.67009 0.04693 0.03343 
% STD 0 3.6113 8.1978 4.5933 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Histograms of the peak data. 
 




Histogram of intervals between peak positions




Histogram of peak heights




Histogram of peak widths




Histogram of peak areas
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Next, to determine the closest waveform of the peaks, several iterations of curve fitting of 
the selected peaks were performed, alternating among Gaussian, Lorentzian, logistic, 
Pearson, exponential pulse, alpha function, and Voigt profile. The Gaussian waveform 




Figure 5.5: Gaussian—the closest curve fitting results with the highest accuracy. 
 
Table 5.4: Signal statistics for unprocessed original signal. 
 
1,500 total points from x= 0 to 0.2998 
Interval between points = 0.0002 to 0.0002 
min/max Y = 0.547/0.7352 
No baseline correction 
Smooth: = 3 point No, Ends = 0 
Selected range: 375 points from x=0.1124 to 0.1872 
Peak-to-peak Y: 0.1207   
Standard deviation: 0.0232  
Area: 0.04521 
 
5.2.1 Signal Processing with LPF—Results 
 Next, the signal smoothing was performed using rectangular, triangular, Gaussian, 
and Savitsky-Golay approaches. The summary of signal statistics for each method is shown 




Peaks = 2     Shape = Gaussian     Error = 2.32% 
Peak #          Position        Height         Width             Area
1 0.07995 0.1038 0.01047 0.001157




in Table 5.5. Of greatest interest is the resultant SNR as compared to the typical SNR of 
110/1 for these detectors.  
 
Table 5.5: Comparison of signal de-noised results using the four proposed methods. Of 
most interest is the filter performance in terms of the obtained SNR.  
 
  Tri Rec Gaussian Savitzky-Golay 
Position 0.15053 0.15058 0.15052 0.15055 
Height 0.59489 0.59491 0.59482 0.59493 
Width 0.11125 0.11045 0.11414 0.10952 
Gaussian area 0.07045 0.069949 0.072273 0.069362 
Total area 0.045211 0.045211 0.045212 0.045211 
R2 0.19606 0.12588 0.22719 0.12843 
SNR 122.9 92.5 142.1 92.5 
 
5.2.2 Signal De-Noising with WTA – Results 
Denoising using WTA of a one-dimensional signal was performed with the 
assumption that the sample signal is a general 1-D function with random Gaussian 
distributed variables. Following the approach described in the methodology sections, the 
data was transformed into the wavelet domain, thresholds were selected for the wavelet 
coefficients, and the transform was inverted. Various threshold options were applied to 
determine the optimal denoise approach. Stein’s Unbiased Risk Estimate (SURE) is based 
on the quadratic loss function and a combination of a fixed-form threshold equal to 
sqrt(2*log(length(y)). The SURE threshold produced the most conservative results. Similar 
to the SURE method, the threshold based on the minimax [28] principle was also successful 
at reducing noise, particularly when small details of the signal lie in the noise range. Signal 
decomposition was used for the assumption that nonwhite noise might be present in the 
signal. Comparison of the denoising metrics for each approach is compiled in Table 5.6 
below. Notably, the WTA approach did not produce the desired SNR of ≥110/1.  
 






level5sym8 softSURE stddev 
mean squared error 0.000278 0.000278 0.000278 
mean absolute error 0.013279 0.013268 0.013279 
SNR (dB)   31.308271  31.316610  31.308271  
peak SNR (dB)  32.886957  32.895296  32.886957  
cross correlation  0.809729 0.810137 0.809729 
 
5.2.3 Comparison of Results and Selection of the Method for Implementation  
 Two (2) methods, namely LPF and WTA, were used to obtain theoretical predictions 
of noise reduction efficiency. Overall, LPFs used in this study performed better than the 
WTA for reducing the high-frequency components of a signal while retaining the low-
frequency components. Smoothing methods were useful for removal of sharp spikes of not 
normally distributed random noise. The results show that the most considerable noise 
reduction was obtained from the pseudo-Gaussian method along with the highest 
improvement in SNR (≥110). The Savitsky-Golay smoothing algorithm yielded the 
smallest reduction in peak height but offered the least reduction in noise amplitude.  
 Application of wavelet analysis techniques combined with smoothing of derivatives 
produced less desirable results in terms of an acceptable SNR and loss of signal amplitude. 
This method showed better capabilities to eliminate the high frequency components of 
noise, where most of the white noise energy is concentrated, but did not demonstrate the 
desired SNR improvement. One characteristic of the wavelets is that they account for the 
nonstationarity of the data. Thus, intuitively, the MWT approach should perform better or, 
as a minimum, produce results similar to the standard LPF filtering. However, one of the 
challenges in the wavelet filtering may be due to the choice of the wavelets for this study. 
The basis function needs to be selected such that it closely matches input signal. Then, 
using the level of decomposition, it is possible to control the frequency bands that are 
classified as useful data or noise. The scaling function is the low pass component, and the 
wavelets are subsequent bands of higher and higher frequency. Therefore, further work is 
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required for the choice of wavelet method, filter, and length to determine their implications 
for the expected signal denoising results with the optimal SNR values. 
 The results of this study show that the greatest noise reduction was obtained from the 
pseudo-Gaussian method along with the highest improvement in SNR compared to the 
WTA approach. Therefore, the LPF approach was selected for experimental validation at 
the plant.  
 
5.2.4 Implementation and Validation with Plant Data 
 The LPF approach was used to validate the theoretical response using plant data for 
one of the detectors in the case study. None of the interfacing devices, such as cables and 
connectors, is included within the scope of this study. A digital LPF was applied as a 
temporary design change to a noisy neutron detector, designated as AF10F. This detector 
loop has been out of service for some years due to the erratic response observed from the 
associated in-core flux detector. The initial signal was decomposed into its frequency 
components, and the high frequency components were suppressed. Next, detector signal 
cable was reconnected to the amplifier AF10F while remaining disconnected from the 
safety system trip circuit. Plant data from July 15, 2016, to August 1, 2016, was 
downloaded and analyzed to check the detector response. The original unfiltered signal and 
the filtered signal are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7,  respectively. 
 





Figure 5.7: AF10F response—filtered signal with random spikes visibly removed. 
 
Several additional cases were analyzed to validate the detector response (post-filter) against 
introduced transients, and the results are shown below in Figures 5.8, Figure 5.9, Figure 
5.10, Figure 5.11, and Figure 5.12.  Both the steady state and transient conditions were 
carefully selected to correspond to specific operating conditions at the plant, namely: 
 A controlled power maneuver,  
 Steady-state operation, 
 Fueling near the AF10F detector, 
 Comparison with a control and an adjacent detector. 
 
Case 1: Response to a Controlled Power Maneuver Test. 
AF10F response (shown in blue in Figure 5.8) was recorded during a system test along 




Figure 5.8: Testing AF10F response to a system test compared to some nearby detectors. 
 
In this trend, plant data is captured at a sample rate of 0.5Hz with minimal filtering. The 
analysis shows that AF10F closely followed changes in power with other nearby detectors 
(designated here as AF9F, AF11F, and AF12F). The gain to normalize AF10F in line with 
other amplifiers was not adjusted at the time the test was performed, and as such, AF10F 
appears with an offset. 
 
Case 2: Response during Steady-State Operation  
A steady-state response was monitored and analyzed for the data collection period, as can 
be seen below in Figure 5.9. Examination of this trend shows that from July 15, 2016, to 
August 1, 2016, no erratic indication, high noise, or signal drift was observed. Both the 






Figure 5.9: Response to steady-state conditions is shown in the left-side portion of the 
graph; AF10F is shown in red. 
Case 3: Response to Fueling 
Due to the physical location of detector AF10F, it was expected that fueling of fuel channel 
X10 would result in a visible level of localized changes in flux. Fueling of channel X10 
occurred on July 29, 2016, and the response of AF10F can be seen below in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: AF10F response during fueling of channel X10. 
 
The equivalent fueling runs in another reactor unit were investigated to interpret this 
response. The AF10F detector in the case study response closely followed the comparable 
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trends of equivalent fueling runs, as seen next. The response of a modified AF10F appears 
to be consistent with the expected behavior shown in Figure 5.11. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Response of another AF10F detector at a different unit during fueling (for 
baseline comparison). 
 
Case 4: Comparison of AF11F (Control Detector) and AF12F (Adjacent Detector) 
Finally, detector AF10F performance was trended against the control detector AF11F, as 
shown in Figure 5.12. AF11F detector was designated because of its location in the same 
instrumentation channel and acceptable performance over time. Detector AF12F is a 





Figure 5.12: AF10F detector response post modification (shown in red) versus the control 
detector, AF11F (shown in blue), and another nearby detector in the same channel, 
AF12F. 
 
In this case, the data was collected from July 15, 2016, to August 1, 2016. The first 
significant spike (in the negative direction) occurs during a scheduled control power 
reduction and is expected. The last spike in the graph below occurs when the data logger 
was disconnected and is expected. Overall, the AF10F detector signal appears consistent 
with the control detector AF11F as well as AF12F (another nearby detector in the same 
channel). 
 
5.2.5 Performance Acceptance—Criteria and Results 
 In addition to the SNR requirements, the performance acceptance criterial for the 
detector outfitted with an LPF includes evaluation of inherent noise in power measurement 
signal during normal online operation. As discussed in the previous section, based on the 
four (4) case studies, the results are deemed acceptable. No increase in inherent output 
noise is observed. While no tolerance can be provided as to what the acceptable noise-to-
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signal ratio is, engineering judgment can be used when comparing signal quality before 
and after the installation (for the same detector). The comparison is limited to the interval 
where the corresponding detector with LPF is trended against control and adjacent 
detectors in the same channel.  
 Another performance acceptance criterion for the affected detector is to track 
changes in reactor power, either during power maneuvers or fueling. Responses of the 
detector with LPF are identical to the trends of the detectors to which they were compared. 
There will be offsets in power levels being indicated (due to normalization and CPPF 
values or CPPF penalties). Hence, the evaluation will be limited to observing the degree of 
agreement between the affected and the adjacent detectors. It is expected that all of them 
will be registering an increase in power—or a decrease in power should a power maneuver 
occur. The complete ramp-down/ramp-up in reactor power is not part of the criterion of the 
filter credibility because the detector was already tested on all power levels during bench 
calibration. There is very little to be gained by observing a ramp-down/ramp-up. The tests 
shown in this section demonstrate that the results in all cases are positive. 
 
5.3 Dimensionality Reduction with PCA and wPCA  
 Plant data for the selected case study was arranged into a 108x2200 dataset, and a 
108x2200 data matrix was created and exported from Excel datasheet into MATLAB for 
analysis in PCA, wPCA, and NLPCA. 
 
5.3.1 Results—PCA 
 For the first iteration of a PCA algorithm for 108x2200 matrix, the sample data was 




Figure 5.13: 108x108 principal component space after first PCA rendition of the sample 
dataset. Due to a large number of variables, it is difficult to interpret the results. 
 
This identified a challenge with traditional PCA analysis. In cases with more than three (3) 
variables, it is difficult to visualize their relationships. The graph does show principal 
component space, but due to the number of variables, it is also difficult to determine which 
specific component has the most weight. Next, the following assumption was made: each 
principal component is a linear combination of the original variables and all the principal 
components are orthogonal to each other, so there is no redundant information. Thus, there 
should be no need for redundant information in the process data.  
 Following this assumption, all channelized measurements were removed from the 
historical sample of data, thus reducing the number of PVs to fourteen. Also, the focus time 
interval was shortened to one (1) hour. The sampling frequency was increased to ten (10) 
seconds. The second iteration of the PCA analysis was repeated on the restricted dataset. 
The results are given in Figure 5.14 below, where the principle components are shown as 





























Figure 5.14: PCA analysis results showing the multivariate distance of each observation 
from the center of the dataset, with the most prominent vectors corresponding to X2, X6, 
and X5 variables. 
 
Each observation of data is projected on the axis so that the resulting values form a 
new variable. Variability of this parameter is of particular interest; it is the maximum 
among all possible choices. The process is repeated for the second and third principal 
components to obtain the variance of this variable among all possible choices of the second 
axis. All fourteen variables are represented by blue vectors in Figure 5.14. Direction and 
length of each vector show how each variable contributes to the principal components.  
In this case, the algorithm generated a new set of variables (principal components). 
Each principal component is a linear combination of the original variables. The original 
variables—in our case, instances of PVs—are represented by a point, and their locations 
indicate the score of each measurement for the two (2) factors. Coordinates of each point 
indicate the score of each observation for the principal components in the plot. The points 
are scaled to fit within the unit square, so only their relative locations can be determined 
from the plot. Process variables are represented in this plot by blue vectors, and the 
direction and length indicate how each variable depends on the underlying factors, e.g., 
X2, X6, and X5 are the most prominent PVs. In this iteration, the most prominent vectors 
































 To determine the percent variability explained by each principal component, and 
ultimately find the most extreme points in the data, Hotelling’s T-square was calculated 
and is shown in Figure 5.15: 
 
Figure 5.15: Hotelling’s T-square statistic, showing the percent variability explained by 
each principal component. 
 
Based on these findings, the PCA algorithm suggests that process variables X2 and X6 
(corresponding to moderator temperature and calandria inlet pressure) have the strongest 
effect on signal oscillations.  
 
5.3.2 Results—wPCA  
 While PCA algorithm has shown promising results, it is known to be less than 
optimal for large sets of data where data clusters and outliers are not identified in advance 
or their existence is unknown. Weighted PCA (wPCA) was performed on the selected data 
set by using the inverse variances of the ratings as weights to improve the robustness of the 
algorithm. The same general approach is used as in the PCA method. In this case, however, 
the data is standardized by assigning weights to the mean and the outer products that form 
the covariance matrix. This puts a weight on every point in the training data and makes 
identification of extreme points easier. The scores for each principal component were 
calculated by transforming the original data into the space of the principal components. 
The original data matrix is the same 14x2200 dataset used in the previous analysis. The 
principal components define these original data (in the new coordinate system). The scaled 












and rated data is projected onto the first two principal components. Data points farthest 
away from the center of the cluster are outliers, i.e., more extreme than the rest of the data, 
as presented in Figure 5.16: 
 
Figure 5.16: Principal component space for sample data processed with wPCA algorithm. 
 
Weighted coefficients are determined first. Since the coefficient matrix was not orthogonal 
it had to be transformed. Next, all fourteen variables were plotted in the graph shown in 
Figure 5.17:  
 
Figure 5.17: Results of wPCA analysis—blue vectors correspond to process variables that 
have the primary effect. 
  


























































Each variable is represented by a blue vector, where its length and direction 
indicated how much each variable impacts the principal components. For example, on the 
horizontal axis of component 1, variables X3, X4, X8, and X9 have positive coefficients 
(in the upper right side of the plot). Variables X3 and X4 have the largest coefficients and 
will be selected for fault reconstruction scenario. Process variables with negative 
coefficients will not be considered in the follow-up analysis. Thus, weighted PCA 
identified X3, X4, X8, and X9 vectors as requiring further attention. In the data model of 
this study, X3 and X4 correspond to moderator pump-bearing temperature for Pump 1 and 
Pump 2, respectively. X8 corresponds to the average liquid zone level (AZL) measurement 
and X9 to zone 6 level. Next, the eigenvalues of a correlation matrix were sorted in 
descending order of magnitude and plotted as shown below to determine the fraction of 
total variance in the data as represented by each principal component.  
It can be noted that there is a significant amount of variance between the first and 
second components, and together they explain roughly two-thirds of the total variability in 
the standardized ratings, as shown in Figure 5.18.  
 
Figure 5.18: Pareto plot of variance distribution shows components that explain 95% of 
the total variance. 
 
 The two cases, one based on PCA and the other based on wPCA, produced slightly 
inconsistent results. Application of the PCA to the 108x108 parameter matrix with 2,200 
instances identified X2 and X6 factors corresponding to moderator temperature and 





































calandria inlet pressure, while the weighted PCA determined two (2) variables with the 
most covariance, namely X3, X4, corresponding to pump-bearing temperature for Pump 1 




Table 5.7: Results of PCA and wPCA analysis. X3 and X4 correspond to the moderator pump bearing temperature change during the 































PCA X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 





Cross-Validation Case 1: Normal Operation 
 Since the unsupervised models are used in this study, standard techniques for cross-
validation do not perform well. However, the results can still be looked at in relation to the previous 
engineering analysis and other studies on the moderator pump properties and temperature 
distributions. Such validation was performed using field data collected for the moderator pump-
bearing temperature during normal operation and referenced with the detector response, as shown 
below in Figure 5.19.   
 
Figure 5.19: Neutron detector signals (yellow and blue) plotted against moderator pump bearing 
temperature. Pump1 shown in white, Pump2 shown in red. 
 
 Examination of this trend suggests that activation of Pump 2 is indicated by the increase in 
the pump-bearing temperature (shown in white). The Pump 1 temperature drop (shown in brown) 
indicates that the pump was swapped out of duty. The onset of noticeable detector signal variations 
is coincidental with the pump duty swap timestamp. This observation suggests that changes in 
moderator parameters (coincidental or causational with main moderator duty pump swap) are 
intimately related to the cause of signal oscillations, in line with the PCA/wPCA predictions. This 
leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis: the pump duty swap event causes the onset 
of significant detector signal variations (oscillations). To validate this hypothesis, fault diagnosis 
and reconstruction of fault propagation scenario was conducted next. A high number of potential 
causes of disturbance was reduced from 108 to only two: changes in the temperature and pressure 





Figure 5.20: Location of LZ units and in-core detectors in zones 6/8 and 7/9. 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Plant process mapping. Moderator pump system (P1 and P2) and pump circuit are 
shown in relation to the calandria. 
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This process schematic can be simplified to focus on the moderator pumps P1 and P2 and their 
impact on the calandria inlet temperature and pressure, particularly in the axial zone pair 6/8 and 
7/9. This is shown in Figure 5.22, where the fault can be reconstructed due to the effects of Pump 
1 duty swap.  
 
 
Figure 5.22: Fault propagation scenario based on wPCA results. 
 
 Two case studies were selected for validation exercise; one corresponds to normal 
operation of the plant, while the other represents a transient condition.  
 
Cross Validation Case 2: Reverse Operation 
A period when pump duty swap was reversed was examined to determine if the reversal of changes 
in pump-bearing temperature will result in reversal of signal variations. Two consecutive pump 
swap events (indicated by the changes in pump-bearing temperature in Figure 5.23) were identified 






Figure 5.23: Two consecutive pump swaps indicated by the changes in pump bearing 
temperature for Pump 1 (shown in brown) and Pump 2 (shown in teal blue) are plotted along 
with the detector response (shown in blue and yellow). 
 
It can be noted that, before, the first pump swap detector signals were relatively steady. After the 
pumps had been swapped, detector signals experienced a high rate of variation. After the second 
pump swap had occurred, the signals returned to steady operation.  
 
Cross-Validation Case 3: Transient Conditions 
A transient condition case was selected next. In this instance, both pumps were simultaneously 
running for twenty minutes, which is highly unusual. Pump 1 (shown in dark navy blue in Figure 
5.24) was in service and was supposed to shut down at eleven-thirty but failed due to a circuit 
breaker malfunction. Pump 2 (shown in light blue in Figure 5.24) was in standby mode before 
eleven-thirty and was put on duty once Pump 1 was shut down. This resulted in the approximately 
twenty-minute interval when both pumps were running at the same time. Similar to previous 
trends, detector signals are shown in yellow and blue, and corresponding control responses are 
shown in red and blue. Variations in detector signals and controller levels are quite noticeable 




Figure 5.24: Both pumps running in parallel resulted in a steady period with minimal signal 
variations. 
 
The results of this study suggest that pump duty swap is likely the cause of signal variations. In 
this unusual case of two moderator pumps running in parallel, detector signal variations disappear 
during the simultaneous dual run.  
 
5.3.3  Results—NLPCA 
In the previous analysis, an assumption was made to overlook the fact that the application 
of linear PCA to nonlinear data may be inadequate. To make the proposed PCA methods suitable 
for a wide range of field applications, compression, reconstruction, and denoising in nonlinear data 
must be addressed. Experimental, nonlinear extension of PCA algorithm was developed in the 
open research. The algorithm was tested and optimized for use in this thesis using MATLAB 






 Whenever a high-frequency oscillation occurs, the resultant behavior will permeate 
throughout the entire system. Since high-frequency oscillations cause nonlinear system response, 
a simple way of detecting the oscillating signals is to check for nonlinear behavior. An NLPCA 
model was built based on pattern recognition and feature extraction by the algorithm in a 3-D 
principal component space. Process data from the field, shown as blue dots, were processed and 
mapped into an NLPCA space, as shown below. Initially, the network is trained with 14x1100 PV 
instances, representing a ten-minute interval of plant data. The algorithm starts with PCA 
preprocessing and linear weight initialization to begin NLPCA with the linear solution of a PCA. 
The dimensionality is still fourteen and is not reduced here, but the data space is rotated by the 
PCA. The data space of the first three (3) principal components is plotted, but if there are nonlinear 
components identified by the algorithm, they will be originally located in the full fourteen-
dimensional space. The results of the initial network set up with 1,200 iterations are shown below:  
# version: 0.90 
# network  type: bottleneck 
# training mode: hierarchic 
# hierarchic layer: 3  
# hierarchic coefficients: 1    1    1 0.01 
# number of components: 3 
# network architecture: [14-8-3-8-14] 
# weight decay: ON,  coefficient = 0.01 
# PCA pre-processing by 'pre_pca' 
#  using first 14 of 14 PCA components 
# data scaling, set max std to 0.1 (scal=0.0114) 
# initializing weights using: set_weights_linear.m 
# network training 
 
# sorting components at iteration 1 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 3 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 23 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 55 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 1198 - done 
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  # sorting components at iteration 1199 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 1200 - done 
 
# network training - finished  
 
# Explained variance (see: net.variance) 
  # nonlinear PC 1: 76.58% 
  # nonlinear PC 2: 10.03% 
  # nonlinear PC 3: 6.57% 
 
Figure 5.25: Results of NLPCA shown in the case study. 
 
 In Figure 5.25, the first three (3) components of NLPCA are shown by grids. Each grid 
represents the two-dimensional subspace given by two components, while the third one is set to 
zero. This can also be described as the new coordinate system of the transformation. For this 
training case, the training and test errors are: 
trainerror =0.4857 




Next, the network is run with 14x2200 PV instances which represent a twenty-minute plant data 
interval for further training: 
 
# version: 0.90 
# network  type: bottleneck 
# training mode: hierarchic 
# hierarchic layer: 3  
# hierarchic coefficients: 1    1    1 0.01 
# number of components: 3 
# network architecture: [14-8-3-8-14] 
# weight decay: ON,  coefficient = 0.01 
# PCA pre-processing by 'pre_pca' 
#  using first 14 of 14 PCA components 
# data scaling, set max std to 0.1 (scal=0.0114) 
# initializing weights using: set_weights_linear.m 
# network training 
# ... 
 
  # sorting components at iteration 1 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 11 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 23 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 55 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 1198 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 1199 - done 
  # sorting components at iteration 1200 - done 
 
# network training - finished  
 
# Explained variance (see: net.variance) 
  # nonlinear PC 1: 75.53% 
  # nonlinear PC 2: 10.38% 
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  # nonlinear PC 3: 6.23% 
 
trainerror = 0.6246 
testerror =  0.7171 
 
The variance ratio of the first principal components is high enough in comparison to the others, 
and the gap between training error and validation error (testerror) gets smaller as the training 
process is repeated. The training error decreases sharply when the number of iterations increases 
and reaches a level of 0.6246 at 1,200 iteration. Also, the training error comes closer to the 
validation error, even though both are being increased as expected. The results of network training 
with twenty minutes of plant data is shown in Figure 5.26: 
 
Figure 5.26: Results of network training with twenty-minute plant data, 14x2200 PVs 
 
The hypothesis in this study is that if nonlinear system performance is identified, the onset of 
oscillations can be expected. The system in Figure 5.26 shows a linear behavior. Thus, the absence 
of oscillations in detector signal/LZC response can be confirmed. The training can stop at this time 
since the validation error (testerror) is minimized and is bigger than the training error (trainerror); 
thus, the network can generalize to unseen data.  
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 Next, a set of nonlinear data was used to validate the algorithm, as shown below in Figure 
5.27. Unlike the linear PCA used earlier, the NLPCA produced a nonlinear (curved) description 
of the data, as shown next in Figure 5.27. 
 
Figure 5.27: Results of NLPCA algorithm validated using nonlinear data. 
 
Typically, the test error of ANNs decreases monotonically as a function of the iteration number, 
while the training error also continuously decreases; however, such behavior may not occur in 
systems where the input data is corrupted by noise. The network training adjusts the internal 
weights of the network to minimize a predefined error measure. The magnitude of error describes 
the deviation of predicted outcomes from the observed ones where a large deviation suggests a 
poorly fitted model. For typical regression problems, the most commonly used error function is 
the mean square error (MSE). However, depending on the application, it is possible to train the 
network on different error functions to achieve optimal performance for specific performance 
criteria. In this study the computational speed is a critical parameter since the approach is suggested 
for large nonlinear numerical models in near real-time applications. Further network training 
results in minimizing a predefined error function.  
Next, the network performance is measured using test error validation. The “testerror” is 
calculated in the same way as the training error but on a different data set not used for network 
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training. The desired component values, or scores, are computed at the bottleneck layer where a 
reduction of the dimension of the data is performed. This portion of the work is not shown here 
but can be further developed in the future.  
 
5.3.4 NLPCA Cross-Validation of Results 
 Since the unsupervised models are used in this study, standard techniques for cross-
validation do not perform well. However, the results can still be looked at in relation to the previous 
engineering analysis and other studies on the moderator pump properties and temperature 
distributions.  
 Previous engineering analysis confirmed that the detector loops and zone controllers 
operated correctly in every case where signal oscillations were present. Moderator poison data and 
distribution patterns in the calandria were also examined to ensure that the zone level oscillation 
was not due to some local reactivity perturbation. Although the actual cause was not identified at 
the time, it was believed that the signal perturbations were caused by a change in moderator flow 
characteristics on the side of calandria corresponding to Pump 2, i.e., zones 6, 7, 8, and 9.  
 
Cross-Validation Study for NLPCA Results: 
Figure 5.28 shows results of a study on moderator temperature and flow distribution. This study 
modeled moderator inlet jets and internal heating in the calandria-like cylindrical vessel to 
represent the characteristics of a typical PHWR reactor. Recirculating jet-induced flow, heating of 
the water by volumetric heat generation, and a matrix of horizontal tubes parallel to the cylindrical 






Figure 5.28: Flow velocity and temperature during normal operating conditions [140]. 
 
The results shown in Figure 5.28 indicate that the inlet flow rate and heat load to the fluid differ 
noticeably between the east and west sides of the calandria, i.e., the split between the Pump 1 and 
Pump 2 injection nozzles is not even. The two main moderator pumps are both 100% duty pumps, 
and in terms of design there should be very few differences. During the manufacturing process, 
the effort is made to ensure that the hydraulic components, namely the impeller, are consistent 
between both pump assemblies. It is expected that the inlet header produced for each pump is 
slightly different due to trivial differences in manufacturing, servicing, etc. However, due to the 
site design requirements for placing the pump heat exchangers in two (2) separate rooms, the flow 
split is approximately 55% and 45%, which is likely to cause less flow on one side of the calandria 
than the other.  
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 Another significant issue for pump duty swaps is that for a very brief period, both pumps 
are online at the same time, which may cause some extra flow. This increase in feed to two pumps 
during that period can potentially introduce some turbulence in the piping. In the case study in this 
thesis, assuming moderator temperature coefficient is 0.067mk/degree C at 60oC and the reactivity 
worth of all fourteen zones is 6mk, then a typical increase of 6% zone level during an oscillation 
event corresponds to: 
 
2*0.06*6/14 = 0.05 mk or slightly higher than 1oC   [Equation 5.1] 
 
This is in a reasonable agreement with the assumption that slight localized changes in moderator 
temperature, approximately 1oC, may lead to zone level increase in the affected zones. Since the 
zones 6/8 and 7/9 are closest to moderator Pump 2 injection nozzles, it is possible that moderator 
temperature is slightly different when produced by this pump.  
 Thus, both linear and nonlinear PCA algorithms suggest that moderator circulation at the 
calandria nozzles is varied, which produces local variations of the moderator temperature. These 
artificially induced perturbations lead to variations in localized detector measurements. The 
resolution of this phenomenon is outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
5.4 Model Validation with Residual Noise, Oscillation, and Transient Data 
 To validate the detector model with noise and oscillation transient data, it was further tuned 
for the three additional cases, thus extending the existing detector modeling methodology to be 
applicable to operational transients. The analysis consists of three test case simulations. In each 
case, trends of the DSC output with the old and new gains are presented for comparison, followed 
by a single trend of the difference in DSC output due to the gain change. This last trend represents 
the MTT loss. 
 
Case 1: Residual Detector Noise 
The model for detector AF8G, shown in Figure 5.29 below, represents a modified detector model 
to accurately show the noisy detector’s response to fueling of a nearby channel. Plant data is used 




Figure 5.29: AF8G detector developed for this thesis to model noise during a fueling operation. 
 
This case analyzed the impact of the gain factor change on the MTT during refueling of fuel 
channel P03, using plant data. Fuel channel P03 was selected for two reasons. Firstly, it is known 
to cause a high response—about 8% in this case. It is normal for certain four-bundle region 
channels and eight-bundle region channels refueled near detectors to show a high response. Eight-
bundle region channels can have a high detector response because replacing eight bundles with 
fresh fuel will cause a localized power increase. In certain four-bundle and eight-bundle region 
channels, the bundles pushed from positions 2 and 3 are generally near their Pu peak and are, 
therefore, relatively high-power bundles when pushed through the channel. Therefore, due to either 
Xenon-free fresh fuel or high reactivity bundles near their Pu peak, a high response may be 
observed while fueling specific channels. Secondly, it is located in zone 7/9, which is prone to 
significant detector oscillations. The historical oscillation data was input into the detector AF8G 
model to determine its response to fueling conditions. The simulation was run for both old and 
new gain settings. The DSC difference (new versus old gains) is shown below in Figures 5.30 and 
5.31. The yellow trace in Figure 5.30 represents the as-is configuration, the purple trace represents 




Figure 5.30: DSC comparison—AF8G response to fueling U5-P03.
 
Figure 5.31: DSC difference—AF8G response to fueling channel P03; the maximum MTT loss 
is ≤0.5%. 
 
The difference between the two traces in Figure 5.31 indicates the maximum MTT loss of 0.5%. 
These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions and are within the bounding refueling 
cases discussed earlier.  
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Case 2: Detector Signal Oscillation 
The model for the detector (designated as AF13H) was developed to accurately depict the noisy 
detector’s response to fueling of a nearby fuel channel, S07. The detector signal with oscillations 
is used as an input into the model signal building block. A circuit for processing plant data is added 
to the model to enable comparison of the predicted response with the actual plant data, as shown 
in Figure 5.32. 
 
 
Figure 5.32: A detector model for detector AF13H. This model represents detector response 
during fueling coincidental with signal oscillations.  
 
This case analyzed the impact of the gain factor change on MTT during refueling of channel S07 
using plant data. Channel S07 was selected for analysis because of the signal oscillations, which 
are observed to occur shortly after the completion of fueling. The results of the DSC comparison 
are shown in Figure 5.33, where the yellow trace represents the as-is configuration, and the purple 




Figure 5.33: DSC comparison—detector AF13H response to fueling channel S07. 
 
The difference between the two traces in Figure 5.34 indicates that the maximum MTT loss occurs 
during the noted variations and has a magnitude of 0.25%. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions and are within the bounding refueling cases discussed earlier.  
 
Figure 5.34: DSC difference—detector AF13H response to fueling channel S07; the maximum 
MTT loss is ≤0.25%. 
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Case 3: Power Ramp-Up—Transient Data  
This transient condition case was selected next to test the model response over the full range of 
power spectrum using historical power ramp-up data. A detector (designated as AF3H) was 
chosen to represent response during the reactor unit start-up, particularly in terms of the model 
dynamic changes in reactor power. Plant data is used as input into the model signal building 
block, as shown in Figure 5.35. 
 
Figure 5.35: A detector model developed for detector AF3H to represent a power increase and 
dynamic response during reactor unit start-up. 
   
This final case considers the impact of the proposed gain factor change on the power raise profile 
after an outage. Power changes during start-up may be significantly greater than those caused by 
fueling. This was the primary reason this case was chosen for scrutiny. Data for analysis was 
collected for detector AF3H reactor start-up in May 2015. The results are shown below in Figure 
5.36, where the yellow trace represents the as-is configuration, and the purple trace represents the 





Figure 5.36: Reactor power ramp-up profile, May 2015. 
 
The difference between the two traces in Figure 5.37 indicates the maximum the maximum MTT 
loss of 1.4%. 
 




Throughout the ramp-up, the MTT remained greater than 10% FP with the revised gains. However, 
the impact of each step in power change on the MTT can be distinctly observed in the spikes in 
figure 5.37. The maximum MTT loss is 1.4% and occurs after the power raise from 63 to 90%. 
The effect on a step change in power is then calculated to a first order as follows: 
 
ΔMTT = ΔPower (New Static Gain/Old Static Gain -1) [Equation 5.2] 
 
The result of this calculation is:  
(90 − 63) ∗
.
.
− 1 = 2.1%. 
 
This exceeds the stylized ramp case in the FUELPIN prediction.  
 
5.5 DSC Gain Optimization with GA 
 The solution to the DSC case study problem where the MTT loss exceeded the boundary 
condition of 1.0%, discussed in the previous section, was obtained using the genetic algorithm 
solver in MATLAB.  The initial results for the optimized DSC gain solution are: [K1, K2, K3] = 
[1.105, -0.035, -0.070]. The following Simulink DSC model, shown in Figure 5.38, was developed 
to visualize the solution, and represents a breakdown of the DSC state space model into a form 
that explicitly shows the gain parameters. 
 
Figure 5.38: The breakdown of the DSC state space model to show the gain parameters. 
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The impact of the GA DSC gains on the MTT for the reactor power ramp-up case study is shown 
in the trend in Figure 5.39 below: 
 
 
Figure 5.39: The MTT loss with the GA-optimized gains is shown for the ramp-up case. 
 
Similar to the ramp-up case, the required safety analysis PF improvement target of 3% was met. 
The margin loss during the reactor power ramp-up with the new GA gains is 0.88%. This is 
contrasted against the design gain case, where the margin loss is 1.4%. 
 
Additional Tuning: 
With subsequent model tuning (shown in Figure 5.40) and additional iterations of the algorithm, 
the results of the GA run (including diagnostic, and iteration data) were further tuned and the 




Figure 5.40: The final Simulink model with the breakdown of the DSC state space model to 
show the gain parameters. 
 
The margin loss during the reactor power ramp-up with the GA gains is 0.8%. This is contrasted 
against the design limit case, where the margin loss is 1.4%. The impact of the GA DSC gains on 
the MTT for the reactor power ramp-up case is shown in Figure 5.41: 
 
Figure 5.41: The MTT loss with the final GA-optimized gains is shown for the ramp-up case. 
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Thus, it can be concluded that the GA gains are an improvement over the design limit solution, 
meeting safety requirements and leaving a margin for further improvement in the future. It is 
importance to note that the obtained optimized results may not represent the best possible solution 
for DSC gains. There is no guarantee that a solution will be found or that a solution will be optimal. 
New generations of solutions are iteratively produced and evaluated until a termination condition 
is reached, e.g., if the desired fitness level has been attained. Using the GA method, it is possible 
to obtain efficiency improvements, which is shown in the thesis.  
In this case, the margin loss during the reactor power ramp-up with the GA gains is 0.88%. This 
is contrasted against the design limit case, where the margin loss is 1.4%. With subsequent 
iterations, it is possible to achieve further improvement to 0.8%. Thus, with the use of the proposed 
methods, the GA gains are an improvement over the design limit solution. Further gains can be 
made if boundary conditions are tightened during subsequent GA runs based on past solution 
results. This, for example, can be done to ensure the solution will meet DSC hardware limitations. 
 
5.6 Risk Estimation with FSN—Results 
 In this section, the result of an FSN/Bayesian-based approach for risk estimation (discussed 
in Chapter 3) is demonstrated considering the impact of detector noise and signal oscillations. The 
historical plant data was used to determine the acceptability of the risk increment. In this case, the 
process is subject to the change of gain, change of input signal, detector bias, and change of 
variance in the measurement disturbance. Therefore, the detector can be shown as follows: 
y = Ku + f + e   [Equation 5.3] 
 
),0( 2Ne                 [Equation 5.4] 
 
where: 
 y – sensor reading, 
 K – process gain, K = [1, 0] corresponding to normal and abnormal operation, 
 u – input, u = [-1, 0, and 1], 
 f – sensor bias, f= [0 ,1] for bias and non-bias,  
 e – noise,  
 
2 – variance, 




Next, the conditional probability distribution (the detector reading node) is built according to noise 
distribution equation. The joint distribution among the remaining six (6) random variables can be 
established for: 
 sensor bias,  
 process input,  
 process gain, 
 noise variance,  
 noise,  
 sensor reading,  
 
Through Bayes’s theorem, probabilistic inferences are made, e.g., for a given time instance, there 
are two readings available, namely the input reading and detector output reading:  u =1, y = 0.7.  
Next, the following posterior (probabilities conditioned on the measurements) can be calculated 
as:  
 %97)(  EBiasSensorP , 
 %7.98)(Pr  EAbnormalocesGainP , 
 %1.74)(  EnormalnceNoiseVariaP , where E represents all evidence (measurements) 
available.  
  
Based on the results of the Bayesian calculation, it can be concluded, with at least 97% probability, 
that the detector in question had bias, and process gain is abnormal. Also, the results show that 
noise variance is likely to be normal with 74.1% probability. Once noise is confirmed, a decision 
to continue operation of the system for a short period of time (e.g., one (1) week or one (1) month), 
must be made.   
 
Case 1: Detector Noise 
In this example, this neutron detector is assumed to be in a particular configuration (detector noise 
identified based on the noisy sensor analysis) for one (1) month. The detector in this case belongs 
to the equipment class of NOP_Det_01 with a failure mode (FM) of noise or NS_01. The 
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consequence of this FM (FM_Conseq = PS_01) is the inability to continue system operation, as 















Table 5. 8: System equipment, FM, and consequence table for the detector in this case study. The detector belongs to the equipment 




The following sample failure data was collected and processed using an FSN, as shown in 
Table 5.9: 
 
Table 5.9:  Failure data for Case 1—equipment class is neutron detectors, and the failure 
mode is “functional failure—noise.” 
Equipment Class            
Eq_Class_ID 
Failure Mode           
FM_ID 
Highest Failure 
Rate  (f/1000 yrs) 
NOP_Det FF_001 (noise_HIGH) 0.9 
NOP_Det FF_001 (noise_LOW) 0.1 
 
 
Next, it is necessary to decide whether there will be a significant safety impact if the system 
remains in service. Per the collected data, the failure rates can be determined as shown in 
in Table 5.10: 
 
Table 5.10: Breakdown of failure data for Case 1—equipment class is neutron detectors, 
and the failure mode is “functional failure—noise.” 
Failure Rate  FR (f/1000y)  FM_ID Rate 
2.0E-04 
(f/m/h) 
Highest  NOP_Det_FF-001 0.9 
Lowest  NOP_Det_FF-002 0.1 
Discarded  None   
Geometric mean   - 0.3 
Selected FR NOP_Det_FF-001 0.9 
MTTR for the selected FR NOP_Det_FF-001 12 





The instantaneous risk is calculated as 2*10-4/year. The sum of all risks of all maintenance 
activities (ΣRmtce) is 5*10-6/year, while the current risk baseline frequency is 2*10-5/year. 
The available margin can be calculated as: 
 
2*10-4/year - 2*10-5/year = 18*10-5/year 
 
If the instantaneous risk is 2*10-4/year , the Risk Increment can be calculated as follows: 
RI=(IRi – BR)* ΔT/8760hr = ((IRi – BR)* 0.0821 =1.482*10-5=1.5*10-5/year 
 
In this case, the magnitude of the acceptable risk increment (RI), including all other 
maintenance activities, must be limited to 10% of the available margin: 
 
(RI +ΣRmtce*4)= (1.5*10-5+ 5*10-6)*4 =20-6*4=8*10-5/year 
 
This is significantly above the 0.2*10-5/year limit stipulated above. Therefore, an 
immediate compensatory action is required for this detector.  
 
Case 2: Signal Oscillations 
In this example, a neutron detector is assumed to be in a particular configuration (frequent 
signal oscillations) for two (2) weeks. It is necessary to determine whether there will be a 
significant safety impact if the system remains in service. Historical failure data was 
collected for this case, as shown in Table 5.11 and 5.12 below. 
 
Table 5.11: Failure data for Case 2—equipment class is neutron detectors, and the failure 
mode is “functional failure—oscillation.” 
Equipment Class            
Eq_Class_ID 
Failure Mode           
FM_ID 
Highest Failure Rate  
(f/1000 yrs) 







Table 5.12: Breakdown of failure data for Case 2—equipment class is detectors, and the 
failure mode is “functional failure—oscillation.” 
Failure Rate  FR (f/1000y)  FM_ID Rate 
1.5E-04 (f/m/h) 
Highest  NOP_Det_FF-003 11.9 
Lowest  NOP_Det_FF-003 11.9 
Discarded  None   
Geometeric mean    11.9 
Selected FR NOP_Det_FF-001 11.9 
MTTR for the selected FR NOP_Det_FF-001 3 
FR for the required FM FF_003 0.9 
 
 
The instantaneous risk is calculated as 1.5*10-4/year. The sum of all risks of all 
maintenance activities (ΣRmtce) is 8*10-6/year while the current risk baseline frequency is 
2*10-5/year. In this case, the available margin can be calculated as: 
 
1*10-4/year - 2*10-5/year = 8*10-5/year 
 
Thus, for the risk activity of two (2) weeks that introduces an instantaneous risk of 1.5*10-
4/year, the RI can be calculated as follows: 
 
RI=(IRi – BR)* 336/8760 =(1.5*10-4-0.2*10-4)*336/8760=(5.0*10-6)/year 
 
This risk activity meets the limiting criterion since the associated RI is 6.2% (i.e., less than 
10%) of the available margin of 8*10-5/year. Therefore, immediate compensatory action is 
not required for this detector.  
 
Case 3: Aggregate Risk—Coincidental Noise and Signal Oscillations 
A component/system failure rate and test interval can be assigned to the basic failure event 
to derive a failure-on-demand probability. For example, for a particular neutron detector, a 
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failure rate and test interval are assigned to the component to derive a failure-on-demand 
probability, as shown in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.13: Various failure rates for neutron detectors obtained using historical data. 
Highest Failure Rate (f/1000y) 0.1 
Lowest Failure Rate (f/1000y) 0.0045 
Discarded failure rate (f/1000y) 0 
Mean of failure rates (f/1000y) 0.021213203 
Selected failure rate (f/1000y) 0.1 
MTTR for selected failure rate (hours) 40 
 
 
Next, the three (3) most prominent failure mode IDs are selected for analysis as shown in 
Table 5.14 below: 
 
Table 5.14: Sample failure rates for three (3) separate failure modes affecting the 
detector. 





The failure rate for selected failure modes is then calculated as follows in Table 5.15:  
 
Table 5.15: Calculated failure modes for the selected FM_IDs. 






The aggregate risk due to both types of degradation in the system can be calculated as: *10-
6 +5*10-6=13*10-6/year. If the acceptable risk due to all degradation is defined as 25% of 
the available margin, then the aggregate risk of 13*10-6/year can be expressed as 16.2%. 
This is still below the limiting criterion, and immediate detector replacement is not required 
as shown in Figure 5.42.  The risk increment of 5*10-6 /year, shown in blue is less than the 
10% of the available margin of 8*10-5/year. 
Figure 5.42:  Updated risk profile, where risk increment changes over time due to system 
configuration, e.g., detector noise. 
 
Based on the above discussion, an immediate detector replacement is not required, and 
delaying detector replacement can be justified. However, some mitigating actions are 
needed since there is a significant safety impact if the system is allowed to remain in service 
in its current state.  
 The risk due to the detector behavior is defined by two (2) quantities: the magnitude 
(severity) of the possible adverse consequences and the likelihood (probability) of 
occurrence of each consequence. The consequences can be expressed numerically, and 
their likelihoods of occurrence can be expressed as probabilities or frequencies (i.e., the 
number of occurrences or the probability of occurrence per unit time). The total risk is the 
sum of the products of the consequences multiplied by their probabilities. The magnitude 
of risk defines the risk category of the channel, e.g., the highest risk factor of “2” is assigned 
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based on the probability of a complete shutdown system trip due to the detector response. 
This is summarized in Table 5.16 below. 
 Initially it was assumed that all channels would fall into one of two categories, risk 
category 1 or risk category 2, since there was not enough current operating experience on 
how these channels respond. In this study, it was conservatively assumed that under 
abnormal circumstances (low zone levels, high burnup, and low MTT) there is a low risk 
of channel or completed trips. Subsequently, category 1 was further divided into two (2) 
subcategories, 1A and 1B, based on the projected magnitude of risk. Category 1A contains 
low-risk channels that could result in single-channel or full trips. Category 1B risk channels 
contain a high risk of single-channel trips, but there is no risk of completed system trips. 
Although the production risk is low for these channels, all neutron detector trips are 
reportable to the federal regulator and should be avoided.  
 
Table 5.16: Risk categorization matrix. The highest risk value is assigned to a complete 
shutdown system trip.  
Risk Value Definition 
2 High risk of a complete shutdown system trip 
1B Single-channel trip 
1A Low risk but potential for trip 
 
 
Category-2 risk contains high-risk channels where completed trips could occur, 
based on detector location and operating experience. Risk category information for all 
reactor channels is analyzed next. Initially, no channels are categorized in relation to risk 
estimated for fueling operation near in-core detectors. With the static FSN, the locations of 








Table 5.17: Categorization of all eight-bundle channels according to the risk matrix. 
 
Risk Cat 2 Risk Cat 1B Risk Cat 1A 
D05 J02 G02 
D20 J23 G23 
E04 K01 H02 
E21 K24 H23 
F03 P01 R02 
F22 P24 R23 
S02 Q02 U04 
S23 Q23 U21 
T03  V05 
T22  V20 
Y12  X11 
Y13  X14 
 
 
Based on the risk category, a set of mitigating actions can be developed for each risk factor 
as shown in Table 5.18 below: 
 
Table 5.18: Actions for each risk category. 
 
Risk 
Value Definition Actions prior to Fueling  
2 
High risk of a complete 
shutdown system trip 
• Ensure at least 12% MTT prior to fueling 
• Ensure no channels are rejected during 
fueling 
1B Single-channel trip 
• Ensure at least 10% MTT prior to fueling 
• Ensure no channels are rejected during 
fueling 
1A Low risk but potential for trip 
• Ensure at least 8% MTT prior to fueling 






Based on this guidance, the appropriate action is taken in accordance with the risk 
categorization, as shown in Figure 5.43.  
 
 
Figure 5.43: Flowchart for action response in case of the detector noise/malfunction 
challenging MTT prior to fueling.  
 
The detector H3 shows high response during steady-state operation and presents a potential 
risk for fueling, as shown in Chapter 4. Noise on detector H3 is significantly higher than 
on the adjacent detector G12 and often challenges both MTT limits. Based on the risk 
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mitigation matrix, the reactor power was de-rated at 23:02 to bring the detector signal back 
into the allowable MTT. The resultant impact on MTT is shown below in Figure 5.44.  
 
 
Figure 5.44: Operational response to a high-risk trend developing for detector AF3H. 
Reactor power is de-rated at 23:02 to increase the available MTT and bring the detector 
response back into the acceptable band (in red). 
 
Once the model is established using historical data, the detector response data are collected 
daily and trended to determine the risk factor for all channels. As the new information 
becomes available, the model is modified to improve accuracy and completeness. The 
initial channel table is updated, as shown below, along with the channel risk prioritization 
map. Since enough channels were confirmed to fall under the risk criteria for 1A or 1B, 
this category was modified into two (2) independent categories, B and C, with the 
associated risk factors of 10% and 8% risk, respectively. The channel mapping is updated 
to reflect the latest findings. The risk categorization in Table 5.19 applies any time four (4) 
bundles are fueled in the four-bundle region or eight (8) bundles are fueled in the eight-





Table 5.19: The updated channel table. Channels are updated as the new 
information becomes available. A4, B4 = four-bundle push; A8, B8 = eight-bundle push; 
C = four-bundle and eight-bundle push. 
 
 
5.7 Summary of Results 
The results of testing new detector models, denoising and dimensionality reduction, PF 
optimization, and risk estimation results are summarized in Table 5.20, while final 
Risk Category A (12% MTT) 
Risk Category B (10% 
MTT)  
Risk Category 
C (8% MTT) 
A4-bundle A8-bundle B4-bundle B8-bundle 4/8bundle 
J03 D04 K02 F03 G02 
J22 D05 K23 F22 G23 
K03 D20 M04 J02 S02 
K22 D21 M21 J23 S23 
L04 E04 O03 Q01 X11 
L21 E21 O04 Q24 X14 
P03 H02 O21 T03  
P22 H23 O22 T22  
P04 J01 P02 V05  
P21 J24 P23 V20  
 K01 Q03   
 K24 Q22   
 L01 W12   
 L24 W13   
 O01    
 O24    
 P01    
 P24    
 Q02    
 Q23    
 R02    
 R23    
 U04    
 U21    
 Y12    
 Y13    
169 
 
discussions of these results regarding the research objectives, along with conclusions and 




Table 5.20: Results summary table. 
 
 
Case Description  Execution Performance Criteria Discussion of Results  
5.1.1 Model Validation  Detector responses to 
fueling and oscillations 
assumed to be 10% of 
full power and 6% 
respectively. 
Detector response to the 
power ramp of 16% in ten 
(10) seconds. 
Comparison of old versus new 
DSC gains and comparison to 
FUELPIN predictions 
5.1.2 DSC Difference 16% Ramp/10 sec for 
aged detectors 
MTT loss ≤1% The maximum MTT loss due to 
the gain change was 1.0% 
5.2.1 Denoising and 
Smoothing of Data 
LPF SNR ≥110/1 SNR of 122.9 (Tri),  92.5 (Rec),  
142.1 (Gaussian),  92.5 (S-G) 
5.2.2 Denoising and 
Smoothing of Data 
with WTA 





PCA 95% of the total variance. X2 and X6 (calandria inlet 
temperature and pressure) 
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Table 5.20: Results summary table (continued). 
5.3.2 Dimensionality 
Reduction 
wPCA 95% of the total variance. X3, X4 (pump bearing 








NLPCA Check for non-linear behavior 
based on pattern recognition 
in a 3D PC space. 
The training error decreases sharply when 
the number of iterations increases and 
reaches a level of 0.6246 at 1200 
iteration.  
5.4. DSC Model  for 
Transient 
Scenarios 
Application of the 
new gains  
Residual DSC error ≤1% Min. residual DSC error = 0.25%, max. 
residual DSC error =2.1% for transient 
power case. 
5.5 Optimization of 
DSC gain 
coefficients 
GA solver in 
MATLAB 
Residual DSC error ≤1% Min. residual DSC error = 0.8%, max. 
residual DSC error = 0.88% for transient 
power case. 
5.6 Risk Estimation FSN Qualitative/quantitative 
Case 1: (RI) = 8*10–5/year (significantly 
above the 0.2*10–5/year). An immediate 
compensatory action is required.  
Case 2: (RI) = 6.2% (i.e., less than 10%) 









Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work 
This final chapter of the thesis presents conclusions, significance of results, and 
suggestions for future work.  
 
6.1. Conclusions 
With the nuclear energy industry realigning itself toward life-extension projects, 
additional tools and methods are required to ensure that effective performance optimization 
methods are available. Commercial awareness is increasingly becoming one of the major 
business drivers for all utilities. Initiatives that have a real impact on the successful delivery 
of life-extension projects are a welcome addition to an existing suite of tools and 
approaches. As discussed in Chapter 1, the main problem to address in this thesis is 
improving the effective PFs for aged detectors, which may delay the need for detector 
replacement. Therefore, the overarching target of this research was to propose a 
methodology for optimization of detector performance to mitigate detector aging effects 
without adversely affecting the operational MTT. To achieve this objective, the following 
work was performed: 
 
1. In-core neutron detector design and properties were analyzed, and new detector models 
were developed using mathematical models. A simulation model for aged in-core 
neutron detector was developed in Simulink. The model employed two noise reduction 
techniques, LPF and WTA. Resultant SNRs were used as performance criterion to 
compare the two methods.  LPF yielded the maximum SNR of 142.5 as 
compared to 31.5 for WTA. For dimensionality reduction of the detector data, three 
methods were investigated: PCA, wPCA, and NLPCA with ANNs. Both PCAs and 
NLPCAs were successful at reducing the dimensionality of the dataset and identifying 
patterns of interest.  
 
2. The model was validated using plant data for the case of 16% power ramp in 10 
seconds, which represents the same theoretical scenario as used in the similar case in 
FUELPIN reference code. The obtained residual DSC error was compared to the 
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bounding criteria (≤1% loss of MTT) by FUELPIN code. The model performed in 
agreement with the theoretical predictions with no discrepancies.  
 
3. The model was customized to include three typical plant transient scenarios: detector 
noise, acyclic detector signal variations, and a full power ramp-up. The three  resultant 
models were validated for the case of maximum DSC gain settings, which represent 
the worst-case scenario for each transient. The results were compared to the predictions 
for the maximum residual DSC error. In the first two cases, the residual DSC error was 
found to be acceptable (≤1% loss of MTT). The maximum loss to MTT in the first case 
of a noisy detector was ≤0.5%, while the maximum loss to MTT in the second case of 
a detector signal oscillation was ≤0.25%. The results of the third case (simulating a full 
power ramp-up maneuver) were poor, i.e., 1.4% DSC error.  
 
4. To translate the maximum DSC error into the effective MTT loss, an equation was 
developed for calculation of MTT for changing power conditions. The result for this 
case study was found to be 2.1%. 
 
5. To improve the impact on the MTT, the models were further tuned with the new DSC 
gain settings, obtained with an enhanced GA. A GA was selected as a heuristic 
technique for solving optimization and search problem where the DSC function was 
the objective function and the detector function was the fitness function. Two new sets 
of DSC gain constants were obtained and used to solve the power ramp-up case. This 
allowed reduction of the maximum MTT loss to 0.88% and subsequently to 0.8%. In 
spite of the solution potentially being not optimal because of the application of a 
heuristic technique, the results indicate that the proposed algorithm was successful at 
reducing the residual DSC to less than the bounding criteria ( ≤1% loss of MTT).  
 
6. To integrate the suggested approach for detector life extension, this thesis proposed the 
use of FSN for estimation of instantaneous risk due to detector degradation. Compared 
with the PRA, the FSN approach had a significant advantage in the fact that the plant 
data could be continuously collected, expanded, and transferred as needed. Fault 
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probabilities calculated by FSN were dynamically updated as new knowledge became 
available or in cases of missing or incomplete data. This was demonstrated in three case 
studies where system unavailability statistics based on the assumed component failure 
rates were used in a qualitative/quantitative manner for risk estimation. In these cases, 
it was assumed that due to a specific system configuration, a detector system would be 
required to be placed in an unusual state for a short duration. Risk evaluation could still 
be performed without waiting for the annual PRA model updates using the 
instantaneous risk estimated from the FSN and comparing it with the existing margin. 
The results showed that this approach could be used to enable risk-informed decisions 
for detector extensions and to delay the need for replacements.  
 
6.2. Significance of Results 
All steps in the proposed methodology were validated with actual operational data 
transients. It is expected that the work in this thesis will: 
 Provide NPP staff with additional confidence that the impact on MTT due to 
degradation in aged detectors’ PF is acceptable, 
 Support a possible strategy of delaying detector replacement, 
 Provide an option to avoid having to take compensatory penalties (with the 
potential for a reactor power de-rate). 
 
These contributions support several fundamental performance objectives, such as system 
availability, personnel safety, and economic costs:  
 
1. Availability: 
Findings of this thesis can be used to ensure that neutron detection systems can meet 




2. Personnel Safety: 
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Findings of this thesis can be used to justify the option of postponing the detector 
replacement until the planned refurbishment outage. The additional personnel radiation 
exposure (necessitated by replacement of neutron detector equipment in radioactive 
areas) and handling and disposal of additional radioactive wastes (generated by the 
detector replacement campaign) are expected to be significant. The work in this thesis 
helps ensure that worker radiation exposure is as low as practical and is comparable to 
industry peers. 
 
3. Economic Impacts: 
The findings of this thesis can be used to optimize the cost of maintenance as a 
percentage of the overall plant operation and maintenance cost. Operations control 
specialists can graphically view the risk state of the station and monitor ongoing and 
planned activities. The work in this thesis supports the extension to the life cycle of the 
equipment to obtain the most extended effective service life. A portion of the proposed 
methodology was used to implement one prototypical modification at an NPP. It is 
expected that, with time, this pilot implementation will serve as the basis for similar 
changes to the remaining detectors at the NPP in question. Thus, the need for ad-hoc 
detector replacement before the planned refurbishment campaign can be eliminated. 
  
6.3. Future Work 
 The scope of the operational cases analyzed in this thesis was narrowed to Pt-clad 
Inconel in-core neutron detectors. It can be further extended to perform a similar 
assessment before implementation of this methodology to other neutron detection 
instrumentation at NPPs. Trend analyses of the installed noise reduction modification and 
validation against the theoretical cases would be beneficial for both design validation and 
long-term aging management. A systematic approach to modeling detector response could 
be used to optimize ongoing verification of system unavailability models against operating 
experience. The comparison can be performed between the actual and assumed component 
failure rates and failure modes based on the near real-time plant performance data rather 
than information collected in the past to avoid large unexpected discrepancies in the system 
unavailability assumptions. This is particularly suitable for unavailability assessments 
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where some FMs are not amenable to numerical treatment, e.g., FMs for which no failure 
data exists, such as latent design or commissioning faults and or common-mode failures 
due to human interactions. 
 Since the primary focus of this work is on the overall methodology, only a brief 
investigation into optimization of data smoothing and filtering was conducted, and a 
limited set of filtering techniques was selected to explore the importance of denoising 
process data before future analysis. LPFs used in this study showed promise in terms of 
reducing the high-frequency components of a signal. One of the limitations noted for this 
method is that the low-frequency noise in the process signal is typically omitted in the 
analysis. Also, smoothing of data using sliding average filters comes at a price of some 
losses in signal shape, amplitude, and SNR versus the desired SNR values (e.g., 110:1 or 
better) or distortion of the true signal waveform. This can be further explored in future 
studies. 
 The wavelet transform method performed better in terms of computational time, 
which was an important criterion for real-time applications. Application of wavelet 
analysis techniques combined with careful optimization of smoothing of derivatives could 
be further investigated to produce better results in terms of an acceptable SNR and loss of 
signal amplitude. Thus, this method can produce better capabilities to eliminate the high-
frequency components of noise, where most of the white noise energy is concentrated, 
subsequently leading to SNR improvement. Another future exploration of this method over 
traditional LPFs can focus on numerically controlling the smoothing strength.  
 Although the work described in this thesis shows the application of FSN-based 
troubleshooting methods to a simple problem, the same approach can be expanded to apply 
to more complex problems and larger systems. Traditional methods such as PRA could 
benefit from the addition of FSN to address model uncertainties and provide a valuable 
tool to the implementation of risk and reliability analysis. This can be incorporated as early 
as the design phase to guide the development and verification of emergency operating 
procedures and assessment of the risk significance of mitigation systems. Furthermore, 
after the knowledge base has been sufficiently expanded and the accuracy of the forecasting 
based on the historical data reaches a certain level, the system can be used for real-time 
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forecasting fault propagation scenarios based on the real-time data. This can be a valuable 
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